The Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings in Imperial Germany, 1870-1896

In this article, we evaluate underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) at the Berlin Stock Exchange between 1870 and 1896. In contrast to modern data, first day returns were extraordinary low and averaged less than five percent, even during the speculative period of the early 1870s. Moreover, standard underpricing theories based on asymmetric information, signalling mechanisms, or litigation risk cannot explain underpricing. In contrast to modern markets, the past market return had a negative influence on initial returns. Finally, we show that cash-flow relevant information contained in the corporate charter were readily factored in the first market price. Thus, the historical capital market differed from today’s market, but seems to have been efficient.Initial public offerings, Financial history, Germany pre-1913

Pharmaceutical research in Wilhelmine Germany: The case of E. Merck

In this paper, we describe the emergence and evolution of pharmaceutical research at the German company E. Merck during the late 19th and early 20th century. Revolutionary changes in the scientific knowledge base, especially the rise of bacteriological research, and the market entry of dyestuff producers into pharmaceuticals made the re-organisation of pharmaceutical research during the 1890s a necessary corporate strategy. Consequently, Merck restructured its in-house research between 1895 and 1898. Moreover, the firm deepened its co-operation with universities and other outside inventors. Jointly and severally, the firm depended on outside inventors for the generation of new products, whereas in-house scientists improved the productive efficiency. Moreover, we show that a significant number of new products were launched between the late 1890s and 1905. During the following years, however, resource constraints restricted Merck’s innovative capacity.Business history, pharmaceutical research, case study

Comparative productivity in British and German manufacturing before World War II: reconciling direct benchmark estimates and time series projections

This article provides a new benchmark estimate of comparative Germany/U.K. labor productivity in manufacturing for circa 1907, and experiments with alternative German manufacturing production indices for time series projection from a circa 1935 benchmark. A consistent picture of broadly similar levels of manufacturing labor productivity in Britain and Germany throughout the period 1871–1938 is established. We also show that a substantial German productivity lead had already emerged in heavy industry by 1907, but was offset by a substantial British productivity lead in light industry. For the pre-1914 period, an additional check is provided using nominal income-based estimates

If only I could sack you! Management turnover and performance in large German Banks between 1874 and 1913

We analyze the relation of firm performance and managerial turnover in 19th century German banking by probit estimation. This period covers a major reform of corporate governance. Before the reform performance and turnover are unrelated, wheras after the reform more succesfull managers leave firms more seldom. However, only short run performance matters.Management turnover, Performance, Banking, late 19th century Germany

Poverty and crime in 19th century Germany: A reassessment

Using panel data for Prussia during 1882 to 1910, we replicate Mehlum, Miguel, and Torvik’s (2006) study on the causal effect of poverty on crime in 19th century Germany. In addition, our data set allows us to make several original contributions to the literature. We confirm the robust positive effect of poverty on property crime. Employing the rye price as a proxy for poverty, we show that the effect is less pronounced for provinces with a large agricultural sector. As Mehlum et al., we also find a strong negative impact of poverty on violent crime. However, once we account for beer consumption, this effect vanishes.Crime, Poverty, rye price, beer, weather, Prussia

Resolving the Anglo-German Industrial Productivity Puzzle, 1895-1935 : A Response to Professor Ritschl

This paper offers a critical appraisal of the claim of Ritschl (2008) to have found a “possible resolution” to what he calls the “Anglo-German industrial productivity puzzle”. To understand the origins of this term, it is necessary to describe some recent developments in comparisons of industrial labour productivity between Britain and Germany. The Anglo-German industrial productivity puzzle really arose as the result of a new industrial production index produced by Ritschl (2004), which differed very substantially from the widely used index of Hoffmann (1965). Broadberry and Burhop (2007) pointed out that if the Ritschl (2004) index is combined with an index of German employment from Hoffmann (1965) and time series of UK output and employment from Feinstein (1972), it implies an implausibly high German labour productivity lead over Britain in 1907, when projected back from a widely accepted Germany/UK labour productivity benchmark for 1935/36.

Incentives and Innovation? R&D Management in Germany’s High-Tech Industries During the Second Industrial Revolution

The allocation of intellectual property rights between firms and employed researchers causes a principal-agent problem between the two parties. We investigate the working contracts of inventors employed by German chemical, pharmaceutical, and electrical engineering firms at the turn of the 20th century and show that some firms were aware of the principal-agent problem and offered performance-related compensation schemes to their scientists. However, neither a higher total compensation nor a higher share of variable compensation in total compensation is correlated with a higher innovative output. Thus, incentives techniques were already used during the early history of industrial research laboratories, but their impact on innovative output was unsystematic.Compensation packages; incentives; innovation; economic history; Germany, pre-1913

A Corporate Governance Reform as a Natural Experiment for Incentive Contracts

The present paper proposes to employ a major shift in the legal and institutional environment to identify contractual incentives from the correlation of executive pay and firm performance. We use the reform of the German stock companies act in 1884 as such a major shift and estimate the sensitivity of the pay to firm performance between 1870 and 1910 for executives of nine large banks. The reform substantially enhanced corporate control and strengthened monitoring incentives. Accordingly, we find the pay-performance sensitivity to decrease significantly after the reform. While executives received a bonus of 39 M per 1000 M increase in profits before 1884, after the reform the sensitivity decreased by two-thirds.pay-performance sensitivity, natural experiment, legal reform, corporate governance

Scientists’ responses to global financial turbulence

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