Peace agreements without commitment

In this paper we present a model of war between two rational and completely informed players. We show that in the absence of binding agreements war can be avoided in many cases by one player transferring money to the other player. In most cases, the "rich" country transfers part of her money to the "poor" country. Only when the military proficiency of the "rich" country is sufficiently great, it could be that the "poor" country can stop the war by transfering part of its resources to the "rich" country

Cooperative production and efficiency

We characterize the sharing rule for which a contribution mechanism achieves efficiency in a cooperative production setting when agents are heterogeneous. The sharing rule bears no resemblance to those considered by the previous literature. We also show for a large class of sharing rules that if Nash equilibrium yields efficient allocations, the production function displays constant returns to scale, a case in which cooperation in production is useless

Rational Sabotage in Cooperative Production with Heterogeneous Agents

We present a model of cooperative production in which rational agents might carry out sabotage activities that decrease output. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium without sabotage. It is shown that the absence of sabotage in equilibrium depends on the interplay between technology, relative productivity of agents and the degree of meritocracy. In particular we show that, ceteris paribus, meritocratic systems give more incentives to sabotage than egalitarian systems.Publicad

The roles, needs, and challenges of Arkansas women in agriculture

Participants of the 2005-2007 Arkansas Women in Agriculture conferences were surveyed for this study to identify recent changes in their roles on and off the farm, the factors important to their success, and the problems they face in their businesses. Respondents were broken into two groups—Farm (women owner-operators of farms, ranches, or agribusinesses) and Non-farm (women working in supporting agricultural industries)—for comparisons and responses were also analyzed across years. Farm women most often reported problems keeping good employees each year, while Non-farm women often reported having problems with being respected as a female business person. For Farm women, the factor most often cited as important to success in their business was being able to pass the business on to family; for Non-farm women it was being able to apply their talents and skills. These results suggest that different types of agricultural women hold different attitudes about business and face different challenges. Results across years suggest that successes and problems may change over time. This marks some of the first research on the roles, challenges, and attitudes of Arkansas’ women in agriculture. Based on the results of this research, educational efforts are underway across the state to assist Arkansas’ women in agriculture. However, given the small sample of women surveyed, further research is still needed to fully understand the roles, challenges, and attitudes of Arkansas’ women in agriculture

A Generalized Sznajd Model

In the last decade the Sznajd Model has been successfully employed in modeling some properties and scale features of both proportional and majority elections. We propose a new version of the Sznajd model with a generalized bounded confidence rule - a rule that limits the convincing capability of agents and that is essential to allow coexistence of opinions in the stationary state. With an appropriate choice of parameters it can be reduced to previous models. We solved this new model both in a mean-field approach (for an arbitrary number of opinions) and numerically in a Barabasi-Albert network (for three and four opinions), studying the transient and the possible stationary states. We built the phase portrait for the special cases of three and four opinions, defining the attractors and their basins of attraction. Through this analysis, we were able to understand and explain discrepancies between mean-field and simulation results obtained in previous works for the usual Sznajd Model with bounded confidence and three opinions. Both the dynamical system approach and our generalized bounded confidence rule are quite general and we think it can be useful to the understanding of other similar models.Comment: 19 pages with 8 figures. Submitted to Physical Review

Connections between the Sznajd Model with General Confidence Rules and graph theory

The Sznajd model is a sociophysics model, that is used to model opinion propagation and consensus formation in societies. Its main feature is that its rules favour bigger groups of agreeing people. In a previous work, we generalized the bounded confidence rule in order to model biases and prejudices in discrete opinion models. In that work, we applied this modification to the Sznajd model and presented some preliminary results. The present work extends what we did in that paper. We present results linking many of the properties of the mean-field fixed points, with only a few qualitative aspects of the confidence rule (the biases and prejudices modelled), finding an interesting connection with graph theory problems. More precisely, we link the existence of fixed points with the notion of strongly connected graphs and the stability of fixed points with the problem of finding the maximal independent sets of a graph. We present some graph theory concepts, together with examples, and comparisons between the mean-field and simulations in Barab\'asi-Albert networks, followed by the main mathematical ideas and appendices with the rigorous proofs of our claims. We also show that there is no qualitative difference in the mean-field results if we require that a group of size q>2, instead of a pair, of agreeing agents be formed before they attempt to convince other sites (for the mean-field, this would coincide with the q-voter model).Comment: 15 pages, 18 figures. To be submitted to Physical Revie