Eliciting taxpayer preferences increases tax compliance

Two experiments show that eliciting taxpayer preferences on government spending—providing taxpayer agency--increases tax compliance. We first create an income and taxation environment in a laboratory setting to test for compliance with a lab tax. Allowing a treatment group to express nonbinding preferences over tax spending priorities, leads to a 16% increase in tax compliance. A followup online study tests this treatment with a simulation of paying US federal taxes. Allowing taxpayers to signal their preferences on the distribution of government spending, results in a 15% reduction in the stated take-up rate of a questionable tax loophole. Providing taxpayer agency recouples tax payments with the public services obtained in return, reduces general anti-tax sentiment, and holds satisfaction with tax payment stable despite increased compliance with tax dues. With tax noncompliance costing the US government $385billion annually, providing taxpayer agency could have meaningful economic impact. At the same time, giving taxpayers a voice may act as a two-way "nudge," transforming tax payment from a passive experience to a channel of communication between taxpayers and government

The Power of Voice in Stimulating Morality: Eliciting Taxpayer Preferences Increases Tax Compliance

Decisions about paying taxes represent one of the most common moral quandaries faced by citizens. In the present research, we argue that taxpayer compliance can be raised by increasing “voice”: allowing taxpayers to express non-binding preferences about the way their taxes are used. We first test for effects of preference expression on tax compliance with a tax in a laboratory setting. Here, we find that allowing participants to express non-binding preferences over tax spending priorities leads to a 16% increase in compliance. A follow-up online study tests this treatment with a simulation of paying US federal taxes. Allowing taxpayers to express their preferences on the distribution of government spending reduces the stated take-up rate of a questionable tax loophole by 15%. A third experiment shows that this effect only occurs when taxpayers have voice in spending on preferred tax categories; allocating tax dollars across disliked spending categories increased neither feelings of voice nor likelihood of payment