ABS Inflows to the United States and the Global Financial Crisis

The “global saving glut” (GSG) hypothesis argues that the surge in capital inflows from emerging market economies to the United States led to significant declines in long-term interest rates in the United States and other industrial economies. In turn, these lower interest rates, when combined with both innovations and deficiencies of the U.S. credit market, are believed to have contributed to the U.S. housing bubble and to the buildup in financial vulnerabilities that led to the financial crisis. Because the GSG countries for the most part restricted their U.S. purchases to Treasuries and Agency debt, their provision of savings to ultimately risky subprime mortgage borrowers was necessarily indirect, pushing down yields on safe assets and increasing the appetite for alternative investments on the part of other investors. We present a more complete picture of how capital flows contributed to the crisis, drawing attention to the sizable inflows from European investors into U.S. private-label asset-backed securities (ABS), including mortgage-backed securities and other structured investment products. By adding to domestic demand for private-label ABS, substantial foreign acquisitions of these securities contributed to the decline in their spreads over Treasury yields. Through a combination of empirical estimation and model simulation, we verify that both GSG inflows into Treasuries and Agencies, as well as European acquisitions of ABS, played a role in contributing to downward pressures on U.S. interest rates.

International Capital Flows and the Returns to Safe Assets in the United States, 2003-2007

Part of the International Finance Discussion Paper

Idiopathic myelopathies with white matter vacuolation in non-acquired immunodeficiency syndrome patients

Postmortem examination of 21 patients showed a vacuolar myelopathy resembling that associated with the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome. Underlying diseases included six cases of leukemia or lymphoma, five of carcinoma, three of systemic lupus erythematosus, two of chronic lung disease, and one each of cadaveric renal transplant, cirrhosis, diabetes, hemophagocytic syndrome, and viral encephalitis. Fourteen patients were on long-term steroid therapy and 10 of these also had immunosuppressive chemotherapy. No patient had the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome, although one received blood transfusions in 1978. Signs and symptoms consistent with myelopathy included paraparesis in seven patients, ataxia in one, and bilateral extensor plantar reflexes in one. Microscopic examination showed vacuolation in spinal cord white matter primarily located in posterior and lateral columns. Lipid-laden macrophages and axonal changes were proportional to the severity of the vacuolation, which was severe in five patients, moderate in 10, and mild in six. Eight patients had coexistent viral diseases elsewhere in the central nervous system, but viral-associated antigens or genomic material was not found in regions of vacuolated spinal cord white matter. Although the etiology of these myelopathies is unknown, their association with immune suppression and coexistent viral infection of the central nervous system suggests that an opportunistic viral infection may be important

How long can the unsustainable U.S. current account deficit be sustained?

This paper addresses three questions about the prospects for the U.S. current account deficit. Is it sustainable in the long term? If not, how long will it take for measures of external debt and debt service to reach levels that could prompt some pullback by global investors? And if and when such levels are breached, how readily would asset prices respond and the current account start to narrow? ; To address these questions, we start with projections of a detailed partial-equilibrium model of the U.S. balance of payments. Based on plausible assumptions of the key drivers of the U.S. external balance, they indicate that the current account deficit will resume widening and the negative NIIP/GDP ratio will continue to expand. However, our projections suggest that even by the year 2020, the negative NIIP/GDP ratio will be no higher than it is in several industrial economies today, and U.S. net investment income payments will remain very low. The share of U.S. claims in foreigners' portfolios will likely rise, but not to an obviously worrisome extent. All told, it seems likely it would take many years for the U.S. debt to cumulate to a level that would test global investors' willingness to extend financing. ; Finally, we explore the historical responsiveness of asset prices and the current account in industrial economies to measures of external imbalances and debt. We find little evidence that, as countries' net indebtedness rises, the developments needed to correct the current account--including changes in growth rates, asset prices, or exchange rates--materialize all that rapidly. ; We would emphasize that these findings do not imply that U.S. current account adjustment is necessarily many years away, as any number of factors could trigger such adjustment. Our point is rather that international balance sheet considerations likely are not sufficient, by themselves, to require external adjustment any time soon.Balance of payments ; Balance of trade

ABS inflows to the United States and the global financial crisis

The "global saving glut" (GSG) hypothesis argues that the surge in capital inflows from emerging market economies to the United States led to significant declines in long-term interest rates in the United States and other industrial economies. In turn, these lower interest rates, when combined with both innovations and deficiencies of the U.S. credit market, are believed to have contributed to the U.S. housing bubble and to the buildup in financial vulnerabilities that led to the financial crisis. Because the GSG countries for the most part restricted their U.S. purchases to Treasuries and Agency debt, their provision of savings to ultimately risky subprime mortgage borrowers was necessarily indirect, pushing down yields on safe assets and increasing the appetite for alternative investments on the part of other investors. We present a more complete picture of how capital flows contributed to the crisis, drawing attention to the sizable inflows from European investors into U.S. private-label asset-backed securities (ABS), including mortgage-backed securities and other structured investment products. By adding to domestic demand for private-label ABS, substantial foreign acquisitions of these securities contributed to the decline in their spreads over Treasury yields. Through a combination of empirical estimation and model simulation, we verify that both GSG inflows into Treasuries and Agencies, as well as European acquisitions of ABS, played a role in contributing to downward pressures on U.S. interest rates.Capital movements ; Financial crises ; Asset-backed financing ; Interest rates

International capital flows and the returns to safe assets in the United States, 2003-2007

A broad array of domestic institutional factors--including problems with the originate-to-distribute model for mortgage loans, deteriorating lending standards, deficiencies in risk management, conflicting incentives for the GSEs, and shortcomings of supervision and regulation--were the primary sources of the U.S. housing boom and bust and the associated financial crisis. In addition, the extended rise in U.S. house prices was likely also supported by long-term interest rates (including mortgage rates) that were surprisingly low, given the level of short-term rates and other macro fundamentals--a development that Greenspan (2005) dubbed a "conundrum." The "global saving glut" (GSG) hypothesis (Bernanke, 2005 and 2007) argues that increased capital inflows to the United States from countries in which desired saving greatly exceeded desired investment--including Asian emerging markets and commodity exporters--were an important reason that U.S. longer-term interest rates during this period were lower than expected. ; This essay investigates further the effects of capital inflows to the United States on U.S. longer-term interest rates; however, we look beyond the overall size of the inflows emphasized by the GSG hypothesis to examine the implications for U.S. yields of the portfolio preferences of foreign creditors. We present evidence that, in the spirit of Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2009), foreign investors during this period tended to prefer U.S. assets perceived to be safe. In particular, foreign investors--especially the GSG countries--acquired a substantial share of the new issues of U.S. Treasuries, Agency debt, and Agency-sponsored mortgage-backed securities. The downward pressure on yields exerted by inflows from the GSG countries was reinforced by the portfolio preferences of other foreign investors. We focus particularly on the case of Europe: Although Europe did not run a large current account surplus as did the GSG countries, we show that it leveraged up its international balance sheet, issuing external liabilities to finance substantial purchases of apparently safe U.S. "private-label" mortgage-backed securities and other fixed-income products. The strong demand for apparently safe assets by both domestic and foreign investors not only served to reduce yields on these assets but also provided additional incentives for the U.S. financial services industry to develop structured investment products that "transformed" risky loans into highly-rated securities. ; Our findings do not challenge the view that domestic factors, including those listed above, were the primary sources of the housing boom and bust in the United States. However, examining how changes in the pattern of international capital flows affected yields on U.S. assets helps provide a deeper understanding of the origins and dynamics of the crisis.Saving and investment ; Investments, Foreign ; Housing - Prices ; Financial crises