Construction and demolition waste management in Hong Kong

Author name used in this publication: J Jian-li HaoAuthor name used in this publication: C N L Fan2005-2006 > Academic research: refereed > Chapter in an edited book (author)Version of RecordPublishe

Achieving partnering success through an incentive agreement : lessons learned from an underground railway extension project in Hong Kong

Author name used in this publication: Linda C. N. FanAuthor name used in this publication: John F. Y. Yeung2008-2009 > Academic research: refereed > Publication in refereed journalAccepted ManuscriptPublishe

How the social-evaluative context modulates processes of cognitive control

Cognitive control enables intelligent systems to select relevant information in the face of distracting information. The aim of the research presented here was to investigate the influence of the social-evaluative context on processes of cognitive control. Female participants had to perform the Erikson flanker task with each trial being preceded by a photograph of an attractive woman or a beautiful landscape. Concurrently, another person (partner or fellow student) either evaluated the attractiveness of the pictures of the women or the beauty of the landscapes. Participants showed increased flanker interference on trials following the presentation of pictures of attractive women, but only, if these were concurrently evaluated by another person. By contrast, in the control conditions (social presence without concurrent picture evaluation, or picture evaluation without social presence) no such effect occurred. That is, the concurrent evaluation task selectively increased distractibility presumably due to the affective reaction to the social-evaluative context

On the multiplicity of solutions in generation capacity investment models with incomplete markets: a risk-averse stochastic equilibrium approach

Investment in generation capacity has traditionally been evaluated by computing the present value of cashflows accruing from new equipment in a market with globally optimized capacity mix. The competition and risk that now prevail in the sector may require a more refined analysis. We consider a competitive market with agents investing in some mix of capacities: the risk exposure of a plant and the attitude towards risk of the owner depend on the plant and the portfolio of its capacities. They may also depend on hedging contracts acquired by the investor on the market if such contracts exist. We represent these effects through equilibrium models of generation capacity in incomplete markets. The models come in different versions depending on the portfolio of physical plants and hedging contracts. These modify the long-term risk of the plants, the attitude of the owners towards risk, and hence the incentive to invest. The models involve risk-averse producers and consumers, and their behavior is represented by convex risk measures. We use degree theory to prove existence and explore multiplicity of equilibrium solutions