Determinants and value relevance of UK CEO pay slice

This paper studies the CEO pay slice (CPS) of UK listed firms during the period 2003 to 2009. We investigate the determinants of CPS. We study the links between CPS and measures of firm performance. We find that firms with higher levels of corporate governance ratings and those with more independent boards tend to have higher CPS. In addition, we find that CEOs are more likely to receive lower compensation when they chair the board and when they work in firms with large board size. We also find that higher CPS is positively associated with firm performance after controlling for the firm-specific characteristics and corporate governance variables. We get compatible results when we examine the association between equity-based CPS and firm performance. Our results remain robust to alternative accounting measures of firm performance. Our results suggest that high UK CPS levels do indeed reflect top managerial talent rather than managerial power

Liberal conservatism, ‘boardization’ and the government of civil servants

Drawing inspiration from the loosely coupled genre of studies of governmentality, this article explores the emergence in Britain during the early years of the millennium of a distinctive liberal conservative scheme for the government of civil servants. The term ‘boardization’ has been used to characterize the trend to reproduce the technology of the board of directors in central government. Conservatives currently assign a distinctive role to the work of departmental ‘boards’ in the effective management of the Civil Service. Intimating the costs and risks of the Conservatives’ programme, we explore the role of diverse governmental forces in the emergence of the boards of the Civil Service as an object for action and intervention during the early years of the new millennium. We explore a mutation in the application of practices and techniques drawn from the domain of the business enterprise to the organization of the Civil Service. </jats:p

The Implementation of Corporate Governance Principles in an Emerging Economy: a critique of the situation in Cyprus

When the Cyprus economy was booming in the 1990s, key issues emanating from sound corporate governance, such as accountability, transparency and effective independent boards were not deemed important. However, largely as a result of the Cyprus stock exchange collapse of 2000, this view changed. In September 2002, due to the collapse, the Cyprus Stock Exchange implemented a Corporate Governance Code predicated largely on Anglo-Saxon principles of corporate governance. Copyright (c) 2006 The Authors; Journal compilation (c) 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Corporate governance, performance and take-overs: an empirical analysis of UK mergers

This paper analyses the relationship between the probability of being acquired, firm performance and governance structures. The acquired firms were all fully quoted on the London Stock Exchange and the acquisitions took place between 1990 and 1993. They were matched by a sample of non-acquired quoted companies. The sample was also analysed in terms of hostile and non-hostile acquisitions. It was found that the key governance characteristics which differentiated between acquired and nonacquired corporations related to the proportion of non-executive directors on the board and to whether or not the roles of chief executive officer and chairman were combined. It was also found that acquired firms were poor performers, which suggests that the internal governance structures had been ineffective. These results applied to hostile and non-hostile targets. The findings support the view that hostile acquisitions are disciplinary but cast doubt on the claim that non-hostile acquisitions are purely synergistic. The results also support the view that certain governance characteristics are effective substitutes for the take-over mechanism as a means of minimizing discretionary behaviour.