559 research outputs found
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International Price-Fixing Cartels and Developing Countries: A Discussion of Effects and Policy Remedies
The U.S. Department of Justice, the European Commission, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development have all recently voiced concern about international price- fixing cartels. The U.S. and European Union have increased prosecution of international cartels in the past decade, but very few developing countries have made similar enforcement efforts. If these cartels have significant effects on developing country consumers and producers, the lack of antitrust prosecutions by developing countries against these cartels is an important problem. Geographically limited prosecut ions may not provide sufficient disincentives to deter collusion that has worldwide benefits for colluding firms. Ongoing prosecutions of international cartels by industrialized countries may open up markets for entry by developing country producers, but these efforts may be undermined if cartels create durable barriers to entry. Western governments are also susceptible to manipulation by domestic producers using tariff barriers and anti- dumping duties to protect the home market, both during and after the price- fixing conspiracy. Thus, developing countries may need to develop their own antitrust laws and enforcement capabilities to help deter international cartel activity. A recent ruling of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals also opens up the possibility that developing country consumers may be able to exact remedies in U.S. courts. In this paper we examine the possible effects of private international cartels on developing countries by looking in detail at three recent cartel cases, as well as at a broader cross- section of forty- two recently prosecuted international cartels. We discuss the indirect effects on developing country producers, either as competitors or co- conspirators, as well the direct effects of cartels on developing country consumers. By combining trade data with a sample of US and European prosecutions of international cartels in the 1990s, we are able to make a first attempt at quantifying the order of magnitude of the consequences of these cartels on developing countries as consumers. In 1997, the latest year for which we have trade data, developing countries imported $54.7 billion of goods from a sub - sample of 19 industries that had seen a price- fixing conspiracy during the 1990s. These imports represented 5.2% of total imports and 1.2% of GDP in developing countries.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39923/2/wp538.pd
Managing Research and Data for Reproducibility and Transparency
Presentation at the OPRE Open Science Methods Meeting, October 2019http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/156406/1/Levenstein OPRE 2019 FINAL.pdfDescription of Levenstein OPRE 2019 FINAL.pdf : PresentationSEL
Best Practices for Protecting and Sharing Data
Presented as part of Session on The Conflict Between Research Transparency and Respondent Confidentiality at the 73rd Annual Conference of the American Association for Public Opinion Research in Denver, Colorado on May 17, 2018ICPSR's approach to safe and ethical research using confidential datahttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/144521/1/AAPOR 2018.pd
Breaking up is Hard to Do: Determinants of Cartel Duration
We estimate the impact of cartel organizational features, as well as macroeconomic fluctuations and industry structure, on cartel duration using a dataset of contemporary international cartels. We estimate a proportional hazards model with competing risks, distinguishing factors which increase the risk of “death by antitrust” from those that affect “natural death,” including defection, dissension or entry. Our analysis indicates that the probability of cartel death from any cause increased significantly after 1995 when competition authorities expanded enforcement efforts toward international cartels. We find that fluctuations in firm-specific discount rates have a significant effect on cartel duration, whereas market interest rates do not. Cartels with a compensation scheme – a plan for how the cartel will handle variations in demand – are significantly less likely to break up. In contrast, retaliatory punishments in response to perceived cheating significantly increase the likelihood of natural death. Cartels that have to punish are not stable cartels.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/78004/1/1150_Suslow.pdfhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/78004/3/1150_Suslow.pd
Connecting Data Sharing to Article Publishing How to Maximize the Impact of Your Research
Presentation to the Annual Meeting of the American Education Research Associationhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/143814/1/AERA presentation April 15, 2018.pdf5912
Presentation to Use Cases Breakout, OpenDP Community Meeting, May 14, 2020
Presentation to the Use Cases Workshop of the OpenDP Community Meeting, describe in more detail at https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/opendp.Sloan FoundationHarvard UniversityMicrosofthttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/155361/1/OpenDP Use Cases workshop May 14, 2020.pdfDescription of OpenDP Use Cases workshop May 14, 2020.pdf : Presentatio
Price-Fixing Hits Home: An Empirical Study of U.S. Price Fixing Conspiracies
This paper analyzes all Section 1, Sherman Act price fixing cases brought by the U.S. Department of Justice between 1961 and 2013. Over 500 cartels were prosecuted during this period. The determinants of cartel formation and cartel breakup are estimated, including analysis of the impact of the discount rate, business cycles, and antitrust policy. We find that cartels are more likely to breakup during periods of high real interest rates, presumably because higher interest rates are associated with greater impatience. The adoption of a stronger amnesty policy has no significant impact on cartel breakup over this period, although the results suggest some association with lower cartel formation rates.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/116016/1/1290_Levenstein.pd
Price Wars and the Stability of Collusion: A Study of the Pre-World War I Bromine Industry
Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/72383/1/1467-6451.00039.pd
Addressing Challenges of Restricted Data Access
Standardizing Data Access, Sharing, and Use Agreements Workshop at Harvard Universityhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/156407/1/Levenstein Harvard-Microsoft DUA workshop March 2020.pdfDescription of Levenstein Harvard-Microsoft DUA workshop March 2020.pdf : PresentationSEL
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