573 research outputs found
No arbitrage and closure results for trading cones with transaction costs
In this paper, we consider trading with proportional transaction costs as in Schachermayer’s paper (Schachermayer in Math. Finance 14:19–48, 2004). We give a necessary and sufficient condition for , the cone of claims attainable from zero endowment, to be closed. Then we show how to define a revised set of trading prices in such a way that, firstly, the corresponding cone of claims attainable for zero endowment, , does obey the fundamental theorem of asset pricing and, secondly, if is arbitrage-free then it is the closure of . We then conclude by showing how to represent claims
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Sponsor ownership in Asian REITs
This study examines the relationship between sponsor ownership and firm performance proxied by firm value, operating cash flow, and dividend policy with Asian real estate investment trusts (REITs) in Japan, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore for the period from 2002 to 2012, focusing on both the incentive alignment effect and the entrenchment effect. Our study sheds new light on effective corporate governance for Asian REITs that are prone to agency problems. Such agency problems arise from the inequitable distribution of power to sponsors that results from the external management structure. The findings suggest that larger sponsor ownership aligns the interests of sponsors and minority shareholders and enhances the performance of Asian REITs, while such an effect diminishes as sponsors become more entrenched. We find that the incentive alignment effect and entrenchment effect are primarily driven by developer-sponsored REITs. Also evident is that the presence of institutional investors mitigates agency problems and increases firm performance
CEO Compensation
This paper surveys the recent literature on CEO compensation. The rapid rise in CEO pay over the past 30 years has sparked an intense debate about the nature of the pay-setting process. Many view the high level of CEO compensation as the result of powerful managers setting their own pay. Others interpret high pay as the result of optimal contracting in a competitive market for managerial talent. We describe and discuss the empirical evidence on the evolution of CEO pay and on the relationship between pay and firm performance since the 1930s. Our review suggests that both managerial power and competitive market forces are important determinants of CEO pay, but that neither approach is fully consistent with the available evidence. We briefly discuss promising directions for future research
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