Verbal Reports and "Real' Reasons" : Confabulation and Conflation

This document is the Accepted Manuscript version of a published work that appeared in final form in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice after peer review and technical editing by the publisher. Constantine Sandis, ‘Verbal Reports and “Real” Reasons: Confabulation and Conflation’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 18(2): 267-280, first published online 18 March 2015. The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-015-9576-6 © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015This paper examines the relation between the various forces which underlie human action and verbal reports about our reasons for acting as we did. I maintain that much of the psychological literature on confabulations rests on a dangerous conflation of the reasons for which people act with a variety of distinct motivational factors. In particular, I argue that subjects frequently give correct answers to questions about the considerations they acted upon while remaining largely unaware of why they take themselves to have such reasons to act. Pari passu, experimental psychologists are wrong to maintain that they have shown our everyday reason talk to be systematically confused. This is significant because our everyday reason-ascriptions affect characterizations of action (in terms of intention, knowledge, foresight, etc.) that are morally and legally relevant. I conclude, more positively, that far from rendering empirical research on confabulations invalid, my account helps to reveal its true insights into human nature.Peer reviewe

Must we measure what we mean?

This paper excavates a debate concerning the claims of ordinary language philosophers that took place during the middle of the last century. The debate centers on the status of statements about “what we say”. On one side of the debate, critics of ordinary language philosophy argued that statements about “what we say” should be evaluated as empirical observations about how people do in fact speak, on a par with claims made in the language sciences. By that standard, ordinary language philosophers were not entitled to the claims that they made about what we would say about various topics. On the other side of the debate, defenders of the methods of ordinary language philosophy sought to explain how philosophers can be entitled to statements about what we would say without engaging in extensive observations of how people do in fact use language. In this paper I defend the idea that entitlement to claims about what we say can be had in a way that doesn’t require empirical observation, and I argue that ordinary language philosophers are (at least sometimes) engaged in a different project than linguists or empirically minded philosophers of language, which is subject to different conditions of success