19 research outputs found
Why Are Gender Quota Laws Adopted by Men? The Role of Inter- and Intra-Party Competition
In nearly every case of quota law adoption, the support of party elites is critical. But this raises a puzzle: What can motivate predominantly male elites to put these policies in place? This article uses a comparison of two sets of matched pair countriesâsimilar on background characteristics except for quota adoptionâto explore the motivations and role of male party elites in quota reform. The cases of Belgium and Austria, and Portugal and Italy highlight two key explanations. First, quota laws are likely to be supported and passed by parties threatened by a new, more progressive competitor on the left, as a way of claiming women voters back from the encroaching party (interparty competition). Second, quotas can be employed as a mechanism for party elites to gain power over candidate selection within their own parties in the face of entrenched local party monopolies (intraparty competition).</p
Women acting for women? An analysis of gender and debate participation in the British House of Commons 2005â2007
The recent push for more women parliamentarians around the world via positive action measures such as gender quotas naturally begs the question of whether the increased descriptive representation of women in parliament is making a substantive difference, in terms of the types of policies passed, behavioral norms, and procedures. How does the substantive representation of women take place? One way of measuring gendered impacts in politics is to look at the participation of Members of Parliament (MPs) in formal, parliamentary debate on key policy issues. It is reasonable to assume that one (though certainly not the only) measure of a good MP is his or her ability to contribute his or her voice and thoughts to public policy debates in parliament. Furthermore, if we consider women MPs representative of women in particular as a marginalized group, making their voices heard in parliamentary debates is perhaps one of the best ways of acting for women. As Melissa Williams (1998, 138) argues, the unique voice of women is a necessary component for women's political equality: It is not enough that women communicate their perspectives to men; a full respect for women's agency, and a full protection of their interests, requires that they act on their own behalf. Only through their legislative presence can women be sure that the âwoman's point of viewâ on each policy issue is formulated and expressed
Quotas and Party Priorities: Direct and Indirect Effects of Quota Laws
In light of increasing numbers of women in politics, extant research has examined the role of women in the parliamentary party on agenda-setting. This paper complements that literature by exploring the effect of a gendered institution theorized to promote both numbers of women and awareness of womenâs interests: gender quota laws. I suggest that after a quota law, parties could have incentives to either reduce (backlash effect) or increase (salience effect) attention to womenâs policy concerns. Using matching and regression methods with a panel data set of parties in advanced democracies, I find that parties in countries that implement a quota law devote more attention to social justice issues in their manifestos than similar parties in countries without a quota. Furthermore, the paper shows that this effect is driven entirely by the law itself. Contrary to expectations, quota laws are not associated with increases in women in my (short-term) sample; it is thus no surprise that no evidence of an indirect effect through numbers of women is found. I interpret the findings as evidence of quota contagion, whereby quotas cue party leaders to compete on gender equality issues
How corporate board quotas influence gender equality policies within companies
Gender quotas can increase the representation of women on corporate boards, but do they also encourage broader attitude shifts within a company? Drawing on a study of recent trends in Greece and Italy, Audrey Latura and Ana Catalano Weeks demonstrate that quotas can have an important spillover effect by encouraging corporate leadership to assign more importance to equality issues
Quotas and qualifications: the impact of gender quota laws on the qualifications of legislators in the Italian parliament
This article addresses concerns that candidates nominated because of gender quota laws will be less qualified for office. While questions of candidate quality have long been relevant to legislative behavior, quota laws requiring a certain percentage of candidates for national office to be women have generated renewed interest. Gender quotas are often perceived to reduce the scope of political competition. By putting gender identity center stage, they preclude the possibility that elections will be based on âideasâ or âmeritâ alone. Other electoral rules that restrict candidate selection, such as the centralization of candidate selection common in closed list PR systems, have been found to reduce the quality of candidates. Rules that open selection, such as primaries, result in higher quality candidates. We exploit the institutional design of Italyâs mixed electoral system in 1994, where quotas were applied only to the PR portion of the list, to compare the qualifications of men, women, and âquota womenâ. We estimate regressions on several measures of deputiesâ qualifications for office and performance in office. We find that unlike other rules limiting candidate selection, quotas are not associated with lower quality on most measures of qualifications. In fact, quota women have more local government experience than other legislators and lower rates of absenteeism than their male counterparts. Contrary to critics, quota laws may have a positive impact on legislator quality. Once the quota law was rescinded, quota women were less likely to be re-elected than non-quota women or men, which suggests that discrimination â not qualification â limits womenâs status as candidates
Recommended from our members
Identity and Policymaking: The Policy Impact of Gender Quota Laws
Does politician identity matter to policy outcomes? Political scientists tend to be skeptical of the idea because of the strong role of electoral incentives. Yet the argument for greater diversity in public office often relies upon exactly this claim. To make progress on this question, my dissertation examines the political impact of gender quota laws, which require all parties to include a percentage of women in their candidate lists.
I argue that quotas help overcome a political market failure, whereby group interests are unlikely to be represented in politics if the group faces high barriers to entry and their interests lie off the main left-right (class-based) dimension in politics. Using survey data, I show that the largest gender gap in advanced democracies exists on maternal employment, and it cuts across partisan ties. I evaluate the argument using a mixed methods approach, combining statistical analysis of time series data with qualitative evidence from two matched pair case studies -- Belgium and Austria, and Portugal and Italy. After showing that quota laws are one of the most important determinants of women's descriptive representation, I demonstrate that they also increase both party- and national-level attention to women's preferences. Implementing a quota law increases coverage of women's social policy concerns in manifestos, and raises public spending on child care, which encourages maternal employment. Evidence from case studies suggests that increased numbers of women and rising issue salience after a quota are both important mechanisms linking quotas to policy change.
Overall, the findings provide new insights about when and how politician identity is relevant to policies. Results point towards the importance of descriptive representation particularly when group demands are orthogonal to the left-right dimension. They highlight several ways that quotas, and increased numbers of women, can shift policies even in the context of strong parties.Governmen
Quotas and Party Priorities: Direct and Indirect Effects of Quota Laws
In light of increasing numbers of women in politics, extant research has examined the role of women in the parliamentary party on agenda-setting. This paper complements that literature by exploring the effect of a gendered institution theorized to promote both numbers of women and awareness of womenâs interests: gender quota laws. I suggest that after a quota law, parties could have incentives to either reduce (backlash effect) or increase (salience effect) attention to womenâs policy concerns. Using matching and regression methods with a panel data set of parties in advanced democracies, I find that parties in countries that implement a quota law devote more attention to social justice issues in their manifestos than similar parties in countries without a quota. Furthermore, the paper shows that this effect is driven entirely by the law itself. Contrary to expectations, quota laws are not associated with increases in women in my (short-term) sample; it is thus no surprise that no evidence of an indirect effect through numbers of women is found. I interpret the findings as evidence of quota contagion, whereby quotas cue party leaders to compete on gender equality issues
Women acting for women? An analysis of gender and debate participation in the British House of Commons 2005â2007
The recent push for more women parliamentarians around the world via positive action measures such as gender quotas naturally begs the question of whether the increased descriptive representation of women in parliament is making a substantive difference, in terms of the types of policies passed, behavioral norms, and procedures. How does the substantive representation of women take place? One way of measuring gendered impacts in politics is to look at the participation of Members of Parliament (MPs) in formal, parliamentary debate on key policy issues. It is reasonable to assume that one (though certainly not the only) measure of a good MP is his or her ability to contribute his or her voice and thoughts to public policy debates in parliament. Furthermore, if we consider women MPs representative of women in particular as a marginalized group, making their voices heard in parliamentary debates is perhaps one of the best ways of acting for women. As Melissa Williams (1998, 138) argues, the unique voice of women is a necessary component for women's political equality: It is not enough that women communicate their perspectives to men; a full respect for women's agency, and a full protection of their interests, requires that they act on their own behalf. Only through their legislative presence can women be sure that the âwoman's point of viewâ on each policy issue is formulated and expressed
Why Are Gender Quota Laws Adopted by Men? The Role of Inter- and Intra-Party Competition
In nearly every case of quota law adoption, the support of party elites is critical. But this raises a puzzle: What can motivate predominantly male elites to put these policies in place? This article uses a comparison of two sets of matched pair countriesâsimilar on background characteristics except for quota adoptionâto explore the motivations and role of male party elites in quota reform. The cases of Belgium and Austria, and Portugal and Italy highlight two key explanations. First, quota laws are likely to be supported and passed by parties threatened by a new, more progressive competitor on the left, as a way of claiming women voters back from the encroaching party (interparty competition). Second, quotas can be employed as a mechanism for party elites to gain power over candidate selection within their own parties in the face of entrenched local party monopolies (intraparty competition). </jats:p
Quotas and qualifications: the impact of gender quota laws on the qualifications of legislators in the Italian parliament
This article addresses concerns that candidates nominated because of gender quota laws will be less qualified for office. While questions of candidate quality have long been relevant to legislative behavior, quota laws requiring a certain percentage of candidates for national office to be women have generated renewed interest. Gender quotas are often perceived to reduce the scope of political competition. By putting gender identity center stage, they preclude the possibility that elections will be based on âideasâ or âmeritâ alone. Other electoral rules that restrict candidate selection, such as the centralization of candidate selection common in closed list PR systems, have been found to reduce the quality of candidates. Rules that open selection, such as primaries, result in higher quality candidates. We exploit the institutional design of Italyâs mixed electoral system in 1994, where quotas were applied only to the PR portion of the list, to compare the qualifications of men, women, and âquota womenâ. We estimate regressions on several measures of deputiesâ qualifications for office and performance in office. We find that unlike other rules limiting candidate selection, quotas are not associated with lower quality on most measures of qualifications. In fact, quota women have more local government experience than other legislators and lower rates of absenteeism than their male counterparts. Contrary to critics, quota laws may have apositiveimpact on legislator quality. Once the quota law was rescinded, quota women were less likely to be re-elected than non-quota women or men, which suggests that discrimination â not qualification â limits womenâs status as candidates.</jats:p