Categorization of States Beyond Strong and Weak

The discourse on poor state performers has suffered from widely varying definitions on what distinguishes certain weak states from others. Indices that rank states from strong to weak conceal important distinctions that can adversely affect intervention policy. This deficiency is addressed by grouping states according to their performance on three dimensions of stateness: authority, legitimacy, and capacity. The resultant categorization identifies brittle states that are susceptible to regime change, impoverished states often considered as aid darlings, and fragile states that experience disproportionately high levels of violent internal conflict. It also provides a quantifiable means to analyze transitions from one state type to another for more insightful intervention policy

The J Curve Revisited: Assessing Backsliding and Reversal Among Unstable States

Just over ten years ago, Ian Bremmer published a treatise (2006) on the stability of states built on the notion that states fall along a curve resembling a slanted “J” when plotting their stability against openness. The basic idea is that states to the right of the turnover (bottom of the curve) are increasingly open while those to the left are increasingly closed. States on either side of the turnover exhibit increased stability the further they rise along the curve, with the implicit assumption that closed states cannot reach the same level of stability as the most open states As states transition from the left side of the curve to the right, they become more open. States in the turnover process are considered unstable, and are at risk of either reversing to a closed and stable system or even collapsing. In this paper we recast Bremmer’s framework of associated conditions to a causal model. Second, we more accurately specify the causes of reversal in which crises of instability occur. To meet those objectives, we identify states according to the six types characterized by Tikuisis and Carment (2017). We then define stability as a function of two state dimensions: authority and capacity, and apply the remaining state dimension of legitimacy as a proxy for openness. In testing the model, we find that shifts to openness and reversals leading to increasing instability are not as clear cut as Bremmer argues. Transitions can reverse, oscillate, or simply stall, which are exemplified in the different types of states we categorize. For example, we find that the least stable states experience the highest volatility in shifts between stability and openness, while the most stable states exhibit the lowest volatility. Although all state types significantly improved in stability due to capacity but not authority, changes in openness were mixed over the twenty year period of study

Kinstate intervention in ethnic conflicts : Albania and Turkey compared

Albania and Turkey did not act in overtly irredentist ways towards their ethnic brethren in neighboring states after the end of communism. Why, nonetheless, did Albania facilitate the increase of ethnic conflict in Kosovo and Macedonia, while Turkey did not, with respect to the Turks of Bulgaria? I argue that kin-states undergoing transition are more prone to intervene in external conflicts than states that are not, regardless of the salience of minority demands in the host-state. The transition weakens the institutions of the kin-state. Experiencing limited institutional constraints, self-seeking state officials create alliances with secessionist and autonomist movements across borders alongside their own ideological, clan-based and particularistic interests. Such alliances are often utilized to advance radical domestic agendas. Unlike in Albania's transition environment, in Turkey there were no emerging elites that could potentially form alliances and use external movements to legitimize their own domestic existence or claims

State Fragility, Rent Seeking and Lobbying: Evidence from African Data

This paper assesses the determinants of state fragility in sub-Saharan Africa using hitherto unexplored variables in the literature. The previously missing dimension of nation building is integrated and the hypothesis of state fragility being a function of rent seeking and/or lobbying by de facto power holders is tested. The resulting interesting finding is that, political interference, rent seeking and lobbying increase the probability of state fragility by mitigating the effectiveness of governance capacity. This relationship (after controlling for a range of economic, institutional and demographic factors) is consistent with a plethora of models and specifications. The validity of the hypothesis is confirmed in a scenario of extreme state fragility. Moreover, the interaction between political interferences and revolutions mitigate the probability of state fragility while the interaction between natural resources and political interferences breeds the probability of extreme state fragility. As a policy implication, there is a 'sub-Saharan African specificity' in 'nation building' and prevention of conflicts. Blanket fragility oriented policies will be misplaced unless they are contingent on the degree of fragility, since 'fragile' and 'extreme fragile' countries respond differently to economic, institutional and demographic characteristics of state fragility

The International Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict: Concepts, Indicators, and Theory

One of the growing debates among students of international politics concerns the precise linkage between ethnic conflict and international conflict. The present investigation attempts to contribute to this dialogue in three ways. First, prior studies of ethnic conflict and international relations are reappraised in terms of the central concepts and presumed causal linkage, leading to several changes in approach. Specifically, a typology of ethnic conflicts is devised deductively, including a rank ordering of types of ethnic conflicts in terms of the impact they have on levels of international violence. Second, testing focuses on the presumed ordering of ethnic conflicts from anti-colonial, secessionist and irredentist utilizing data from the International Crisis Behaviour Project on cases in the period 1945-81. A set of bivariate and multivariate indicators and an index of violence are used in the assessment of the proposed impact ethnic conflicts have on interstate violence. Four of the five propositions are confirmed. Third, the paper offers some preliminary conclusions about the policy and theoretical implications of the international dimensions of ethnic conflict, including directions for future research

Managing Interstate Ethnic Tensions: The Thailand-Malaysia Experience

Thai Malay separatism, centred in the southern Thai provinces of Pattani and Yala, offers an interesting contrast to current ethnic conflicts around the globe. Next to the Moro of the Philippines, the Malay of Thailand have been one of Southeast Asia's most vocal and least assimilated Muslim minorities. Despite the presence of significant international linkages, the Thai Malay secessionist movement has yet to result in serious conflict between Thailand and Malaysia. The goal of this inquiry is to determine how and why these processes have led to minimized interstate ethnic conflict and to specify how the management of these tensions could provide insight for those states that are not coping well. Three phases of Thai Malay secessionism, including their impact on Thailand Malaysia relations, are examined. The article concludes with an assessment of these patterns for the management and resolution of interstate ethnic conflict