Environmental crime and judicial rectification of the Prestige oil spill: the polluter pays

The enforcement of institutional rules requires the judicial system to perform well. In the case of oil spills, courts are key actors in determining the allocation of liabilities according to international and national norms. In 2002, the Prestige oil spill led to a major environmental disaster on the coasts of Spain, France and Portugal. The limitations of liability provided by the International Regime of Civil Liability and Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage have prevented the polluters from fully compensating injured parties for the damage the spill produced. In 2013, the Spanish Provincial Court of A Coruña condemned the captain of the tanker for disobedience, but no environmental crime was found; therefore, no further civil liabilities were incurred. Nevertheless, in 2016, the Spanish Supreme Court overruled the ruling of the provincial court and proclaimed the existence of an environmental crime. This judicial rectification changed the allocation of liabilities, extended the application of the polluter-pays principle, and opened a different stage for estimating and covering the costs of the damage. This paper presents a highly relevant case study that analyses the new situation involving oil spills and the distribution of liabilities within the current international regime.Xunta de Galicia | Ref. GRC2014/022Xunta de Galicia | Ref. AGRUP2015/08Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. ECO2014-52412-

Oil spills, governance and institutional performance: the 1992 regime of liability and compensation for oil pollution damage

The oil industry is nowadays of vital importance for industrialized and developing countries. However, oil transportation continues to be a highly risky activity, both for the actors involved in its production and exchange and for the rest of society, producing enormous negative externalities. This article delves into the international system of liability and compensation for oil pollution damage (1992 CLC/CF) from the perspective of New Institutional Economics, evaluates its operation in practice across countries and its evolution over time. It reveals substantial heterogeneity in terms of performance across nations and the main drivers and obstacles to its transformation.Xunta de Galicia | Ref. GRC 2014/022Xunta de Galicia | Ref. AGRU2015/08Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. ECO 2014-52412-

The procyclicality of political trust in Spain

Political trust has been considered a necessary condition for good democratic and economic performance over time. The grave economic crisis that started in 2008, which is known as the Great Recession, has deteriorated the level of political trust in several countries. Some authors have shown that those countries with an increasing level of unemployment experienced a sharp decline in political trust. In particular, the political distrust in Spain has suffered a high increase since the Great Recession. This paper tests the procyclicality of political trust in Spain through the analysis and modeling of the relationship between political trust and business cycle in Spain over the period 1996-2015. The cross-correlation analysis, the Granger causality test, and the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) bounds testing approach coherently conclude the procyclicality of political trust in Spain. The unemployment rate shows a negative and statistically significant influence on political trust four quarters later.Xunta de Galicia | Ref. GRC2014/022Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. HAR2013-40760-RMinisterio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. ECO2014-52412-

The diversity and rapprochement of theories of institutional change: original institutionalism and new institutional economics

Understanding the complexity of institutional change is a necessary step in gaining deeper knowledge of economic performance over time, and it is one of the main challenges in the research agenda of institutionalism. Institutional change can be studied using a variety of theoretical approaches. We study some of the main approaches to institutional change in original economic institutionalism and new institutional economics. First, after comparing the approaches of Émile Durkheim and Thorstein Veblen, we focus on the contributions of the instrumental value theory and other original institutional traditions in the study of institutional change. Second, new institutional economics improved on the weak points of rational choice institutionalism regarding institutional change and incorporated the “institutions-as-rules” approach (Douglass North) and the “institutions-as-equilibria” approach (Avner Greif, Masahiko Aoki). We analyze both approaches to institutional change. Furthermore, we present an updated nonintegral overview of approaches to institutional change, show several interconnections between original and new institutionalisms, and conclude that the dialogue between the different theories of institutional change is relevant and beneficial.Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. HAR2013-40760-RXunta de Galicia | Ref. GRC2014/02

Por que os custos de transação são tão relevantes na governança política? : uma nova pesquesa institucional

ABSTRACT The New Institutional Economics, led by four Nobel laureates (Ronald Coase, Douglass North, Oliver Williamson and Elinor Ostrom), has showed that institutions and organizations are a medium for reducing transaction costs and obtaining a higher efficiency in economic performance. This paper goes into the research program of the New Institutional Economics to explain the relevance of transaction costs in political exchange and organization and show that transactions costs are even higher in political markets than in economic markets. The paper reviews the main contributions on institutions, transaction costs and political governance, and provides some lessons on political transacting and governance. The survey includes the most detailed catalogue of political transaction costs that has ever been published.RESUMO A Nova Economia Institucional, liderada por quatro ganhadores do Prêmio Nobel (Ronald Coase, Douglass North, Oliver Williamson e Elinor Ostrom), mostrou que as instituições e organizações são um meio para reduzir os custos de transação e obtenção de maior eficiência no desempenho econômico. Este artigo examina o programa da Nova Economia Institucional para explicar a importância dos custos de transação em intercâmbio político e organização, e mostrar que os custos são maiores nos mercados políticos do que nos mercados econômicos. O artigo analisa as principais contribuições sobre transação política e de governança. A pesquisa inclui o catálogo mais detalhado que já foi publicado dos custos políticos de transação

Economía de las instituciones: de Coase y North a Williamson y Ostrom

La Economía de las instituciones constituye un campo de referencia en la ciencia económica de principios del siglo xxi. La Nueva Economía Institucional impulsó el retorno de las instituciones a la agenda de investigación principal de los economistas. Para ello, Ronald Coase aportó la noción de los costes de transacción, Douglass North concibió a las instituciones como reglas de juego, Oliver Williamson conceptualizó la gobernanza de la empresa y Elinor Ostrom la gobernanza de los bienes comunes. La concesión del Nobel de Economía a Coase (1991), North (1993), Williamson (2009) y Ostrom (2009) evidencia el reconocimiento de los avances del análisis institucional moderno. Este artículo realiza una aproximación a las instituciones, la gobernanza y el cambio institucional mediante el análisis de las principales aportaciones de los cuatro autores de referencia y la discusión de los argumentos fundamentales de Nueva Economía institucional.Economics of Institutions constitutes a main field in economics of xxi Century. The New Institutional Economics propelled the «return of institutions» into the research agenda of the mainstream in economics. Ronald Coase provided the notion of transaction costs, Douglass North understood institutions as the rules of the game, Oliver Williamson conceptualized the governance of the firm and Elinor Ostrom studied the governance of the commons. The Nobel prizes awarded to Coase in 1991, North in 1993, Williamson in 2009 and Ostrom in 2009 show the advances of the modern institutional analysis. This paper implies an approach to institutions, governance and institutional change from the analyses of the main contributions of the four principal authors and the debate over the central arguments of the institutional economic literatureXunta de GaliciaMinisterio de Educación y Ciencia | Ref. HUM2007-62276Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación | Ref. ECO2009-1032

La economía política desde el estado depredador franquista al estado contractual español

Este artículo constituye un análisis de la evolución del Estado desde el franquismo a la democracia en España utilizando el enfoque teórico de la Nueva Economía Institucional y, en particular, la teoría del Estado de Douglass North. De este modo, se estudia como el Estado español transitó desde un modelo depredador a uno contractual, y se desgranan algunas claves importantes sobre la economía política del desarrollo español en la segunda mitad del siglo XX

El comportamiento humano en las ciencias sociales: un enfoque económico institucional

La Nueva Economía Institucional ha emergido en las últimas décadas del siglo XX como uno de los más sólidos programas de investigación en economía. Este programa modificó los supuestos de racionalidad sustantiva que sobre el comportamiento humano asumía la corriente principal en economía. Este artículo desarrolla los fundamentos teóricos que sobre el comportamiento humano sostiene el enfoque de la Nueva Economía Institucional. Las nociones de racionalidad limitada, modelos mentales, instituciones, dependencia cognitiva de la senda, creencias y aprendizaje ocupan la agenda que incorpora este trabajo. Estos fundamentos teóricos escapan del imperialismo de lo económico y facilitan el diálogo entre las distintas ciencias sociales

Environmental Economics: An Institutional Approach

Texto dispoñible en galego e españolNeste artigo realízase unha primeira aproximación teórica de corte institucional ó estudio das interrelacións entre economía e medio natural. En concreto, maniféstase a insuficiencia dunha Economía do Medio Natural edificada sobre a economía neoclásica ortodoxa. A partir do teorema de Coase, tantas veces mal interpretado na economía ambiental, e do corpo teórico da nova economía institucional, formúlase unha “revisión débil” que destaca o peso das institucións sobre a cuestión ambiental. Pero ademais, formúlanse unha serie de argumentos afastados do reduccionismo económico que constitúen un intento de “revisión forte” ó defende-la insuficiencia dunha economía ambiental neoclásica ortodoxa centrada no obxectivo da eficiencia económica. A través de ámbalas dúas vías conclúese a relevancia de cuestións como as institucións, a ética e o dereito na análise económica ambiental, polo que se finaliza presentando unhas consideracións xurídicas xerais sobre o medio naturalThis article constitutes an institutional theoretical approach that studies the relationship between economics and natural environment, pointing out that Neoclassical Economics of Environment is insufficient. From the Coase Theorem and New Institutional Economics, institutions matter in Economics of Environment, which implies a “weak revision”. Moreover, we present a “strong revision” that goes beyond the efficiency objective. These two revisions conclude the importance of institutions, ethics and law into the environmental economic analysisEn este artículo se realiza una primera aproximación teórica de corte institucional al estudio de las interrelaciones entre economía y medio ambiente. En concreto, se manifiesta la insuficiencia de una Economía del Medio Ambiente edificada sobre la economía neoclásica ortodoxa. A partir del teorema de Coase, tantas veces mal interpretado en la economía ambiental, y del cuerpo teórico de la nueva economía institucional, se formula una “revisión débil” que destaca el peso de las instituciones sobre la cuestión ambiental. Pero además, se formulan una serie de argumentos alejados del reduccionismo económico que constituyen un intento de “revisión fuerte” al defender la insuficiencia de una economía ambiental neoclásica ortodoxa centrada en el objetivo de la eficiencia económica. A través de ambas vías se concluye la relevancia de cuestiones como las instituciones, la ética y el derecho en el análisis económico ambiental, por lo que se finaliza presentando unas consideraciones jurídicas generales sobre el medio ambienteS

Institutions and fiscal system : reflections from the new institutional economics

A Nova Economía Institucional é o corpo teórico máis relevante que xorde nos últimos anos na ciencia económica. Nestas páxinas expoñemos cómo se presenta o sistema fiscal ante a mirada deste novo enfoque económico. Comezamos presentando o carácter institucional e organizacional do sistema fiscal. Sinalamos cómo detrás dun sistema fiscal existe un Estado, cómo este determina o sistema fiscal, partindo da teoría do Estado do Nobel Douglass North. Analizamos cómo o fenómeno fiscal é estudiado desde dúas perspectivas distintas dentro do institucionalismo: unha macro e unha micro. A continuación, recollémo-la relevancia do capital social para un sistema fiscal, o cal constitúe un dos factores que nos permiten defende--la nonexistencia de regras fiscais que teñan unha optimidade xeral. Expoñemos cómo a Teoría Política dos Custos de Transacción permite novas dimensións na análise de cuestións tributarias e rematamos cunha recapitulación como conclusión: The New Institutional Economics is the most relevant body of theory to emerge in economics in recent years. In these pages, we expose how the fiscal system is seen from this new economic focus. We start presenting the institutional and organizational character of the fiscal system. We point out how, behind a fiscal system, a State exists, and how this State decides the fiscal system, setting from the Nobel Laureate Douglass North State Theory. We analyse how the fiscal phenomenon is studied from two different perspectives that form institutionalism: a macro and a micro. Next, we expose the importance of social capital for the fiscal system, which constitutes one of the factors that allows us to defend the non existence of fiscal rules the optimality of which is general. We expose how Transaction Cost Politic Theory allows new dimensions to analyse tax matters, and we finish with a recapitulation as our conclusionXunta de Galicia | Ref. PGIDT99PX130001