CURBSIDE RECYCLING: WASTE RESOURCE OR WASTE OF RESOURCES?

Replaced with revised version of paper 07/28/04.Environmental Economics and Policy, Public Economics,

Cheap Talk Revisited: New Evidence from CVM

Two recent studies have shown that “cheap talk” is an effective means of eliminating positive hypothetical bias in experimental and field-auction settings. We further investigate the ability of cheap talk to mitigate positive hypothetical bias in a CVM phone survey administered to over 4,000 households. Positive hypothetical bias is detected in our data by contrasting revealed and stated preference information. However, a short, neutral cheap-talk script appears to exacerbate rather than mitigate the bias. Based on this and mixed evidence from earlier studies, we suggest caution in using cheap talk as an ex ante control for hypothetical bias.cheap talk, hypothetical bias, contingent valuation

Curbside Recycling: Waste Resource or Waste of Resources?

In this paper, we estimate the social net benefits of curbside recycling. Benefits are estimated using survey data on household willingness to pay (WTP) from over 4,000 households across 40 western U.S. cities. We calibrate WTP for hypothetical bias using an experimental design that contrasts stated and revealed preferences. Cost estimates are compiled from previous studies by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the Institute for Local Self Reliance, as well as from in-depth interviews with recycling coordinators in our sampled cities. Remarkably, we find that the estimated mean social net benefit of curbside recycling is almost exactly zero. Therefore, the decision of whether to implement or maintain a curbside recycling program (CRP) must be done on a city-by-city basis.curbside recycling, willingness to pay, social net benefits, hypothetical bias, calibration

Bioethics Grows Up

Arthur Caplan reviewsThe Cambridge Textbook of Bioethics

Carbon Sequestration and Permit Trading on the Competitive Fringe

This paper makes two contributions to the carbon-sequestration literature. The first is the development of a theoretical framework in which sequestration and permit trading are analyzed jointly in the context of a competitive fringe model. The second is a numerical analysis demonstrating the role market structure, or market power, might play in the determination of an equilibrium sequestration allocation and carbon price. We present three comparative-static cases, the first two of which assess the impact of relative changes in the cost structures of the dominant firm and competitive fringe. For these two cases we find that the equilibrium allocation of sequestration aligns with a higher carbon price when the competitive fringe experiences an increase in its marginal cost parameter. Conversely, the carbon price falls when the dominant firm experiences a decrease in its marginal cost parameter. In a third case we evaluate the impact of stricter regulation on the abatement decisions of the polluting firm. Our results demonstrate the importance of incorporating into empirical supply-side models demand-side information that is reflective of an underlying market structure