Investigating Diversity in the Banking Sector in Europe: The Performance and Role of Savings Banks. CEPS Paperbacks. June 2009

In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the foundations of modern and innovative financial systems developed over decades have suffered serious damage. This has triggered massive state interventions and has led authorities to revamp the regulatory structures and frameworks. While many voices have called for a return to more traditional approaches to banking and finance, no one has argued the merits of diversity. This book investigates the merits of a diverse banking system with a special focus on the performance and role of savings banks in selected European countries where they are still prominent (Austria, Germany and Spain) and where they have progressively disappeared (Belgium and Italy). The theoretical and empirical arguments that are developed in this book tend to support the view that it is economically and socially beneficial to have ‘dual bottom-line’ institutions, such as savings banks. For those who accept this premise, it would suggest that policy-makers should not take or support actions that could jeopardise this valuable element of the financial system in various countries in Europe and of the emerging integrated European financial system

Estimating the intensity of price and non-price competition in banking

We model bank oligopoly behaviour using price and non-price competition as strategic variables in an expanded conjectural variations framework. Rivals can respond to changes in both loan and deposit market prices as well as (non-price) branch market shares. The model is illustrated using data for Spain which, over 1986-2002, eliminated interest rate and branching restrictions and set off a competitive race to lock-in expanded market shares. Banks use both interest rates and branches as strategic variables and both have changed over time. We illustrate the results using a regional vs. a national specification for the relevant markets.non-price competition, banking, market shares

A machine learning approach to the digitalization of bank customers: evidence from random and causal forests

Understanding the digital jump of bank customers is key to design strategies to bring on board and keep online users, as well as to explain the increasing competition from new providers of financial services (such as BigTech and FinTech). This paper employs a machine learning approach to examine the digitalization process of bank customers using a comprehensive consumer finance survey. By employing a set of algorithms (random forests, conditional inference trees and causal forests) this paper identities the features predicting bank customers’ digitalization process, illustrates the sequence of consumers’ decision-making actions and explores the existence of causal relationships in the digitalization process. Random forests are found to provide the highest performance–they accurately predict 88.41% of bank customers’ online banking adoption and usage decisions. We find that the adoption of digital banking services begins with information-based services (e.g., checking account balance), conditional on the awareness of the range of online services by customers, and then is followed by transactional services (e.g., online/mobile money transfer). The diversification of the use of online channels is explained by the consciousness about the range of services available and the safety perception. A certain degree of complementarity between bank and non-bank digital channels is also found. The treatment effect estimations of the causal forest algorithms confirm causality of the identified explanatory factors. These results suggest that banks should address the digital transformation of their customers by segmenting them according to their revealed preferences and offering them personalized digital services. Additionally, policymakers should promote financial digitalization, designing policies oriented towards making consumers aware of the range of online services available.FUNCAS Foundation PGC2018 - 099415 - B - 100 MICINN/FEDER/UEJunta de Andalucia P18RT-3571 P12.SEJ.246

Evidence of Regulatory Arbitrage in Cross-Border Mergers of Banks in the EU

Banks are in the business of taking calculated risks. Expanding the geographic footprint of an organization’s profit-making activities changes the geographic pattern of its exposure to loss in ways that are hard for regulators and supervisors to observe. This paper tests and confirms the hypothesis that differences in the character of safety-net benefits that are available to banks in individual EU countries help to explain the nature of cross-border merger activity. If they wish to protect taxpayers from potentially destabilizing regulatory arbitrage, central bankers need to develop statistical procedures for assessing supervisory strength and weakness in partner countries. We believe that the methods and models used here can help in this task.

Evidence of Differences in the Effectiveness of Safety-Net Management in European Union Countries

EU financial safety nets are social contracts that assign uncertain benefits and burdens to taxpayers in different member countries. To help national officials to assess their taxpayers' exposures to loss from partner countries, this paper develops a way to estimate how well markets and regulators in 14 of the EU-15 countries have controlled deposit-institution risk-shifting in recent years. Our method traverses two steps. The first step estimates leverage, return volatility, and safety-net benefits for individual EU financial institutions. For stockholder-owned banks, input data feature 1993-2004 data on stock-market capitalization. Parallel accounting values are used to calculate enterprise value (albeit less precisely) for mutual savings institutions. The second step uses the output from the first step as input into regression models of safety-net benefits and interprets the results. Parameters of the second-step models express differences in the magnitude of safety-net subsidies and in the ability of financial markets and regulators in member countries to restrain the flow of safety-net subsidies to commercial banks and savings institutions. We conclude by showing that banks from high-subsidy and low-restraint countries have initiated and received the lion's share of cross-border M&A activity. The efficiency, stabilization, and distributional effects of allowing banks to and from differently subsidized environments to expand their operations in partner countries pose policy issues that the EU ought to address.