Divine Practical Thought in Plotinus

Plotinus follows the Timaeus and the Platonist tradition before him in postulating the existence of a World Soul whose function it is to care for the sensible world as a whole. It is argued that, since the sensible world is providentially arranged, the World Soul’s care presupposes a sort of practical thinking that is as timeless as intellectual contemplation. To explain why this thinking is practical, the paper discusses Plotinus’ view on Aristotle’s distinction between praxis and poiêsis. To explain why it is timeless, it studies Plotinus’ view on Aristotle’s distinction between complete and incomplete actuality. The focus is on Enn. IV 4, 9-12

Rhetoric and Platonism in Fifth-Century Athens

There are reasons to believe that relations between Platonism and rhetoric in Athens during the fifth century CE were rather close. Both were major pillars of pagan culture, or paideia, and thus essential elements in the defense of paganism against increasingly powerful and repressive Christian opponents. It is easy to imagine that, under these circumstances, paganism was closing ranks and that philosophers and orators united in their efforts to save traditional ways and values. Although there is no doubt some truth to this view, a closer look reveals that the relations between philosophy and rhetoric were rather more complicated. In what follows, I will discuss these relations with a view to the Platonist school of Athens. By “the Platonist school of Athens” I mean the Platonist school founded by Plutarch of Athens in the late fourth century CE, and reaching a famous end under the leadership of Damascius in 529. I will first survey the evidence for the attitudes towards rhetoric prevailing amongst the most important Athenian Platonists of the time. I will then consider whether rhetoric played any role in the canonical course of study at the Platonist schools of Athens and Alexandria. Finally, I will conclude with some remarks about the philosophical interest that fifth century Platonists had in rhetoric

The Scepticism of Francisco Sanchez

The Renaissance sceptic and medical doctor Francisco Sanchez has been rather unduly neglected in scholarly work on Renaissance scepticism. In this paper I discuss his scepticism against the background of the ancient distinction between Academic and Pyrrhonian scepticism. I argue that Sanchez was a Pyrrhonist rather than, as has been claimed in recent years, a mitigated Academic sceptic. In keeping with this I shall also try to show that Sanchez was crucially influenced by the ancient medical school of empiricism, a school closely allied with Pyrrhonism

Reason and Necessity: The Descent of the Philosopher Kings

One of the reasons why one might find it worthwhile to study philosophers of late antiquity is the fact that they often have illuminating things to say about Plato and Aristotle. Plotinus, in particular, was a diligent and insightful reader of those great masters. Michael Frede was certainly of that view, and when he wrote that \u27[o]ne can learn much more from Plotinus about Aristotle than from most modern accounts of the Stagirite\u27, he would not have objected, I presume, to the claim that Plotinus is also extremely helpful for the study of Plato. In this spirit I wish to discuss a problem that has occupied modern Plato scholars for a long time, and I shall present a Plotinian answer to that problem. It concerns the descent of the philosopher-kings in Plato\u27s Republic

The Essential Functions of a Plotinian Soul

In reading Plotinus one might get the impression that the essential functions of a Plotinian soul are very similar to those of an Aristotelian soul. Plotinus talks of such vegetative functions as growth, nurture and reproduction. He discusses such animal functions as sense perception, imagination and memory. And he attributes such functions as reasoning, judging and having opinions to the soul. In Plotinus\u27 Psychology, Blumenthal bases his whole discussion of the soul on an analysis of these functions. He concludes that Plotinus \u27saw the soul\u27s activities as the functions of a series of faculties which were basically those of Aristotle\u27 (Blumenthal (1971), 135)

Plotin: Was fühlt der Leib? Was empfindet die Seele?

Thema dieses Aufsatzes ist Plotins Theorie der Emotionen, eines Themas, das in der antiken Philosophie in der Regel im Rahmen einer Handlungstheorie diskutiert wurde. So auch bei Plotin. In meinem Aufsatz wird gezeigt, wie der plotinische Leib-Seele-Dualismus im Hintergrund von Plotins Emotionstheorie steht: Leibliche Affekte werden von seelischen Emotionen unterschieden und es wird deutlich gemacht, dass das Haben einer Emotion im eigentlichen Sinn sowohl Rationalität als auch einen Leib voraussetzt. Zwei Aspekte werden besonders hervorgehoben: 1. Plotin gehört zu den Vertretern einer kognitivistischen Emotionstheorie. 2. Im Gegensatz zu vielen anderen Kognitivisten (z.B. der Stoa) macht er aber auch in einer detaillierten Analyse die Rolle des Leibes deutlich und kann diese im Rahmen seiner Theorie, im Gegensatz zu vielen anderen kognitivistischen Emotionstheoretikern, auch im Detail erklären

Plotinus on the Soul

It is the aim of this thesis to provide a systematic account of Plotinus' theory of the Soul. One main focus is on the so-called hypostasis Soul, an entity which Plotinus introduced into philosophy and which has been hardly considered in the literature up to now. I discuss why Plotinus introduced it, what it is, and what its relation is to individual souls.EThOS - Electronic Theses Online ServiceGBUnited Kingdo

Francisco Sanchez: A Renaissance Pyrrhonist Against Aristotelian Dogmatism

Francisco Sanchez (1550/51-1623) was a well-known skeptic in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. His one skeptical work, That Nothing is Known (Quod nihil scitur), first published in 1581, was widely read and went to four editions.1 Pierre Bayle praised him in his Dictionnaire historique et critique as a great Pyrrhonist (Bayle 1740: vol. IV, 133), and Gabriel Naudé recommended in 1644 that Sanchez\u27s skeptical work should be part of every learned library—next to that of Sextus Empiricus (see Jolly 1990).2 Even as late as 1702, Leibniz declared in a letter to the French mathematician and physicist Pierre de Varignon that he had often thought a reply to Sanchez would be a very useful thing indeed (Gerhardt 1859: 94-95). After this, Sanchez\u27s influence waned. He no longer seems to have been discussed much in the eighteenth century. In what follows, I will first discuss what kind of skepticism Sanchez adhered to: whether he was an Academic or a Pyrrhonian skeptic. Then I will consider Sanchez\u27s critique of the scholastic Aristotelians, the dogmatists of his day. Finally, I will ask where Sanchez stands in relation to modern Cartesian skepticism and whether his skepticism is purely theoretical or whether it also has implications for the practical affairs of life