Net neutrality, Network capacity and Innovation at the Edges

We study how net neutrality regulations affect a high-bandwidth content provider (CP)'s investment incentives to enhance its quality of services (QoS) in content delivery to end users. We find that the effects crucially depend on whether the CP's entry decision is constrained by the Internet service provider (ISP)'s network capacity. If capacity is relatively large, prioritized services reduce the QoS investment as they become substitutes, but improve trafic management. With limited capacity, by contrast, prioritized delivery services are complementary to the CP's investments and can facilitate entry of congestionsensitive content; however, this creates more congestion for other existing content. Our analysis suggests that the optimal policy may call for potentially asymmetric regulations across mobile and fixed networks

A Second-degree Price Discrimination by a Two-sided Monopoly Platform

In this article we study second-degree price discrimination by a two-sided monopoly platform. We find novel distortions that arise due to the two-sidedness of the mar- ket. They make the standard result \no distortion at top and downward distortion at bottom" not holding. They generate a new type of non-responsiveness, different from the one found by Guesnerie and Laffont (1984). We also show that the platform may mitigate or remove non-responsiveness at one side by properly designing price discrimi- nation on the other side. These findings help to address our central question, i.e., when price discrimination on one side substitutes for or complements price discrimination on the other side. As an application, we study the optimal mechanism design for an advertising platform mediating advertisers and consumers

Internet Interconnection and Network Neutrality

We analyze competition between interconnected networks when content is heterogeneous in its sensitivity to delivery quality. In a two-sided market framework, we characterize the equilibrium in a neutral network constrained to offer the same quality and assess the impact of such a constraint vis-à-vis a non-neutral network where Internet service providers (ISPs) are allowed to engage in second degree price discrimination with a menu of quality-price pairs. We find that the merit of net neutrality regulation depends crucially on content providers' business models. More generally, our analysis can be considered as a contribution to the literature on second-degree price discrimination in two-sided platform markets

Internet Interconnection and Network Neutrality

We analyze competition between interconnected networks when content is heterogeneous in its sensitivity to delivery quality. In a two-sided market framework, we characterize the equilibrium in a neutral network constrained to offer the same quality and assess the impact of such a constraint vis-à-vis a non-neutral network where Internet service providers (ISPs) are allowed to engage in second degree price discrimination with a menu of quality-price pairs. We find that the merit of net neutrality regulation depends crucially on content providers' business models. More generally, our analysis can be considered as a contribution to the literature on second-degree price discrimination in two-sided platform markets

Net neutrality, Network capacity and Innovation at the Edges

We study how net neutrality regulations affect a high-bandwidth content provider (CP)'s investment incentives to enhance its quality of services (QoS) in content delivery to end users. We find that the effects crucially depend on whether the CP's entry decision is constrained by the Internet service provider (ISP)'s network capacity. If capacity is relatively large, prioritized services reduce the QoS investment as they become substitutes, but improve trafic management. With limited capacity, by contrast, prioritized delivery services are complementary to the CP's investments and can facilitate entry of congestionsensitive content; however, this creates more congestion for other existing content. Our analysis suggests that the optimal policy may call for potentially asymmetric regulations across mobile and fixed networks

Second-degree price discrimination by a two-sided monopoly platform

We study second-degree price discrimination by a two-sided monopoly platform. The incentive constraints of the agents on the value creation side may be in conflict with internalizing externalities on the value capture side, which may render pooling optimal. Even without such conflict between the two sides, pooling can be optimal due to type-dependent Spence effects when the preferences of the marginal agents diverge from those of the average agents on the value capture side. We perform a welfare analysis of price discrimination and show that prohibiting price discrimination improves welfare when there is a strong conflict between the two sides

Second-degree price discrimination by a two-sided monopoly platform

We study second-degree price discrimination by a two-sided monopoly platform. The incentive constraints of the agents on the value creation side may be in conflict with internalizing externalities on the value capture side, which may render pooling optimal. Even without such conflict between the two sides, pooling can be optimal due to type-dependent Spence effects when the preferences of the marginal agents diverge from those of the average agents on the value capture side. We perform a welfare analysis of price discrimination and show that prohibiting price discrimination improves welfare when there is a strong conflict between the two sides

Design of the VISTA-ITL Test Facility for an Integral Type Reactor of SMART and a Post-Test Simulation of a SBLOCA Test

To validate the performance and safety of an integral type reactor of SMART, a thermal-hydraulic integral effect test facility, VISTA-ITL, is introduced with a discussion of its scientific design characteristics. The VISTA-ITL was used extensively to assess the safety and performance of the SMART design, especially for its passive safety system such as a passive residual heat removal system, and to validate various thermal-hydraulic analysis codes. The VISTA-ITL program includes several tests on the SBLOCA, CLOF, and PRHRS performances to support a verification of the SMART design and contribute to the SMART design licensing by providing proper test data for validating the system analysis codes. A typical scenario of SBLOCA was analyzed using the MARS-KS code to assess the thermal-hydraulic similarity between the SMART design and the VISTA-ITL facility, and a posttest simulation on a SBLOCA test for the shutdown cooling system line break has been performed with the MARS-KS code to assess its simulation capability for the SBLOCA scenario of the SMART design. The SBLOCA scenario in the SMART design was well reproduced using the VISTA-ITL facility, and the measured thermal-hydraulic data were properly simulated with the MARS-KS code