"Autobiography or Fiction? Ḥasan al-Bannā’s Memoirs Revisited"

Scholars dealing with the rise of contemporary Islamism and the Muslim Brothers’ early history frequently turn to Ḥasan al-Bannā’s autobiography, Mudhakkirāt al-Daʿwah wa’l-Dāʿiyah (Memoirs of the Call and the Preacher) as one major source of information about the movement’s origin. Despite the centrality of this autobiography and the abundance of references to it in Islamist literature, it remains poorly understood. Drawing upon a range of under-explored primary sources, this article argues that the autobiography was never written as a traditional ex post facto memoir. Only by recognizing its fictionalized nature and by exploring the boundaries between biography and fiction, can al-Bannā’s memoirs can be properly understood

Why Terrorism Occurs: A Survey of Theories and Hypotheses on the Causes of Terrorism

Research literature on terrorism has often been criticized for a general lack of scientifically sound theoretical research on patterns and causes. This report provides an updated survey of existing theories and hypotheses on the causes of terrorism, drawing upon studies not only from recent terrorism research literature, but also from general social science and conflict studies. The purpose of this survey is to establish analytical tools for predicting future patterns and developments of terrorism, which is a major research objective of the Terrorism and Asymmetric Warfare Project. At the end of the report, we deal briefly with a few security policy implications of the theories surveyed. They have been discussed more fully, however, in our report „Globalisation and the Future of Terrorism: Patterns and Predictions“, FFI/RAPPORT-2000/01703

Atommateriale, gass og mikrober som terrorvåpen? En undersøkelse av terrorgruppers interesse for og bruk av ikke-konvensjonelle våpen

This report analyses empirical evidence of terrorist and rebel groups’ efforts at acquiring and using chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) substances as ‘weapons’. The significant technical and political-ideological obstacles to acquiring and/or developing an effective weapon of mass destruction, based on CBRN substances are described and discussed. Drawing upon the WMD Terrorism Database, produced by Center for Non-Proliferation, Monterey, 41 incidents of serious acquisition attempts and/or use of WMD by non-state groups have been selected, based on specific criteria, and examined in detail. Although the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo alone accounts for a significant number of the recorded incidents (and admittedly the most serious ones), serious cases of CBRN acquisition and/or use by terrorist and rebel groups have occurred in as many as 11 countries. Our analysis shows that religious groups, while representing only a fraction of conventional terrorism, are greatly over-represented among the perpetrating groups, followed by ethnic-separatist groups. Chemical substances constitute the weapon of choice, accounting for more than half of the incidents, followed by biological substances, and radiological material. There are no recorded incidents of terrorist acquisition of weapon grade nuclear substances. Domestic groups account for nearly all attacks. The study also offers a series of case studies of non-state acquisition and/or use of CBRN substances, including Japanese cult ‘Aum Shinrikyo’, radical Islamist al-Qa‘ida (or the bin Laden group). The report recommends increased policy attention to improve national response capacity and preparedness to counter and handle low-scale CBRN terrorist incident

Islamism and the state after the Arab uprisings: Between people power and state power

The authors would like to thank the Arts and Humanities Research Council for facilitating the research for this article through their support of the research network People Power versus State Power of the Centre for the Advanced Study of the Arab World.This paper examines the trajectories of different Islamist trends in the light of the Arab uprisings. It proposes a distinction between statist and non-statist Islamism to help understand the multiplicity of interactions between Islamists and the state, particularly after 2011. It is outlined how statist Islamists (Islamist parties principally) can contribute to the stabilization and democratization of the state when their interactions with other social and political actors facilitate consensus building in national politics. By contrast when these interactions are conflictual, it has a detrimental impact on both the statist Islamists, and the possibility of democratic politics at the national level. Non statist-Islamists (from quietist salafi to armed jihadi) who prioritize the religious community over national politics are directly impacted by the interactions between statist Islamists and the state, and generally tend to benefit from the failure to build a consensus over democratic national politics. Far more than nationally-grounded statist Islamists, non-statist Islamists shape and are shaped by the regional dynamics on the Arab uprisings and the international and transnational relations between the different countries and conflict areas of the Middle East. The Arab uprisings and their aftermath reshaped pre-existing national and international dynamics of confrontation and collaboration between Islamists and the state, and between statist and non-statists Islamists, for better (Tunisia) and for worse (Egypt).PostprintPeer reviewe

"Jihadism in the Arab World after 2011: Explaining its Expansion"

One of the most puzzling developments since the watershed event of 9/11 and the onset of the U.S.-led Global War on Terror (GWOT) is the expansion of the jihadi movement in the Arab world. This has taken place despite serious efforts to prevent it from happening. Massive investments in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency by a U.S.-led international coalition, in cooperation with regional partners, have included the entire spectrum of instruments available in the state toolbox. This extensive and costly campaign notwithstanding, the past 15 years have witnessed a remarkable growth in jihadism as a rebel ideology, a military guerrilla force and a global terrorist menace. At the time of writing, "the Islamic State" is losing territory in its heartland in Syria and Iraq and in its main regional province in Libya. However, the organization has proved capable of orchestrating an unprecedented campaign of international terrorist violence (outside Iraq and Syria), claiming more than 1,200 lives on five continents between September 2014 and July 2016.2 As for the Middle East, a cursory look at key indicators of the strength of jihadism in the region over the past decade similarly confirms an ominous upward trend

Architect of Global Jihad : the life of al-Qaida strategist Abu Mus?ab al-Suri

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Fanatismens seier? Jihadismens frammarsj i den arabiske verdenen

Jihadismens frammarsj som ideologi og global opprørsbevegelse er blant de mest fremtredende utviklingstrekkene i Midtøsten de siste 15 årene. Hvordan har jihadistbevegelsen kunnet vokse seg så mye sterkere i tidsrommet etter 11. september-angrepene, samtidig som usa og dets allierte i regionen har brukt enorme ressurser på nettopp å nedkjempe opprørsgrupper og nettverk knyttet til al-Qaida og den bredere jihadistbevegelsen

A Kurdish al-Qaida? Making Sense of the Ansar al-Islam Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan in the Early 2000s

Initially construed as the vital link between Saddam Husayn’s Iraq and al-Qaida in the runup to the Iraq war, the Ansar al-Islam (AI) group formed in Iraqi Kurdistan in December 2001 has been the subject of intense debate and huge media coverage. In academic research, however, its history, evolution and affiliation have received surprisingly little academic scrutiny. Commonly depicted as an al-Qaida affiliated group or a sub-group controlled by al-Qaida’s emerging organization in Iraq (AQI), the AI group should—this article argues—instead be understood as a strong independent-minded group with an ideology and operational pattern distinct from that of AQI. Although sharing many commonalities, the AI and AQI became de facto rivals, not allies. Contrary to accepted wisdom, the AI and its first successor group remained a distinct Salafi-jihadi insurgent group largely focused on fighting ‘the near enemy’, i.e., Kurdish and Iraqi authorities. It strongly resisted repeated calls for joining al-Qaida’s new umbrella organization in Iraq, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) in 2006, and it paid no homage to AQI’s or ISI’s leaders. Also on the international level, the groups were fundamentally different. As opposed to al-Qaida’s terrorist plotting abroad, the AI’s international network were hierarchical structures, geared towards raising logistical and financial support as well as recruitment. The article highlights the need for greater attention to the complexities and nuances in patterns of contacts and cooperation between militant Islamist extremists. Informed by the growing scholarship on the multifaceted nature of contemporary jihadism, its numerous manifestations in local settings, and its strong internal rifts, this paper seeks to redress the early reductionist portrayal of the AI movement

Jihadbevegelsen i den arabiske verdenen før og etter 2011

Mange trodde den arabiske våren skulle bety slutten for jihadistbevegelsen. Men etter 2011 har den vunnet terreng i et omfang som de færreste kunne forestilt seg