Endogenous Time-Dependent Rules and Inflation Inertia

In this paper we endogenize fixed price time-dependent rules to examine the output effects of monetary disinflation. We derive the optimal rules in and out of inflationary steady states, and develop a methodology to aggregate individual pricing rules which vary through time. Because of strategic complementarities we have to solve both problems simultaneously. This allows us to reassess the output costs of monetary disinflations, including aspects such as the roles of the initial level of inflation, and of the degree of strategic complementarity in price. Finally, we relax the strict assumption of pure time-dependent rules by allowing price setters to reevaluate their rules at the time disinflation is announced.

Imperfectly Credible Disinflation under Endogenous Time-Dependent Pricing

The real effects of an imperfectly credible disinflation depend critically on the extent of price rigidity. Therefore, the study of how the policymaker's credibility affects the outcome of an announced disinflation should not be dissociated from the analysis of the determinants of the frequency of price adjustments. In this paper we examine the output effects of an imperfectly credible monetary disinflation in a model with endogenous time-dependent pricing rules. We take as the base case a disinflation policy with a constant degree of credibility, and show that the interaction between the endogeneity of time-dependent rules and imperfect credibility increases the output costs of disinflation. We also study the case in which the monetary authority gains credibility during the disinflation as agents update their beliefs.

Endogenous Time-Dependent Rules and the Costs of Disinflation with Imperfect Credibility

The real effects of an imperfectly credible disinflation depend critically on the extent of price rigidity. Therefore, the study of how the policymaker's credibility affects the outcome of an announced disinflation should not be dissociated from the analysis of the determinants of the frequency of price adjustments. In this paper we examine the output effects of an imperfectly credible monetary disinflation in a model with endogenous time-dependent pricing rules. We take as the base case a disinflation policy with a constant degree of credibility, and show that the interaction between the endogeneity of time-dependent rules and imperfect credibility increases the output costs of disinflation. We also study the case in which the monetary authority gains credibility during the disinflation as agents update their beliefs.

Endogenous Time-Dependent Rules and the Costs of Disinflation with Imperfect Credibility

The real effects of an imperfectly credible disinflation depend critically on the extent of price rigidity. Therefore, the study of how the policymaker's credibility affects the outcome of an announced disinflation should not be dissociated from the analysis of the determinants of the frequency of price adjustments. In this paper we examine the output effects of an imperfectly credible monetary disinflation in a model with endogenous time-dependent pricing rules. We take as the base case a disinflation policy with a constant degree of credibility, and show that the interaction between the endogeneity of time-dependent rules and imperfect credibility increases the output costs of disinflation. We also study the case in which the monetary authority gains credibility during the disinflation as agents update their beliefs.

(Des)apoio judiciário

O presente texto corresponde à intervenção proferida na conferência intitulada “Processos Judiciais em Tempos de Crise (Ainda existe tutela judicial efetiva?)”,a qual teve lugar na Escola de Direito da Universidade do Minho, no dia 16 de outubro de 2015. Partindo de uma análise prévia, em sede de direito comparado, dos sistemas de apoio judiciário vigentes em alguns ordenamentos jurídicos europeus, este artigo visa, essencialmente, analisar o regime jurídico do apoio judiciário vigente no nosso ordenamento, propondo-se, a final, algumas medidas de reforma desse regime

Providências cautelares conservatórias: Questões práticas atuais

Partindo da análise da jurisprudência proferida na vigência do novo Código de Processo Civil, bem como do seu confronto com a jurisprudência produzida no domínio da legislação processual civil revogada e com a doutrina, o presente texto procura abordar, numa visão essencialmente prática, algumas questões e problemas atuais concernentes à tutela cautelar conservatória especificada e comum.info:eu-repo/semantics/draf

Responsabilidade patrimonial dos cônjuges e penhora de bens comuns do casal

O presente texto corresponde à intervenção proferida no dia 30 de setembro de 2016, na Escola de Direito da Universidade do Minho, nas “Jornadas internacionais no âmbito da comemoração dos 50 anos do Código Civil Português”. Nele procura-se analisar em que medida os regimes da responsabilidade pelas dívidas dos cônjuges e da penhora de bens comuns do casal se adequam ou não à realidade sócio-económica e familiar atual