Are the anti-globalists right? Gains-from-trade without a Walrasian auctioneer

We examine whether the "fear" of globalisation can be rationalised by economic theory. To do so, we depart from the standard AD/AS (partial) equilibrium model where the coordinational role of the Auctioneer is substituted by an implementation device based on learning (Guesnerie, 1992). By endowing producers with a learning ability to forecast market prices, individual profit-maximizing production decisions become interdependent in a strategic sense (strategic substitutes). Performing basic comparative statics exercises, we show that "competitiveness" matters in a precise sense: as foreign producers gain access to the home market, home producers' ability to forecast market prices is undermined, so being their ability to forecast the profit consequences of their production decisions. When performing a standard open economy exercise in such a framework, we show that the existence of standard efficiency gains - due to the increase in competition (or spatial price stabilization) - is traded-off against coordination upon the welfare enhancing free-trade equilibrium (stabilizing price expectations). Therefore, we identify a new rationale for an exogenous price intervention in open economy targeting coordination, to allow trading countries to fully reap the benefits from trade. We illustrate this point showing that classical measures evaluating ex-ante the desirability of economic integration (net welfare gains) do not always advice integration between two expectationally stable economies

Are the anti-globalists right? Gains-from-trade without a Walrasian auctioneer

We examine whether the "fear" of globalisation can be rationalised by economic theory. To do so, we depart from the standard AD/AS (partial) equilibrium model where the coordinational role of the Auctioneer is substituted by an implementation device based on learning (Guesnerie, 1992). By endowing producers with a learning ability to forecast market prices, individual profit-maximizing production decisions become interdependent in a strategic sense (strategic substitutes). Performing basic comparative statics exercises, we show that "competitiveness" matters in a precise sense: as foreign producers gain access to the home market, home producers' ability to forecast market prices is undermined, so being their ability to forecast the profit consequences of their production decisions. When performing a standard open economy exercise in such a framework, we show that the existence of standard efficiency gains - due to the increase in competition (or spatial price stabilization) - is traded-off against coordination upon the welfare enhancing free-trade equilibrium (stabilizing price expectations). Therefore, we identify a new rationale for an exogenous price intervention in open economy targeting coordination, to allow trading countries to fully reap the benefits from trade. We illustrate this point showing that classical measures evaluating ex-ante the desirability of economic integration (net welfare gains) do not always advice integration between two expectationally stable economies. <br><br> Keywords; globalisation, rational expectations, coordination, common knowledge

Are the antiglobalists right? Gains-from-trade without a walrasian auctioneer

We examine whether the "fear" of globalisation can be rationalised by economic theory. To do so, we depart from the standard AD/AS (partial) equilibrium model where the coordinational role of the Auctioneer is substituted by an implementation device based on learning (Guesnerie, 1992). By endowing producers with a learning ability to forecast market prices, individual profit-maximizing production decisions become interdependent in a strategic sense (strategic substitutes). Performing basic comparative statics exercises, we show that "competitiveness" matters in a precise sense: as foreign producers gain access to the home market, home producers' ability to forecast market prices is undermined, so being their ability to forecast the profit consequences of their production decisions. When performing a standard open economy exercise in such a framework, we show that the existence of standard efficiency gains - due to the increase in competition (or spatial price stabilization) - is traded-off against coordination upon the welfare enhancing free-trade equilibrium (stabilizing price expectations). Therefore, we identify a new rationale for an exogenous price intervention in open economy targeting coordination, to allow trading countries to fully reap the benefits from trade. We illustrate this point showing that classical measures evaluating ex-ante the desirability of economic integration (net welfare gains) do not always advice integration between two expectationally stable economies.open economy ; rational expectations ; coordination ; common knowledge

Are the antiglobalists right? Gains-from-trade without a walrasian auctioneer

We examine whether the "fear" of globalisation can be rationalised by economic theory. To do so, we depart from the standard AD/AS (partial) equilibrium model where the coordinational role of the Auctioneer is substituted by an implementation device based on learning (Guesnerie, 1992). By endowing producers with a learning ability to forecast market prices, individual profit-maximizing production decisions become interdependent in a strategic sense (strategic substitutes). Performing basic comparative statics exercises, we show that "competitiveness" matters in a precise sense: as foreign producers gain access to the home market, home producers' ability to forecast market prices is undermined, so being their ability to forecast the profit consequences of their production decisions. When performing a standard open economy exercise in such a framework, we show that the existence of standard efficiency gains - due to the increase in competition (or spatial price stabilization) - is traded-off against coordination upon the welfare enhancing free-trade equilibrium (stabilizing price expectations). Therefore, we identify a new rationale for an exogenous price intervention in open economy targeting coordination, to allow trading countries to fully reap the benefits from trade. We illustrate this point showing that classical measures evaluating ex-ante the desirability of economic integration (net welfare gains) do not always advice integration between two expectationally stable economies.A l'aide de la théorie économique, on examine si la peur du libre-échange peut être rationalisée. Pour ce faire, on substitue l'élément de coordination implicite présent dans le modèle DA/OA de la macroéconomie standard (commissaire priseur "walrasien") par un mécanisme de "concrétisation" de l'équilibre fondé sur l'apprentissage (Guesnerie, 1992). Doués de cette capacité individuelle d'apprentissage, les producteurs vont former des anticipations sur le prix apurant le marché, et de ce fait reconnaître que leurs décisions de production dépendent des décisions de production des autres. Un exercice de statique comparée simple montre que la "compétitivité" est rationnelle dans un sens très précis : dès lors que les producteurs étrangers écoulent leur production dans le marché national, les producteurs nationaux voient leur capacité de prévoir les conséquences en termes de profit de leurs décisions de production diminuée, du fait de leur difficulté accrue de prévoir le prix de marché toute chose égale par ailleurs. Dans ce cadre, un exercice standard d'intégration économique révèle l'existence d'une tension entre les gains à l'échange (stabilité "spatiale" des prix d'autarcie) et la capacité des producteurs à apprendre l'équilibre de l'économie intégrée ("stabilité" de leurs anticipations du prix). C'est ainsi qu'on justifie la pertinence d'une intervention exogène qui, favorisant la coordination, permettrait aux pays matérialiser les gains à l'échange de l'intégration. Ce point est illustré à l'aide d'un exemple où ex-ante, l'évaluation classique des gains à l'ouverture ne "conseille" pas toujours l'intégration entre des économies "stables" à l'autarcie

The ASEAN Free Trade Agreement: Impact on Trade Flows and External Trade Barriers

Using detailed data on trade and tariffs from 1992-2007, we examine how the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement has affected trade with non-members and external tariffs facing non-members. First, we examine the effect of preferential and external tariff reduction on import growth from ASEAN insiders and outsiders across HS 6-digit industries. We find no evidence that preferential liberalization has led to lower import growth from non-members. Second, we examine the relationship between preferential tariff reduction and MFN tariff reduction. We find that preferential liberalization tends to precede external tariff liberalization. To examine whether this tariff complementarity is a result of simultaneous decision making, we use the scheduled future preferential tariff reductions (agreed to in 1992) as instruments for actual preferential tariff changes after the Asia crisis. The results remain unchanged, suggesting that there is a causal relationship between preferential and MFN tariff reduction. We also find that external liberalization was relatively sharper in the products where preferences are likely to be most damaging, proving further support for a causal effect. Overall, our results imply that the ASEAN agreement has been a force for broader liberalization.regionalism, external tariffs, trade liberalization, preferential trade agreements, Asia

Temperant portfolio choice and background risk: evidence from France

We explore empirically whether earnings uncertainty and borrowing constraints deter households from the stockmarket, consistent with the predictions of theoretical studies of portfolio choice in the presence of uninsurable earnings. Recent extensions highlight the importance of the correlation between earnings and financial risks. We use a self-assessed proxy for the correlation from the DELTA-TNS 2002 cross-sectional survey. While income risk does not deter from the stockmarket those households' reporting a negative correlation, it does for those who report a non-negative sign, consistent with economic theory predictions.portfolio choice ; background risk ; risk aversion ; prudence ; temperance

The ASEAN free trade agreement : impact on trade flows and external trade barriers

Using detailed data on trade and tariffs from 1992-2007, the authors examine how the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement has affected trade with nonmembers and external tariffs facing nonmembers. First, the paper examines the effect of preferential and external tariff reduction on import growth from ASEAN insiders and outsiders across HS 6-digit industries. The analysis finds no evidence that preferential liberalization has led to lower import growth from nonmembers. Second, it examines the relationship between preferential tariff reduction and MFN tariff reduction. The analysis finds that preferential liberalization tends to precede external tariff liberalization. To examine whether this tariff complementarity is a result of simultaneous decision making, the authors use the scheduled future preferential tariff reductions (agreed to in 1992) as instruments for actual preferential tariff changes after the Asia crisis. The results remain unchanged, suggesting that there is a causal relationship between preferential and MFN tariff reduction. The findings also indicate that external liberalization was relatively sharper in the products where preferences are likely to be most damaging, proving further support for a causal effect. Overall, the results imply that the ASEAN agreement has been a force for broader liberalization.Free Trade,Trade Policy,Trade Law,Trade and Regional Integration,International Trade and Trade Rules

Subjective Stock Market Expectations and Portfolio Choice.

Stock market; Portfolio selection; subjective beliefs;

Sequential exporting: how firms break into foreign markets

Many countries are looking to their export sectors as a source of future growth, but how do domestic companies make a success of selling their output abroad? Research by Emanuel Ornelas and colleagues finds evidence of 'sequential exporting' - firms experimenting in nearby foreign markets before seeking to become big exporters.sequential exporting, international business

Sequential Exporting

Firms need to incur substantial sunk costs to break in foreign markets, yet many give up exporting shortly after their first experience, which typically involves very small sales. Conversely, other new exporters shoot up their foreign sales and expand to new destinations. We investigate a simple theoretical mechanism that can rationalize these patterns. A firm discovers its profitability as an exporter only after actually engaging in exporting. The profitability is positively correlated over time and across foreign destinations. Accordingly, once the firm learns how good it is as an exporter, it adjusts quantities and decides whether to exit and whether to serve new destinations. Thus, it is the possibility of profitable expansion at both the intensive and extensive margins what makes incurring the sunk costs to enter a single foreign market worthwhile despite the high failure rates. Using a census of Argentinean firm-level manufacturing exports from 2002 to 2007, we find empirical support for several implications of our proposed mechanism, indicating that the practice of "sequential exporting" is pervasive. Sequential exporting has broad but subtle implications for trade policy. For example, a reduction in trade barriers in a country has delayed entry effects in its own market, while also promoting entry in other markets. This trade externality poses challenges for the quantification of the effects of trade liberalization programs, while suggesting neglected but critical implications of international trade agreements.Export dynamics, trade liberalization, experimentation, uncertainty