A Turn to Violence: The Escalation of Nonviolent Movements

Nonviolent resistance can be a powerful tool for ordinary civilians to transform their governments; however, not all nonviolent movements end in success and many ultimately escalate into violent conflicts. To understand this escalatory process, I begin with the premise that social movements are not unitary actors but a collection of groups with varied preferences on goals and tactics. I argue that escalation is likely when movements have violence-wielding groups among their varied factions, as these groups deal in violence, believe in its utility, and can make the strategic decision to engage in violence as needed. I argue this is particularly likely when the campaign fails to make progress using nonviolent channels, suggesting that nonviolent tactics will not be successful to achieve the group’s goals. Expectations are tested using the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes data and the case of Algeria’s escalation from a nonviolent movement to brutal civil war, and results are generally supportive.This item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at [email protected]

Repression and the Civil-War Life-Cycle: Explaining the Use and Effect of Repression Before, During, and After Civil War

The central goal of this project is to better understand the relationship between civil war and repression at each phase of the "civil-war life-cycle," which is composed of the escalation and onset of civil war, the war itself, and the post-war period. The project then seeks to understand the role of repression in civil war onset, where repression is argued to be either a permissive condition or a direct cause of civil war, where the role of repression is tied to what type of civil war occurs. As a permissive condition, repression essentially provides the opportunity for a group to carry out an attack, invasion, mutiny, and the like. During other conflicts, repression may be a direct cause of the war. The repression of protest movements may lead those groups to view "normal," non-violent political channels as closed, while also increasing grievances and therefore their willingness to fight. This direct mechanism along with the escalation process that leads to civil war is explored in depth, using data from the 2011 Arab Spring. This project also seeks to explain when conflicts are likely to be accompanied by harsh repression and the targeting of civilians, and to address whether that strategy is effective. It is argued that insurgencies rely on civilian populations for material and non-material support; if the government targets this resource pool then it may be able to undercut that lifeline and thus the military effectiveness of the group. Yet, as repression is costly this is only a strategy likely to be employed when the rebels are gaining ground, when they are relatively strong and militarily effective. As such, governments that employ repression as a war-time strategy are likely beginning from a point of weakness or disadvantage. It is thus further argued that the "gamble" of repression is not likely to reverse the government's fortunes; rather, wars marked by high levels of repression are most likely to end in stalemate. Finally, the use of, or the restraint from using, repression in post-war periods is also explored. Little attention has thus far been paid to the use of repression in post-conflict states, despite the growing literature on the consequences of conflict and the importance of this time for rebuilding and establishing peace. Here, the transformation of the war-time threat, together with various constraints against using repression in the post-war period, are considered

Ratification as accommodation? Domestic dissent and human rights treaties

Repression is the expected response to anti-government protest; however, leaders can also accommodate demonstrators. Committing to human rights treaties is considered in this environment, where treaty commitments are conceptualized as a policy concession that leaders can grant dissenters. Past research has shown that top-down domestic pressures, such as new democratic regimes, can influence treaty commitments. This article extends this line of research by considering the influence of bottom-up domestic pressure, arguing that nonviolent, pro-democracy movements can pressure leaders into concessions, as these movements are risky to repress but threatening to ignore. Leaders are expected to seek ‘cheap’ accommodations, and commitments to human rights treaties provide a relatively low-cost concession that also addresses demonstrators’ pro-democracy demands. Using commitments to the nine core UN human rights treaties, results are generally supportive. Governments experiencing a nonviolent, pro-democracy movement are consistently likely to sign human rights treaties. Ratification is also likely but in more limited contexts, and is more closely related to movement success. This suggests that bottom-up pressures can influence commitment to human rights treaties, but there may be little substance behind those concessions. The status quo and cost-averse preferences of leaders lead them to grant accommodations that result in minimal change and cost.Sage Green Route: Once the article has been accepted for publication, you may post the accepted version (version 2) of the article on your own personal website, your department’s website or the repository of your institution without any restrictions.This item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at [email protected]

Lasting peace or temporary calm? Rebel group decapitation and civil war outcomes

Existing research has found that killing or capturing rebel group leaders can lead to the termination of civil wars. This paper considers the quality of those terminations, examining how wars end and whether this produces a lasting peace or only a temporary reprieve from violence. Decapitation is expected to weaken rebel groups, shifting the balance of power to the government; however, results suggest that killing or capturing a rebel group leader tends to produce termination through inactivity rather than outright government victories. Decapitation is also found to have no effect on the chances of civil war recurrence. This suggests that the removal of rebel group leaders is effective primarily as a short-term strategy that does not tend to generate a lasting peace.This item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at [email protected]

Ratification as accommodation? Domestic dissent and human rights treaties

Repression is the expected response to anti-government protest; however, leaders can also accommodate demonstrators. Committing to human rights treaties is considered in this environment, where treaty commitments are conceptualized as a policy concession that leaders can grant dissenters. Past research has shown that top-down domestic pressures, such as new democratic regimes, can influence treaty commitments. This article extends this line of research by considering the influence of bottom-up domestic pressure, arguing that nonviolent, pro-democracy movements can pressure leaders into concessions, as these movements are risky to repress but threatening to ignore. Leaders are expected to seek ‘cheap’ accommodations, and commitments to human rights treaties provide a relatively low-cost concession that also addresses demonstrators’ pro-democracy demands. Using commitments to the nine core UN human rights treaties, results are generally supportive. Governments experiencing a nonviolent, pro-democracy movement are consistently likely to sign human rights treaties. Ratification is also likely but in more limited contexts, and is more closely related to movement success. This suggests that bottom-up pressures can influence commitment to human rights treaties, but there may be little substance behind those concessions. The status quo and cost-averse preferences of leaders lead them to grant accommodations that result in minimal change and cost.Sage Green Route: Once the article has been accepted for publication, you may post the accepted version (version 2) of the article on your own personal website, your department’s website or the repository of your institution without any restrictions.This item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at [email protected]