Network Structure of Insurgent Groups and the Success of DDR Processes in Colombia

We argue that organizational structure of insurgent organizations influences the prospects for success in a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process (DDR). In concrete, we argue that more cohesive, tighter, networks have higher levels of supervision and control on its military units and increase the probability of successful DDR processes. In order to evaluate our hypotheses, we use the theory of networks to map and characterize the network structure of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Our results suggest that armed military units grouped in smaller and more isolated components on the network remilitarize with higher probability with respect to other units on the network. Also, we find that military units with high degree of centrality on the network play an important role for the risk of conflict recurrence and success in a DDR process

Destroying Trust in Government : Effects of a Broken Pact among Colombian Ex-Combatants

Mistrust between conflict parties after civil war is a major hurdle to sustainable peace. However, existing research focuses on elite interactions and has not examined the trust relationship between government and rank-and-file members of armed groups, despite their importance for postconflict stability. We use the unexpected decision of the Colombian government to extradite top-level former paramilitary leaders to the United States in 2008 to identify how a peace deal reversal influences ex-combatants’ trust in government. In theory, they may lose trust for instrumental reasons, if they suffer personal costs, or for normative reasons, if they think the government is failing its commitments. Using quasi-experimental survey evidence, we find that extradition decreases trust substantially among ex-paramilitaries, but not in a comparison group of ex-guerrillas not part of the same peace deal. Even though paramilitaries are seen as particularly opportunistic, our evidence suggests that normative rather than instrumentalist considerations led to trust erosion

Factors of regional poverty reduction in Colombia: Do institutional conditions matter?

[EN] Colombia has a unique history, which has been heavily conditioned by armed conflict lasting more than 50 years. This study examines the institutional conditions for success and failure in reducing poverty in Colombian departments by considering changes that took place between 2003 and 2014. Fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis identifies the changes in regional conditions that reduce poverty over time. The pathways for poverty reduction are multidimensional, and many involve changes in institutional attributes such as government transparency, absence of violence, and electoral turnout. The framework developed in this paper can be used to monitor necessary and sufficient pathways in regional clusters.This work was funded by Grant AGL2015-65897-C3-3-R, ¿Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation, and Universities¿.Nieto-Alemán, PA.; García Alvarez-Coque, JM.; Roig Tierno, N.; Mas Verdú, F. (2019). 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