Do Practice Rounds Bias Experimental Auction Results?

Consumer/Household Economics,

Estimating the Value Consumers Derive from Product Labeling

Firms spend billions of dollars annually on new product and label designs in order to attract and retain customers. The issue of labeling is also important to government agencies and nonprofit labeling organizations. For example, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration has an organizational body in its Office of Nutritional Products that deals with issues of food and dietary supplement labeling. The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection Service also deals with labeling through its Labeling and Consumer Protection Staff. These government agencies spend millions of dollars trying to ensure that food labels adequately inform consumers. One issue that has not been examined is the welfare difference to consumers from alternative labeling schemes/regulations. It seems likely that different labels would differ in effectiveness at informing consumers.

Utilizing cow-calf producer information to increase profits in retained ownership of beef cattle

Retained ownership has been found to be a profitable endeavor, yet many cow-calf producers choose not to retain their calves. While this paper does not directly explore the reasons producers might have for not retaining ownership, which may include uncertainty, it does explore innovative use of asymmetrical information that might reduce some of the uncertainty. Results are summarized in a regression analysis similar to a Hedonic price model where birth weight, weaning weight, and weaning age are found to be important factors to consider when selecting animals to retain.Asymmetrical Information, Hedonic Price Model, Beef, Retained Ownership, Producer Profitability, Farm Management, Livestock Production/Industries, Production Economics, D82, M31, Q13,

Posted Prices and Bid Affiliation: Evidence from Experimental Auctions

In most experimental auctions, researchers ask participants to bid on the same item in multiple potentially binding rounds, posting the price submitted by the top bidder or bidders after each of those rounds. If bids submitted in later rounds are affiliated with posted prices from earlier rounds, this practice could result in biased value estimates. In this article we discuss the results of an experiment designed explicitly to test whether posted prices affect bidding behavior. We find that for familiar items, high posted prices lead to increased bids in subsequent rounds. Our results have implications for researchers conducting experimental auctions.Experimental Auctions, Posted Prices, Affiliation

AJAE Appendix: Posted Prices and Bid Affiliation: Evidence from Experimental Auctions

The material contained herein is supplementary to the article named in the title and published in the American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Volume 88, Number 4, November 2006.Demand and Price Analysis,

The Effect of Initial Endowments in Experimental Auctions

We report the results of an experiment designed to test whether initial endowments affect value estimates elicited from experimental auctions. Comparing bids for one unit of a good, two units of a good, and a second unit of a good when endowed with the first unit, we find that willingness to pay for the second unit of a good is, on average, as much as 75% higher when endowed with the first unit. We go on to advance two theories that could potentially reconcile our results with neoclassical consumer theory.Endowment Effect, Experimental Auctions, Reciprocity, Top-Dog Effect

Consumer Preferences for Fair Trade Foods: Implications for Trade Policy

Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety, International Relations/Trade, Q18, Q51 Effects,