Climate Change Mitigation Strategies in Fast-Growing Countries: The Benefits of Early Action

This paper builds on the assumption that OECD countries are (or will soon be) taking actions to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. These actions, however, will not be sufficient to control global warming, unless developing countries also get involved in the cooperative effort to reduce GHG emissions. This paper investigates the best short-term strategies that emerging economies can adopt in reacting to OECD countries’ mitigation effort, given the common long-term goal to prevent excessive warming without hampering economic growth. Results indicate that developing countries would incur substantial economic losses by following a myopic strategy that disregards climate in the short-run, and that their optimal investment behaviour is to anticipate the implementation of a climate policy by roughly 10 years. Investing in innovation ahead of time is also found to be advantageous. The degree of policy anticipation is shown to be important in determining the financial transfers of an international carbon market meant to provide incentives for the participation of developing countries. This is especially relevant for China, whose recent and foreseeable trends of investments in innovation are consistent with the adoption of domestic emission reduction obligations in 2030.energy-economy modelling, climate policy, developing countries

Alternative Paths toward a Low Carbon World

This paper analyzes the economic and investment implications of a series of climate mitigation scenarios, characterized by different levels of ambition in terms of long term stabilization goals and the transition to attain them. In particular, the implications of fairly ambitious scenarios are investigated for the first time by means of the model WITCH. Although milder climate objectives can be achieved at moderate costs, our results show that stringent stabilization paths, compatible with the target of the European Union and the G8, might have important economic repercussions. The timing of mitigation action influences the cost of meeting a target as well the stringency of the targets we can aspire to. To contain costs it is crucial to rely on a wide mitigation portfolio. Strong reductions in energy consumption through enhanced energy efficiency and life style changes are needed to achieve stringent climate policies. The analysis carried out in the present paper contains several idealistic assumptions that could be violated in the real world where some technologies may not be fully available, technology transfers and diffusion are imperfect, some world regions may not accept to reduce their GHG emissions, trading might be limited to some sectors or to a fraction of the total abatement effort, etc. This would increase the challenge of climate protection and the costs of reducing GHG emissions.Climate Policy, Stabilization Costs

Delayed Participation of Developing Countries to Climate Agreements: Should Action in the EU and US be Postponed?

This paper analyses the cost implications for climate policy in developed countries if developing countries are unwilling to adopt measures to reduce their own GHG emissions. First, we assume that a 450 CO2 (550 CO2e) ppmv stabilisation target is to be achieved and that Non Annex1 (NA1) countries decide to delay their GHG emission reductions by 30 years. What would be the cost difference between this scenario and a case in which both developed and developing countries start reducing their emissions at the same time? Then, we look at a scenario in which the timing of developing countries’ participation is uncertain and again we compute the costs of climate policy in developed and developing countries. We findthat delayed participation of NA1 countries has a negative impact on climate policy costs. Economic inefficiencies can be as large as 10-25 TlnUSD. However, this additional cost wanes when developing countries are allowed to trade emission reductions from their baseline emission paths during the 30-year delay period. Thus, irrespective of whether NA1 countriesare immediately assigned an emission reduction target or not, they should nonetheless be included in a global carbon market. Technology deployment is also affected by the timing of developing countries’ mitigation measures. Delayed NA1-country participation in a climateagreement would scale down the deployment of coal with CCS throughout the century. Onthe other hand, innovation in the form of energy R&D investments would be positivelyaffected, since it would become crucial in developed countries. Finally, uncertainty about the timing of NA1-country participation does not modify the optimal abatement strategy for developed countries and does not alter policy costs as long as a global carbon market is in place.delayed action, climate policy, stabilisation costs, uncertain participation

Climate Change Mitigation Strategies in Fast-Growing Countries: The Benefits of Early Action

This paper builds on the assumption that OECD countries are (or will soon be) taking actions to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. These actions, however, will not be sufficient to control global warming, unless developing countries also get involved in the cooperative effort to reduce GHG emissions. This paper investigates the best short-term strategies that emerging economies can adopt in reacting to OECD countries’ mitigation effort, given the common long-term goal to prevent excessive warming without hampering economic growth. Results indicate that developing countries would incur substantial economic losses by following a myopic strategy that disregards climate in the short-run, and that their optimal investment behaviour is to anticipate the implementation of a climate policy by roughly 10 years. Investing in innovation ahead of time is also found to be advantageous. The degree of policy anticipation is shown to be important in determining the financial transfers of an international carbon market meant to provide incentives for the participation of developing countries. This is especially relevant for China, whose recent and foreseeable trends of investments in innovation are consistent with the adoption of domestic emission reduction obligations in 2030.Energy-economy Modeling, Climate Policy, Developing Countries

Climate Change Mitigation Strategies in Fast-Growing Countries: The Benefits of Early Action

This paper builds on the assumption that OECD countries are (or will soon be) taking actions to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. These actions, however, will not be sufficient to control global warming, unless developing countries also get involved in the cooperative effort to reduce GHG emissions. This paper investigates the best short-term strategies that emerging economies can adopt in reacting to OECD countries’ mitigation effort, given the common long-term goal to prevent excessive warming without hampering economic growth. Results indicate that developing countries would incur substantial economic losses by following a myopic strategy that disregards climate in the short-run, and that their optimal investment behaviour is to anticipate the implementation of a climate policy by roughly 10 years. Investing in innovation ahead of time is also found to be advantageous. The degree of policy anticipation is shown to be important in determining the financial transfers of an international carbon market meant to provide incentives for the participation of developing countries. This is especially relevant for China, whose recent and foreseeable trends of investments in innovation are consistent with the adoption of domestic emission reduction obligations in 2030.Energy-economy modeling, Climate Policy, Developing Countries

Delayed Participation of Developing Countries to Climate Agreements: Should Action in the EU and US be Postponed?

This paper analyses the cost implications for climate policy in developed countries if developing countries are unwilling to adopt measures to reduce their own GHG emissions. First, we assume that a 450 CO2 (550 CO2e) ppmv stabilisation target is to be achieved and that Non Annex1 (NA1) countries decide to delay their GHG emission reductions by 30 years. What would be the cost difference between this scenario and a case in which both developed and developing countries start reducing their emissions at the same time? Then, we look at a scenario in which the timing of developing countries’ participation is uncertain and again we compute the costs of climate policy in developed and developing countries. We find that delayed participation of NA1 countries has a negative impact on climate policy costs. Economic inefficiencies can be as large as 10-25 TlnUSD. However, this additional cost wanes when developing countries are allowed to trade emission reductions from their baseline emission paths during the 30-year delay period. Thus, irrespective of whether NA1 countries are immediately assigned an emission reduction target or not, they should nonetheless be included in a global carbon market. Technology deployment is also affected by the timing of developing countries’ mitigation measures. Delayed NA1-country participation in a climate agreement would scale down the deployment of coal with CCS throughout the century. On the other hand, innovation in the form of energy R&D investments would be positively affected, since it would become crucial in developed countries. Finally, uncertainty about the timing of NA1-country participation does not modify the optimal abatement strategy for developed countries and does not alter policy costs as long as a global carbon market is in place.Delayed Action, Climate Policy, Stabilisation Costs, Uncertain Participation

Human Capital Formation and Global Warming Mitigation: Evidence from an Integrated Assessment Model

Based on recent empirical evidence, this paper includes human capital and knowledge in an integrated assessment model and it assesses the interplay between innovation, human capital, climate change, and education policies. Results indicate that climate policy stimulates a dedicated form of energy-knowledge without reducing generic R&D investments. Since advancements in labour productivity have a negative impact on the environment because labour is assumed to be complement to energy, climate policy reduces education investments, on which human capital is built. However, a policy mix combining climate and education targets shows that education and climate goals can be coupled incurring in small additional economic penalties.climate policy, innovation, human capital

Active-alkali metal promoted reductive desulfurization of dibenzothiophene and its hindered analogues

Reductive desulfurisation of organic compounds is of importance both in organic synthesis and in industry. Benzo- and dibenzothiophenes are between the most abundant sulphur containing impurities in crude oils, and their desulfurization is a mandatory issue in the production of non polluting fuels. Following our interest in the development of efficient alkali metal-mediated synthetic procedures and alternative protocols for the chemical transformation of widespread environmental contaminants we wish to report here on the effectiveness of sodium and lithium metals, in the presence of catalytic amounts of tetraphenylethylene (TPE), in promoting the reductive desulfurization of dibenzothiophene, as well as of the corresponding sulfone and sulfoxide

Active-alkali metal promoted reductive desulfurization of dibenzothiophene and its hindered analogues

Reductive desulfurisation of organic compounds is of importance both in organic synthesis and in industry. Benzo- and dibenzothiophenes are between the most abundant sulphur containing impurities in crude oils, and their desulfurization is a mandatory issue in the production of non polluting fuels. Following our interest in the development of efficient alkali metal-mediated synthetic procedures and alternative protocols for the chemical transformation of widespread environmental contaminants we wish to report here on the effectiveness of sodium and lithium metals, in the presence of catalytic amounts of tetraphenylethylene (TPE), in promoting the reductive desulfurization of dibenzothiophene, as well as of the corresponding sulfone and sulfoxide

Delayed Participation of Developing Countries to Climate Agreements: Should Action in the EU and US be Postponed?

This paper analyses the cost implications for climate policy in developed countries if developing countries are unwilling to adopt measures to reduce their own GHG emissions. First, we assume that a 450 CO2 (550 CO2e) ppmv stabilisation target is to be achieved and that Non Annex1 (NA1) countries decide to delay their GHG emission reductions by 30 years. What would be the cost difference between this scenario and a case in which both developed and developing countries start reducing their emissions at the same time? Then, we look at a scenario in which the timing of developing countries’ participation is uncertain and again we compute the costs of climate policy in developed and developing countries. We find that delayed participation of NA1 countries has a negative impact on climate policy costs. Economic inefficiencies can be as large as 10-25 TlnUSD. However, this additional cost wanes when developing countries are allowed to trade emission reductions from their baseline emission paths during the 30-year delay period. Thus, irrespective of whether NA1 countries are immediately assigned an emission reduction target or not, they should nonetheless be included in a global carbon market. Technology deployment is also affected by the timing of developing countries’ mitigation measures. Delayed NA1-country participation in a climate agreement would scale down the deployment of coal with CCS throughout the century. On the other hand, innovation in the form of energy R&D investments would be positively affected, since it would become crucial in developed countries. Finally, uncertainty about the timing of NA1-country participation does not modify the optimal abatement strategy for developed countries and does not alter policy costs as long as a global carbon market is in place.Delayed Action, Climate Policy, Stabilisation Costs, Uncertain Participation