Project Aid or Budget Aid? The Interests of Governments and Financial Institutions

The paper compares different aid policy instruments and their effect on the target group. Starting from a situation where interest groups compete for the resources of the government, international financial institutions aim to change the policy outcome. They can either directly support one group or condition their financial help to the government on its policy. Apart from a normative analysis which policy is more adequate to help one group, the paper also asks what happens if the IFI is driven by bureaucratic self-interest, and whether this distort policies. --aid policy,conditionality,international financial institutions,interest groups

Taxation, corruption and the exchange rate regime

The paper analyzes the relation between institutional quality, such as corruption, in a country and its monetary regime. It is shown that a credibly fixed exchange rate to a low inflation country, like a currency board, can reduce corruption and improve the fiscal system. A monetary union, however, has ambiguous effects. I find that there is convergence between countries with regard to the level of corruption. --Exchange Rate Regime,Monetary Policy,Fiscal Policy,Seigniorage,Corruption,Developing and Transition Countries

Federal Monetary Policy

What is the optimal institutional structure for an independent central bank? The paper shows when it will be optimal for a country to have a central bank to be organized according to federal, purely national or a combination of both aspects. The analysis is then extended to a supranational monetary union and it is shown which organizational structure of a common central bank is optimal for participating countries and when they are willing to join. The implications for an enlargement of a monetary union are derived as well.Monetary union, federalism, monetary policy

Taxation, Corruption and the Exchange Rate Regime

The paper analyzes the relation between institutional quality, such as corruption, in a country and its monetary regime. It is shown that a credibly fixed exchange rate to a low inflation country, like a currency board, can reduce corruption and improve the fiscal system. A monetary union, however, has ambiguous effects. I …nd that that there is convergence between countries with regard to the level of corruption. --Exchange Rate Regime,Monetary Policy,Fiscal Policy,Seigniorage,Corruption,Developing and Transition Countries

Structural Reforms and the Enlargement of Monetary Union

The paper addresses the question what effects the enlargement of a monetary union will have on necessary structural refoms in the (low distortion) member countries and the (high distortion) candidate country. While monetary union lowers reforms in the candidate country, members of the monetary union will increase their reform efforts. The paper then proceeds to derive the conditions if and when the countries agree to an enlargement of the monetary union.Monetary union, asymmetric shocks, inflation, structural reforms, convergence

Taxation, Corruption and the Exchange Rate Regime

The paper analyzes the relation between institutional quality, such as corruption, in a country and its monetary regime. It is shown that a credibly fixed exchange rate to a low inflation country, like a currency board, can reduce corruption and improve the fiscal system. A monetary union, however, has ambiguous effects. I find that there is convergence between countries with regard to the level of corruption.exchange rate regime, monetary policy, fiscal policy, seigniorage, corruption, developing and transition countries

The monetary policy consequences of enlargement

Europäische Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion, EU-Erweiterung, Geldpolitik, European Economic and Monetary Union, EU enlargement, Monetary policy

EMU Enlargement, Policy Uncertainty and Economic Reforms

The paper analyzes the relation between monetary uncertainty and government incentives to implement economic reforms that reduce structural distortions and make economies more flexible. It is shown that uncertainty about the central bank’s reaction function leads to more reforms. I relate this result to the debate about central bank setup in a larger monetary union.transparency of monetary policy, ECB voting structure, European Monetary Union, optimal representation, labor market regulation

Fiscal Reform and Monetary Union in West Africa

The paper explores the interaction between the proposed monetary union for ECOWAS and structural reforms of fiscal policy. The effects depend to a large extent on the degree of similarity of member countries. In a monetary union of similar countries, member states run a more distortive fiscal policy, while their structural reform efforts will fall. This is also the case for countries that unilaterally peg to an anchor currency or introduce a foreign currency. In an monetary union with dissimilar countries the reverse can happen for those member states that are confronted with high distortion countries. This result implies that current WAEMU members will run a less distortive fiscal policy after the inclusion of other members of ECOWAS.West Africa, monetary union, fiscal policy, structural reforms, Financial Economics, F33, E61, E63,

Labor Market Regulation and the Legal System

When enacting labor market regulation governments face courts that interpret and implement the legal code. We show that the incentives for governments for labor market reform increase with the uncertainty that is involved in the implementation of legal codes through courts. Given that judges have more discretion in common as opposed to civil law systems more reform activity as a response to crises should be observed in the former system. This finding is backed by evidence from a panel of OECD countries.labor market regulation, labor courts, uncertainty, unemployment