Openness, Technology Capital, and Development

In this paper, we extend the growth model to include firm-specific technology capital and use it to assess the gains from opening to foreign direct investment. A firm's technology capital is its unique know-how from investing in research and development, brands, and organization capital. What distinguishes technology capital from other forms of capital is the fact that a firm can use it simultaneously in multiple domestic and foreign locations. Foreign technology capital is exploited by permitting foreign direct investment by multinationals. In both steady-state and transitional analyses, the extended growth model predicts large gains to being open.

Is the Stock Market Overvalued?

The value of U.S. corporate equities in the first half of 2000 was close to 1.8 times U.S. gross national income. Some stock market analysts have argued that the market is overvalued at this level. We use standard economic theory and find that the market is correctly valued. In theory, the market value of equity plus debt liabilities should equal the value of productive assets plus debt assets. Since the net value of debt is currently low, the market value of equity should be approximately equal to the market value of productive assets. We find that the market value of productive assets is roughly 1.8 GNPs and is therefore in line with the market value of equity.

Unmeasured investment and the puzzling U.S. boom in the 1990s

For the 1990s, the basic neoclassical growth model predicts a depressed economy, when in fact the U.S. economy boomed. We extend the base model by introducing intangible investment and non-neutral technology change with respect to producing intangible investment goods and find that the 1990s are not puzzling in light of this new theory. There is micro and macro evidence motivating our extension, and the theory’s predictions are in conformity with U.S. national accounts and capital gains. We compare accounting measures with corresponding measures for our model economy. We find that standard accounting measures greatly understate the 1990s boom. ; Earlier title: Why did U.S. market hours boom in the 1990s? ; Earlier title: Unmeasured investment and the 1990s U.S. hours boomBusiness cycles ; Productivity

The 1929 stock market: Irving Fisher was right

Many stock market analysts think that in 1929, at the time of the crash, stocks were overvalued. Irving Fisher argued just before the crash that fundamentals were strong and the stock market was undervalued. In this paper, we use growth theory to estimate the fundamental value of corporate equity and compare it to actual stock valuations. Our estimate is based on values of productive corporate capital, both tangible and intangible, and tax rates on corporate income and distributions. The evidence strongly suggests that Fisher was right. Even at the 1929 peak, stocks were undervalued relative to the prediction of theory.Depressions ; Stock market

Openness, technology capital, and development

In this paper, we extend the growth model to include firm-specific technology capital and use it to assess the gains from opening to foreign direct investment. A firm's technology capital is its unique know-how from investing in research and development, brands, and organization capital. What distinguishes technology capital from other forms of capital is the fact that a firm can use it simultaneously in multiple domestic and foreign locations. Foreign technology capital is exploited by permitting foreign direct investment by multinationals. In both steady-state and transitional analyses, the extended growth model predicts large gains to being open.Technology - Economic aspects

The Stock Market Crash of 1929: Irving Fisher Was Right!

In the fall of 1929, the market value of all shares listed on the New York Stock Exchange fell by 30 percent. Many analysts then and now take the view that stocks were then overvalued and the stock market was in need of a correction. Irving Fisher argued that the fundamentals were strong and the stock market was undervalued. In this paper, we estimate the fundamental value of corporate equity in 1929 using data on stocks of productive capital and tax rates as in McGrattan and Prescott (2000, 2001) and compare it to actual stock valuations. We find that the stock market in 1929 did not crash because the market was overvalued. In fact, the evidence strongly suggests that stocks were undervalued, even at their 1929 peak.

Average debt and equity returns: puzzling?

Mehra and Prescott (1985) found the difference between average equity and debt returns puzzling because it was too large to be a premium for bearing nondiversifiable aggregate risk. Here, we re-examine this puzzle, taking into account some factors ignored by Mehra and Prescott-taxes, regulatory constraints, and diversification costs-and focusing on long-term rather than short-term savings instruments. Accounting for these factors, we find the difference between average equity and debt returns during peacetime in the last century is less than 1 percent, with the average real equity return somewhat under 5 percent, and the average real debt return almost 4 percent. As theory predicts, the real return on debt has been close to the 4 percent average after-tax real return on capital. Similarly, as theory predicts, the real return on equity is equal to the after-tax real return on capital plus a modest premium for bearing nondiversifiable aggregate risk.

On efficiently financing retirement

A problem facing the United States and many other countries is how to finance retirement consumption as the number of their workers per retiree falls. The problem with a savings for retirement systems is that there is a shortage of good savings opportunities given the nature of most current tax systems and governments’ limited ability to honor the debt it issues. We find that eliminating capital income taxes will greatly increase saving opportunities and make a savings-for-retirement system feasible with only modest amount of government debt. The switch from a system close to the current U.S. retirement system, which relies heavily on taxing workers’ incomes and making lump-sum transfers to retirees, to one without income taxes will increase the welfare of all birth-year cohorts alive today and particularly the welfare of the yet unborn cohorts. The equilibrium paths for the current and alternative policies are computed.

Technology capital and the U.S. current account (appendices)

Appendix A provides details for the computation of our model's equilibrium paths, the construction of model national and international accounts, and the sensitivity of our main findings to alternative parameterizations of the model. We demonstrate that the main finding of our paper - namely, that the mismeasurement of capital accounts for roughly 60 percent of the gap in FDI returns - is robust to alternative choices of income shares, depreciation rates, and tax rates, assuming the same procedure is followed in setting exogenous parameters governing the model's current account. Appendix B demonstrates that adding technology capital and locations to an otherwise standard two-country general equilibrium model has a large impact on the predicted behavior of labor productivity and net exports.International finance ; Technology - Economic aspects