Incentives and the Sorting of Altruistic Agents into Street-Level Bureaucracies

Many street-level bureaucrats (such as caseworkers) have the dual task of helping some clients, while sanctioning others. We develop a model of such a street-level bureaucracy and study the implications of its personnel policy on the self-selection and allocation decisions of agents who differ in altruism towards clients. When bureaucrats are paid flat wages, they do not sanction, and the most altruistic types sort into bureaucracy. Pay-for-performance induces some bureaucrats to sanction, but necessitates an increase in expected wage compensation, which can result in sorting from both the top and bottom of the altruism distribution. We also show how client composition affects sorting and why street-level bureaucrats often experience an overload of clients.street-level bureaucracy, sorting, altruism, personnel policy, pay-for-performance

Public Sector Employees: Risk Averse and Altruistic?

We assess whether public sector employees have a stronger inclination to serve others and are more risk averse than employees in the private sector. A unique feature of our study is that we use revealed rather than stated preferences data. Respondents of a large-scale survey were offered a substantial reward and could choose between a widely redeemable gift certificate, a lottery ticket, or making a donation to a charity. Our analysis shows that public sector employees are significantly less likely to choose the risky option (lottery) and, at the start of their career, significantly more likely to choose the pro-social option (charity). However, when tenure increases, this difference in pro-social inclinations disappears and, later on, even reverses. Our results further suggest that quite a few public sector employees do not contribute to charity because they feel that they already contribute enough to society at work for too little pay.public service motivation, risk aversion, revealed preferences data

Incentives and the Sorting of Altruistic Agents into Street-Level Bureaucracies

Many street-level bureaucrats (such as caseworkers) have the dual task of helping some clients, while sanctioning others. We develop a model of such a street-level bureaucracy and study the implications of its personnel policy on the self-selection and allocation decisions of agents who differ in altruism towards clients. When bureaucrats are paid flat wages, they do not sanction, and the most altruistic types sort into bureaucracy. Pay-for-performance induces some bureaucrats to sanction, but necessitates an increase in expected wage compensation, which can result in sorting from both the top and bottom of the altruism distribution. We also show how client composition affects sorting and why street-level bureaucrats often experience an overload of clients

Beyond the Call of Duty? Essays on motivation and self-selection of bureaucrats

The existence and effects of public service motivation (PSM), or altruism, among bureaucrats, is a well-debated topic among economists and administrative scientists (see e.g. Perry and Hondeghem 2008a, Besley and Ghatak 2005, Francois 2000 and 2007). However, the debate about motivation of public sector workers and its e¤ects on the quality and quantity of public services is not restricted to academia. Many journalists, politicians, and common civilians discuss this issue in the media, parliament, and the streets. The reasons for this lively debate is twofold. First of all, public sector workers are usually paid through taxes. Taxpayers want value for money. A second reason for the public interest in the motivation of bureaucrats and its e¤ects, is that the public, as the clients of public services, encounters the merits and demerits of the e¤orts provided by public sector workers. All the more, since the public often has few alternative providers to choose from. Welfare recipients have no other option than to ask their municipality for benets. Children attending primary schools can often only choose from a few neighbouring schools. Crime victims go to their local police o¢ cer and the injured go to the nearest hospital

Public Sector Employees: Risk Averse and Altruistic?

We assess whether public sector employees have a stronger inclination to serve others and are more risk averse than employees in the private sector. A unique feature of our study is that we use revealed rather than stated preferences data. Respondents of a large-scale survey were offered a substantial reward and could choose between a widely redeemable gift certificate, a lottery ticket, or making a donation to a charity. Our analysis shows that public sector employees are significantly less likely to choose the risky option (lottery) and, at the start of their career, significantly more likely to choose the pro-social option (charity). However, when tenure increases, this difference in pro-social inclinations disappears and, later on, even reverses. Our results further suggest that quite a few public sector employees do not contribute to charity because they feel that they already contribute enough to society at work for too little pay

Incentives and the Sorting of Altruistic Agents into Street-Level Bureaucracies

Many street-level bureaucrats have the dual task of helping some clients, while sanctioning others. We develop a model of a street-level bureaucracy, and we study the implications of its personnel policy on the self-selection and allocation decisions of agents who differ in altruism towards clients. When bureaucrats are paid flat wages, they do not sanction, and the most altruistic types sort into bureaucracy. Pay-for-performance induces some bureaucrats to sanction, but it necessitates an increase in compensation, which can result in sorting from the top and bottom of the altruism distribution. We also explain why street-level bureaucrats often experience an overload of clients

Incentives and the Sorting of Altruistic Agents into Street-Level Bureaucracies

textabstractMany street-level bureaucrats (such as caseworkers) have the dual task of helping some clients, while sanctioning others. We develop a model of such a street-level bureaucracy and study the implications of its personnel policy on the self-selection and allocation decisions of agents who differ in altruism towards clients. When bureaucrats are paid flat wages, they do not sanction, and the most altruistic types sort into bureaucracy. Pay-for-performance induces some bureaucrats to sanction, but necessitates an increase in expected wage compensation, which can result in sorting from both the top and bottom of the altruism distribution. We also show how client composition affects sorting and why street-level bureaucrats often experience an overload of clients