Quitting in Protest: A Theory of Presidential Policy Making and Agency Response

This paper examines the effects of centralized presidential policy-making, implemented through unilateral executive action, on the willingness of bureaucrats to exert effort and stay in the government. Extending models in organizational economics, we show that policy initiative by the president is a substitute for initiative by civil servants. Yet, total effort is enhanced when both work. Presidential centralization of policy often impels policy-oriented bureaucrats ( zealots ) to quit rather than implement presidential policies they dislike. Those most likely to quit are a range of moderate bureaucrats. More extreme bureaucrats may be willing to wait out an opposition president in the hope of tempering future policy when an allied president is elected. As control of the White House alternates between ideologically opposed extreme presidents, policy-minded moderates are stripped from bureaucratic agencies leaving only policy extremists or poorly performing slackers. These departures degrade policy initiative in moderate agencies

Public Sector Personnel Economics: Wages, Promotions, and the Competence-Control Trade-off

We model personnel policies in public agencies, examining how wages and promotion standards can partially offset a fundamental contracting problem: the inability of public sector workers to contract on performance, and the inability of political masters to contract on forbearance from meddling. Despite the dual contracting problem, properly constructed personnel policies can encourage intrinsically motivated public sector employees to invest in expertise, seek promotion, remain in the public sector, and develop policy projects. However, doing so requires internal personnel policies that sort slackers from zealots. Personnel policies that accomplish this task are quite different in agencies where acquired expertise has little value in the private sector, and agencies where acquired expertise commands a premium in the private sector. Finally, even with well-designed personnel policies, there remains an inescapable trade-off between political control and expertise acquisition

Double-averaged velocity and stress distributions for hydraulically-smooth and transitionally-rough turbulent flows

Peer reviewedPreprin

Formation of Kuiper Belt Binaries

The discovery that a substantial fraction of Kuiper Belt objects (KBOs) exists in binaries with wide separations and roughly equal masses, has motivated a variety of new theories explaining their formation. Goldreich et al. (2002) proposed two formation scenarios: In the first, a transient binary is formed, which becomes bound with the aid of dynamical friction from the sea of small bodies (L^2s mechanism); in the second, a binary is formed by three body gravitational deflection (L^3 mechanism). Here, we accurately calculate the L^2s and L^3 formation rates for sub-Hill velocities. While the L^2s formation rate is close to previous order of magnitude estimates, the L^3 formation rate is about a factor of 4 smaller. For sub-Hill KBO velocities (v << v_H) the ratio of the L^3 to the L^2s formation rate is 0.05 (v/v_H) independent of the small bodies' velocity dispersion, their surface density or their mutual collisions. For Super-Hill velocities (v >> v_H) the L^3 mechanism dominates over the L^2s mechanism. Binary formation via the L^3 mechanism competes with binary destruction by passing bodies. Given sufficient time, a statistical equilibrium abundance of binaries forms. We show that the frequency of long-lived transient binaries drops exponentially with the system's lifetime and that such transient binaries are not important for binary formation via the L^3 mechanism, contrary to Lee et al. (2007). For the L^2s mechanism we find that the typical time, transient binaries must last, to form Kuiper Belt binaries (KBBs) for a given strength of dynamical friction, D, increases only logarithmically with D. Longevity of transient binaries only becomes important for very weak dynamical friction (i.e. D \lesssim 0.002) and is most likely not crucial for KBB formation.Comment: 20 pages, 3 figures, Accepted for publication in ApJ, correction of minor typo