Inequality and Education Funding: Theory and Evidence from the U.S. School Districts

We investigate the relationship between inequality and education funding in a model of probabilistic voting over public education spending where the private option is available. A change in inequality can have opposite effects at different income levels: higher inequality decreases public spending per student and increases enrollment in public schools in poor economies, while the opposite holds in the rich ones. A change in the tax base can also have non-monotonic e¤ects. We also study the implications of different voting participation across income groups. The predictions of the model are supported by U.S. school district-level data.

Growth Effects of Spatial Redistribution Policies

Regional income disparities have increased in many European countries recently, even as national and supra-national policy instruments were created to correct them. To explain these evolutions, we develop a two-region, two-sector model with migration and public investment in infrastructure and education. Accumulation and creation of new ideas and technologies as well as migration are at the core of differential regional growth. In this framework, we assess the effectiveness of structural funds, modelled on the EU policy. In a numerical example calibrated to Portugal, we find that, to diminish the initial gap in income per capita, the backward region needs to receive over 8% of its own GDP in structural funds, while the actual disbursements were around 4%. We also find that maximizing innovation in the backward region conflicts in the short run with the goal of maximizing its income per capita. Moreover, the rich region has an incentive to bias the allocation of structural funds towards human capital formation.two-region economy, structural change, migration, regional policy, European Union

Public Budget Composition, Fiscal(De)Centralization, and Welfare

We present a dynamic two-region model with overlapping generations. There are two types of public expenditure, education and infrastructure funding, and governments decide optimally on budget size (tax rate) and its allocation across the two outlays. Productivity of government infrastructure spending can differ across regions. This assumption follows well established empirical evidence, and highlights regional heterogeneity in a previously unexplored dimension. We study the implications of three different fiscal regimes for capital accumulation and aggregate national welfare. Full centralization of revenue and expenditure decisions is the optimal fiscal arrangement for the country when infrastructure spending productivity is similar across regions. When regional differences exist but are not too large, the partial centralization regime is optimal where the federal government sets a common tax rate, but allows the regional governments to decide on the budget composition. Only when the differences are sufficiently large does full decentralization become the optimal regime. National steady state output is instead highest when the economy is decentralized. This result is consistent with the “Oates conjecture” that fiscal decentralization increases capital accumulation. However, in terms of welfare this result can be reversed.fiscal federalism, capital accumulation, infrastructure, public education

Growth Effects of Spatial Redistribution Policies

We develop a two-region, two sector model with migration and public investment in infrastructure and education. In a numerical example calibrated to Portugal, we find that the structural funds can improve the growth rate of the lagging region and slightly reduce the regional inequality, without necessarily producing convergence. When the mix of national public investment departs from optimum, the allocation of supra-national funds across infrastructure and public education can partially offset this national sub-optimality. We also find that the short-run growth-maximizing mix is different from the long-run mix. Moreover, the rich region has an incentive to bias the allocation of structural funds towards human capital formation

Growth Effects of Spatial Redistribution Policies

We develop a two-region, two sector model with migration and public investment in infrastructure and education. In a numerical example calibrated to Portugal, we find that the structural funds can improve the growth rate of the lagging region and slightly reduce the regional inequality, without necessarily producing convergence. When the mix of national public investment departs from optimum, the allocation of supra-national funds across infrastructure and public education can partially offset this national sub-optimality. We also find that the short-run growth-maximizing mix is different from the long-run mix. Moreover, the rich region has an incentive to bias the allocation of structural funds towards human capital formation.endogenous growth, spatial redistribution, regional policy, European Union

Public Budget Composition, Fiscal(De)Centralization, and Welfare

We present a dynamic two-region model with overlapping generations. There are two types of public expenditure, education and infrastructure funding, and governments decide optimally on budget size (tax rate) and its allocation across the two outlays. Productivity of government infrastructure spending can differ across regions. This assumption follows well established empirical evidence, and highlights regional heterogeneity in a previously unexplored dimension. We study the implications of three different fiscal regimes for capital accumulation and aggregate national welfare. Full centralization of revenue and expenditure decisions is the optimal fiscal arrangement for the country when infrastructure spending productivity is similar across regions. When regional differences exist but are not too large, the partial centralization regime is optimal where the federal government sets a common tax rate, but allows the regional governments to decide on the budget composition. Only when the differences are sufficiently large does full decentralization become the optimal regime. National steady state output is instead highest when the economy is decentralized. This result is consistent with the “Oates conjecture” that fiscal decentralization increases capital accumulation. However, in terms of welfare this result can be reversed

Public versus private investment and growth in a hierarchical education system

The paper studies the interaction between public and private spending in a two-stage education framework (K-12 and tertiary education) and their effects on economic growth. We find that an increase in the overall education public spending crowds out the total level of private contributions and increases the share of resources that households devote to K-12 education. For a given public budget, a higher share of K-12 public funding induces higher private education spending overall, of which a larger share goes towards higher education. The model broadly matches data on education finance in the OECD countries. The calibrated parameter values suggest that at both stages public and private inputs are good yet imperfect substitutes, with a higher degree of complementarity in basic education. We show that the growth maximizing share of public spending devoted to K-12 should be high, irrespective of the size of the public budget. Using the calibrated model to compare the structure of education funding in the EU and the US, we find that, to maximize growth, high tax countries should use more of their public resources in tertiary education relative to low tax countries. This suggests that US efforts to improve K-12 education and the reform of higher education in Europe are consistent with the objective of increased economic growth.Basic and advanced education Private spending Public education policies Balanced growth

Public budget composition, fiscal (de)centralization, and welfare

We study the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization in a dynamic federal economy where governments decide on budget size and its allocation between public education and infrastructure spending. We find that full centralization of tax and expenditure policies is optimal when infrastructure productivity is similar across regions. When differences are not too large, partial centralization is optimal. With strong differences, full decentralization becomes optimal. National steady-state output tends to be highest under full decentralization. We provide a justification for the mixed evidence regarding the Oates conjecture by showing that full dominates partial decentralization, despite being inferior to complete decentralization.

Bill Zu and seminar participants at Darden School of Management

Abstract If there are diseconomies of scale in asset management, any predictability in mutual fund performance will be arbitraged away by rational investors seeking funds with the highest expected performance JEL codes: G2; G23