Subordinated Debt, Market Discipline, and Bank Risk

This paper demonstrates that subordinated debt ( subdebt thereafter) regulation can be an effective mechanism for disciplining banks. Under our proposal, investors buy the subdebt of a bank only if they receive favourable information about the bank, and the bank is subject to a regulatory examination if it fails to issue subdebt. By forcing banks to be examined when they are likely weak, subdebt regulation not only reduces the chance that managers of distressed banks can take value-destroying actions to benefit themselves, but may also encourage banks to lower asset risk. It shows that subdebt regulation and bank capital requirements can be complements for alleviating the banks moral hazard problems. It also suggests that to make subdebt regulation effective, regulators may need impose ceilings on the interest rates of subdebt, prohibit collusion between banks and subdebt investors, and require the subdebt to convert into the issuing bank s equity when the government takes over or provides open assistance to the bank

Electronic Purses in Euroland: Why Do Penetration and Usage Rates Differ?

This paper documents the recent performance of European electronic purses. It presents data on 16 such schemes, and compares their penetration and usage rates. These rates are shown to differ substantially. A number of schemes are doing increasingly well and in all probability are here to stay. These schemes have also received a boost from the introduction of the euro. But a number of other schemes are making little or no headway. Some have even experienced a relapse and appear to be on the verge of disappearance. The paper tries to identify explanations for these disparate fates