Economic Policy in Stormy Waters: Financial Vulnerability in Emerging Economies

I. Introduction II. Time Inconsistency III. The Origins of Financial Crises IV. The Nature of Financial Crises V. Emerging Bond Markets VI. National Economic Policy Proposals VII. International Economic Policy Proposals VIII. Alternative Monetary Rules IX. Conclusionstime inconsistency; external factors; contagion; sudden stop; fear of floating; dollarization; inflation targeting

Capital Flows and Capital-Market Crises: The Simple Economics of Sudden Stops

The paper studies mechanisms through which a sudden stop in international credit flows may bring about financial and balance of payments crises. It is shown that these crises can occur even though the current account deficit is fully financed by foreign direct investment. However, equity and long-term bond financing may shield the economy from sudden stop crises. The paper also examines possible factors that could trigger sudden stops, and argues that the greater independence that countries have, as compared to regions of a given country, could help to explain why sudden stop crises are more prevalent and destructive at international than at national levels.

Monetary Policy Challenges in Emerging Markets: Sudden Stop, Liability Dollarization, and Lender of Last Resort

The paper argues that Emerging Market economies (EMs) face financial vulnerabilities that weaken the effectiveness of a domestic Lender of Last Resort (LOLR). As a result, monetary policy is inextricably linked to the state of the credit market. In particular, the central bank should be ready to operate as LOLR during Sudden Stop (of capital inflows) by releasing international reserves in an effective manner. These conditions also impact on optimal monetary policy in normal but high-volatility periods. The paper further argues that during those periods interest rate rules may engender excessive volatility of exchange rates and, thus, that it may be advisable to temporarily supplement those rules by foreign exchange market intervention or outright exchange rate pegging. At a fundamental level, the analysis suggests that the state-of-the-art literature summarized by Woodford (2003) or even more heterodox approaches exemplified by Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003) are likely fall short of providing a satisfactory guide for monetary policy in EMs.

Optimal Time-Consistent Fiscal Policy with Uncertain Lifetimes

This paper studies optimal fiscal policy in an economy where heterogeneous agents with uncertain lifetimes coexist. We show that some plausible social welfare functions lead to time-inconsistent optimal plans, and we suggest restrictions on social preferences that avoid the problem. The normative prescriptions of a time-consistent utilitarian planner generalize the 'two-part Golden Rule" suggested by Samuelson, and imply aggregate dynamics similar to those arisingin the Cass-Koopmans-Ramsey optimal growth framework. We characterize lump-sum transfer schemes that allow the optimal allocation to be decentralized as the competitive equilibrium of an economy with actuarially fair annuities. The lump-sum transfers that accomplish this decentralization are age dependent in general.

Obstacles to Transforming Centrally-Planned Economies: The Role of Capital Markets

This paper identifies obstacles hindering the transformation of centrally-planned economies (CPEs) into well-functioning market economies. The analysis is motivated by the recent experience with economic transformation and restructuring in Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. The economic system in CPEs is highly distorted. Prices do not represent real social costs, incentives systems are absent, losses of unprofitable state-owned enterprises are automatically financed, legislations vital for the functioning of markets are not in place, private ownership and property rights are underdeveloped, bankruptcy laws are absent, markets are missing, shortages prevail and, occasionally, inflation is high. The obstacles identified relate to (i) anticipatory dynamics, (ii) monetary overhang and the budget, and (iii) underdeveloped credit markets. It is demonstrated that these obstacles inhibit the effectiveness of price reform, monetary and credit policies, and trade liberalization. The analysis focuses on various ways to remove the obstacles. In this regard, a special examination is made of the implications of cleaning the balance sheets of enterprises and banks from nonperforming loans, as well as ways to enhance credibility. In the absence of such measures, privatization will be difficult since the necessary information about creditworthiness of firms is lacking. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of sequencing, safety nets. and their associated obstacles.