11 research outputs found
On the automatic construction of indistinguishable operations
An increasingly important design constraint for software running
on ubiquitous computing devices is security, particularly against
physical methods such as side-channel attack. One well studied methodology
for defending against such attacks is the concept of indistinguishable
functions which leak no information about program control
flow since all execution paths are computationally identical. However,
constructing such functions by hand becomes laborious and error prone
as their complexity increases. We investigate techniques for automating
this process and find that effective solutions can be constructed with
only minor amounts of computational effort.Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia - SFRH/BPD/20528/2004
A fast approach to computing exact solutions to the resource-constrained scheduling problem
SCA with Magnitude Squared Coherence
International audienceMagnitude Squared Coherence is a signal processing tool that indicates how well two time domain signals match one with the other by tracking linear dependencies in their spectral decomposition. SCAN was the first way to use it as a SCA. This paper introduces two ways of using the Magnitude Squared Coherence in Side Channel Analysis. The first way is to use it as a distinguisher while the second consists in using it to transform the side channel traces in an worthwhile manner. Additionally, an algorithm for fast computation of the SCAN is provided
Stealthy Compromise of Wireless Sensor Nodes with Power Analysis Attacks
Node capture is considered as one of the most critical issues
in the security of wireless sensor networks. A popular approach to thwart
the problem relies on the detection of events that arise during the attack
such as the removal of a node for instance. However, certain attacks,
such as side-channel attacks, might be furtive and defeat this type of
defense. This work clarifies this question by performing a case study on
power analysis attacks of AES and ECC implementations on two common
types of nodes: the MICAz and the TelosB. From our experiments, the
attacks can be carried out in a stealthy manner. As a result, stealthy
node compromises should be considered when securing wireless sensor
networks. Also, the moderate complexity of our attacks underlines the
importance of low-cost side-channel countermeasures for sensor nodes