Extremism and Social Learning

When members of deliberating groups speak with one another, their predeliberation tendencies often become exacerbated as their views become more extreme. The resulting phenomenon -- group polarization -- has been observed in many settings, and it bears on the actions of juries, administrative tribunals, corporate boards, and other institutions. Polarization can result from rational Bayesian updating by group members, but in many contexts, this rational interpretation of polarization seems implausible. We argue that people are better seen as Credulous Bayesians, who insufficiently adjust for idiosyncratic features of particular environments and put excessive weight on the statements of others where there are 1) common sources of information; 2) highly unrepresentative group membership; 3) statements that are made to obtain approval; and 4) statements that are designed to manipulate. Credulous Bayesianism can produce extremism and significant blunders. We discuss the implications of Credulous Bayesianism for law and politics, including media policy and cognitive diversity on administrative agencies and courts.

Extremism and Social Learning

When members of deliberating groups speak with one another, their predeliberation tendencies often become exacerbated as their views become more extreme. The resulting phenomenon—group polarization—has been observed in many settings, and it bears on the actions of juries, administrative tribunals, corporate boards, and other institutions. Polarization can result from rational Bayesian updating by group members, but in many contexts, this rational interpretation of polarization seems implausible. We argue that people are better seen as Credulous Bayesians, who insufficiently adjust for idiosyncratic features of particular environments and put excessive weight on the statements of others where there are 1) common sources of information; 2) highly unrepresentative group membership; 3) statements that are made to obtain approval; and 4) statements that are designed to manipulate. Credulous Bayesianism can produce extremism and significant blunders. We discuss the implications of Credulous Bayesianism for law and politics, including media policy and cognitive diversity on administrative agencies and courts

The Role of the President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking

Regulatory reform has been a subject of frequent discussion in the last decade, especially in the context of presidential efforts to assert control over the rulemaking process. Presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan have all attempted to increase presidential authority over regulation. In particular, President Reagan has issued two executive orders that give the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) considerable power over the rulemaking activities of executive agencies. In this article, we set forth our views on the role of presidential supervision in the regulatory process, with particular attention to the questions raised by the recent executive orders

Optimal Sludge? The Price of Program Integrity

Public officials often impose eligibility requirements for government programs that have two effects: (1) They screen out ineligible people and (2) they screen out eligible people. Consisting of paperwork requirements, interviews, waiting periods, and administrative burdens, such requirements are sometimes characterized as “sludge,” and for some eligible people, they might prove overwhelming or prohibitive. In these circumstances, there is a pervasive normative issue: What is the optimal tradeoff between the screening out of ineligible people and the screening out of eligible people? It is plausible to think that a great deal depends on numbers. If, for example, the number of ineligible people who are screened out is very large, and if the number of eligible people who are screened out is very small, then there would seem little ground for objection. But if the number of eligible people who are screened out is very large, there is a serious problem, and it might be worthwhile to consider an approach that would not screen out eligible people, even if it would simultaneously fail to screen out, or effectively “screen in,” a small number of ineligible people. We identify competing, plausible positions on the normative question, which we label consequentialist (in the sense that they attempt an assessment of the consequences of alternatives approaches, with a focus on numbers) and legalist (in the sense that they emphasize legal constraints, designed to ensure that benefits go only to those who are actually eligible). We also offer the results of a pilot study, which shows that the overwhelming majority of respondents would favor changes that allow ineligible people to receive benefits, if that is the price of ensuring that eligible people do so as well—unless the number of ineligible recipients is very high. The survey results suggest that most people reject the legalist position and embrace a form of consequentialism. We suggest that in light of the normative analysis and the survey results, a form of consequentialism is best, unless the law explicitly forbids it

Extremism and Social Learning

When members of deliberating groups speak with one another, their predeliberation tendencies often become exacerbated as their views become more extreme. The resulting phenomenon—group polarization—has been observed in many settings, and it bears on the actions of juries, administrative tribunals, corporate boards, and other institutions. Polarization can result from rational Bayesian updating by group members, but in many contexts, this rational interpretation of polarization seems implausible. We argue that people are better seen as Credulous Bayesians, who insufficiently adjust for idiosyncratic features of particular environments and put excessive weight on the statements of others where there are 1) common sources of information; 2) highly unrepresentative group membership; 3) statements that are made to obtain approval; and 4) statements that are designed to manipulate. Credulous Bayesianism can produce extremism and significant blunders. We discuss the implications of Credulous Bayesianism for law and politics, including media policy and cognitive diversity on administrative agencies and courts

Protection of Works of Art From Atmospheric Ozone

Assesses the colorfastness of organic colorants and watercolor pigments tested in atmospheric ozone. A summary of a full report of the Environmental Quality Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena

Ozone and the deterioration of works of art

Seventeen artists' watercolor pigment samples and two Japanese woodblock prints were exposed to 0.40 ppm ozone in a controlled test chamber for three months. It was found that several artists' pigments when applied on paper will fade in the absence of light if exposed to an atmosphere containing ozone at the concentrations found in photochemical smog. Alizarin-based watercolors containing 1,2 dihydroxyanthraquinone lake pigments were shown to be particularly sensitive to ozone damage, as were the yellow pigments used in the Japanese woodblock prints tested. Indoor-outdoor ozone monitoring in a Pasadena, CA art gallery confirmed that ozone concentrations half as high as those outdoors can be found in art galleries that lack a chemically protected air conditioning system. Care should be taken to protect works of art from damage due to photochemical smog

Plant disease - black spot (anthracnose) of grapes

Black spot or Anthracnose of grapes caused by the fungus Elsinoe ampelina is a widespread and serious disease. In commercial vineyards it is often responsible for considerable reduction in yield and quality of fruit, and in home gardens also it may prove very damaging. Under commercial conditions the disease has proved difficult to control in seasons favourable for its development despite the routine application of accepted fungicides. Fortunately, preliminary results of recent spray trials indicate that greatly improved control is likely to result in future from the use of a number of new fungicides