When judges face politicized reelections, their opinions on hot-button issues change to reflect the majority view

Judges are supposed to rule solely based on their interpretation of the law rather than the desires of the public. However, many judges are elected to their positions and must endure re-election campaigns. Using data from 1980-2006, Brandice Canes-Wrone examines how the rise of policy oriented judicial campaigns have affected judges’ opinions on the death penalty. She concludes that when faced with elections, judges respond like elected officials, changing their opinions based on majority support

Electoral Business Cycles in OECD Countries

Studies of OECD countries have generally failed to detect real economic expansions in the pre-election period, casting doubt on the existence of opportunistic political business cycles. We develop a theory that predicts a substantial portion of the economy experiences a real decline in the pre-election period. Specifically, the political uncertainty created by elections induces private actors to postpone investments with high costs of reversal. The resulting declines, referred to as reverse electoral business cycles, are larger the more competitive the electoral race and the greater the polarization between major parties. We test these predictions using quarterly data on private fixed investment in ten OECD countries between 1975 and 2006. The results suggest that reverse electoral business cycles exist, and as expected, depend on electoral competitiveness and partisan polarization. Moreover, simply by removing private fixed investment from gross domestic product (GDP), we uncover robust evidence of opportunistic cycles.

Reverse Electoral Business Cycles and Housing Markets

We argue that the political uncertainty generated by elections encourages private actors to delay investments that entail high costs of reversal, creating a pre-election decline in economic activity entitled a "reverse electoral business cycle." This incentive for delay becomes greater as policy differences between parties/candidates increase. Using new survey and observational data from the United States, we test these arguments. The individual-level analysis assesses whether respondents' perceptions of presidential candidates' policy differences increased the likelihood of postponing certain actions and purchases. For one of these items, housing, we collected observational data to examine whether electoral cycles indeed induce a pre-election decline in economic activity. The findings support the predictions and cannot be explained by existing theories of political business cycles.

Measuring the Chilling Effect

Supreme Court doctrine grants special protection against laws that “chill” protected speech, most prominently via the overbreadth doctrine. The overbreadth doctrine permits persons whose own speech is unprotected to challenge laws that infringe the protected speech of third parties. The Court has not generally applied overbreadth and the other speech-protective doctrines to other constitutional rights even though other rights could also be subject to a chilling effect. The case law simply assumes that the chilling effect only acts on the exercise of speech, and that this justifies treating speech differently from other rights. We tested these assumptions with respect to abortion rights. By comparing abortion rates with state laws over a two-decade-plus period, we found a statistically significant correlation between laws forbidding late-term abortions and the reduction of not only late-term but also “near-late-term” abortions, i.e., abortions in the roughly one month before the period in which abortions are forbidden. That effect persists even after controlling for potentially confounding variables, such as the number of abortion providers and pro-life public opinion. Moreover, the effect is not limited to the year of enactment or associated with failed policy initiatives, suggesting that the impact is due to the law itself rather than associated publicity. These findings are consistent with, and strongly suggestive of, a chilling effect on abortion providers and/or women seeking abortions. This result undermines the implicit assumption that the chilling effect is unique to laws regulating speech and vindicates the general proposition that laws can chill the exercise of constitutional rights beyond their literal coverage

Measuring the Chilling Effect

Supreme Court doctrine grants special protection against laws that “chill” protected speech, most prominently via the overbreadth doctrine. The overbreadth doctrine permits persons whose own speech is unprotected to challenge laws that infringe the protected speech of third parties. The Court has not generally applied overbreadth and the other speech-protective doctrines to other constitutional rights even though other rights could also be subject to a chilling effect. The case law simply assumes that the chilling effect only acts on the exercise of speech, and that this justifies treating speech differently from other rights. We tested these assumptions with respect to abortion rights. By comparing abortion rates with state laws over a two-decade-plus period, we found a statistically significant correlation between laws forbidding late-term abortions and the reduction of not only late-term but also “near-late-term” abortions, i.e., abortions in the roughly one month before the period in which abortions are forbidden. That effect persists even after controlling for potentially confounding variables, such as the number of abortion providers and pro-life public opinion. Moreover, the effect is not limited to the year of enactment or associated with failed policy initiatives, suggesting that the impact is due to the law itself rather than associated publicity. These findings are consistent with, and strongly suggestive of, a chilling effect on abortion providers and/or women seeking abortions. This result undermines the implicit assumption that the chilling effect is unique to laws regulating speech and vindicates the general proposition that laws can chill the exercise of constitutional rights beyond their literal coverage

For Congressional donors, politicians’ policy preferences are more important than their party

Members of Congress spend a great deal of their time fundraising. But what incentivizes those with money to give it to Congressional politicians? In new research which surveyed more than 2,800 in and out of state donors, Michael Barber, Sharece Thrower, and Brandice Canes-Wrone find that donors are more likely to give to senators when their votes align with their policy preferences, as well as to legislators who serve on committees that are important to their profession. Additionally, donors from the same state as senators give around $350 more on average than those from elsewhere

Out of Step, Out of Office: Electoral Accountability and House Members’ Voting

Does a typical House member need to worry about the electoral ramifications of his roll-call decisions? We investigate the relationship between incumbents’ electoral performance and roll-call support for their party—controlling for district ideology, challenger quality, and campaign spending, among other factors—through a series of tests of the 1956–1996 elections. The tests produce three key findings indicating that members are indeed accountable for their legislative voting. First, in each election, an incumbent receives a lower vote share the more he supports his party. Second, this effect is comparable in size to that of other widely recognized electoral determinants. Third, a member’s probability of retaining office decreases as he offers increased support for his party, and this relationship holds for not only marginal, but also safe members

Electoral Cycles, Investment, and Institutional Constraints in Developing Democracies

A longstanding question is whether policy uncertainty reduces private fixed investment in developing democracies. Yet studying the question empirically has proven challenging given that economic activity can cause as well as result from policy uncertainty. We investigate this issue within the context of electoral business cycles, building on research that suggests elections provide an exogenous source of policy uncertainty. As a central part of this analysis, which involves four decades of data from 57 developing democracies, we examine how institutional constraints moderate the relationship. Three main findings emerge. First, on average, elections are associated with a decline in private fixed investment. Second, however, this effect varies according to the level of institutional constraints; as they increase, the electoral cycle becomes less pronounced, including in specifications that account for the potential endogeneity of the institutions. Third, the effects are larger and more robust in systems with fixed elections

Electoral Cycles, Investment, and Institutional Constraints in Developing Democracies

A longstanding question is whether policy uncertainty reduces private fixed investment in developing democracies. Yet studying the question empirically has proven challenging given that economic activity can cause as well as result from policy uncertainty. We investigate this issue within the context of electoral business cycles, building on research that suggests elections provide an exogenous source of policy uncertainty. As a central part of this analysis, which involves four decades of data from 57 developing democracies, we examine how institutional constraints moderate the relationship. Three main findings emerge. First, on average, elections are associated with a decline in private fixed investment. Second, however, this effect varies according to the level of institutional constraints; as they increase, the electoral cycle becomes less pronounced, including in specifications that account for the potential endogeneity of the institutions. Third, the effects are larger and more robust in systems with fixed elections