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Atomic Energy Commission Report AECD-3008
Introduction:"Very little is known about the mechanical properties of zirconium and, in view of this the Atomic Energy Commission requested Sylvania to evaluate the creep characteristics of this metal at various temperatures. Tests at room temperature (25 C) and at 200 C have been completed, the tests having been conducted in air. The data obtained from these tests form the basis of this report. Future tests will be conducted in an atmosphere of water at the desired testing temperature.
The creep of zirconium in water from 400° to 600°F /
"Contract AT-30-1-Gen-366.""Date Declassified: November 29, 1955"--Page [2]."Sylvania Electric Products, Inc.""Subject category: Metallurgy and Ceramics.""April 20, 1951.""SEP-54."Includes bibliographical references (page 17).Mode of access: Internet.This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 "No Rights Reserved" license. The University of Florida Libraries, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law
Drones, Morality, and Vulnerability: Two Arguments Against Automated Killing
This chapter articulates and discusses several arguments against the lethal use of unmanned aerial vehicles, often called drones. A distinction is made between targeted killing, killing at a distance, and automated killing, which is used to map the arguments against lethal drones. After considering issues concerning the justification of war, the argument that targeted killing makes it easier to start a war, and the argument that
killing at a distance is problematic, this chapter focuses on two arguments against automated killing, which are relevant to all kinds of âmachine killingâ. The first argument (from moral agency) questions if machines can ever be moral agents and is based on differences in capacities for moral decision-making between humans and machines. The second argument (from moral patiency), which has received far less attention in the literature on machine ethics and ethics of drones, focuses on the question if machines can ever be âmoral patientsâ. It is argued that there is a morally significant qualitative difference in vulnerability and way of being between drones and humans, and that because of this asymmetry fully automated killing without or with little human involvement is not justified