Character and Candor Requirements for FCC Licensees

The Communications Act explicitly makes the applicant\u27s character an element in licensing. Applications must set forth such facts as the Commission by regulation may prescribe as to the citizenship, character, and financial, technical, and other qualifications of the applicant to operate the station. Even in the absence of such guidance, the Commission could scarcely ignore evidence of bad character in making its ultimate determination whether a grant will serve the public convenience, interest, or necessity. The Act mentions the related problem of misrepresentation only in connection with the Commission\u27s power to revoke licenses. Misrepresentation, or lack of candor, may, nevertheless, be treated as a defect of character, or as an independent ground for finding that public interest does not call for licensing someone who deceives the licensing authority. There is, it will appear, not much question about the Commission\u27s power to demand high standards of truthfulness and candor as well as of character. There is also little doubt that, at least for the last decade, the Commission has set high standards. The questions that merit attention are rather these: 1) In what circumstances is the power exercised? 2) Is it abused, either by the Commission or by parties who bring before the Commission unwarranted charges of bad character or of deception? 3) If there are abuses, how can they be checked? It may be said at the outset, without trying to prefigure any recommendations in conclusion, that there appear to be two forms of excessive concern with character and candor. The first is a tendency of parties, in hard-fought comparative proceedings, to dredge up remote and far-fetched charges of any conceivable kind of wrongdoing. The second, in which the Commission has taken the lead, is to make questionable inquiries about radical or subversive political associations. Examples of these practices will emerge from the discussion that follows

Book Review: Legal Realism at Yale, 1927-1960

Laura Kalman\u27s monograph, originally a dissertation, is nevertheless a fresh and rather engaging study of a finished chapter in intellectual history—the legal realist movement. It flourished in the 1930s, revived in another form after World War II, and then faded away around 1960, when Kalman ends her work. By that time, legal realism had left an indistinct legacy that was widely shared. It was always a rather shapeless growth, even in its prime. Kalman proposes to give the movement some coherence by concentrating on its manifestations at the Yale Law School. Yet, after an introductory chapter in which she locates realism in the broader setting of functionalism as a way of doing history and other social sciences, the second chapter is about Harvard Law School; much of the third chapter is about curricular changes at Columbia and Yale. Late in the day, Yale occupies all of the fourth and fifth chapters; but the sixth and last again turns to Harvard

Book Review: Competition in the Regulated Industries: Transportation

Professor Fulda has plunged into the thorniest thicket of the regulatory process; he emerges, scratched but undaunted, with a useful and coherent account of what he finds there. In the transportation industries the reconciliation of regulation with competitive norms is most difficult. Other utilities, notably those with geographical monopolies like telephones, electricity, and gas, offer little scope for rivalry of any sort. Except in special cases such as competition between electricity, gas, and oil for domestic space heating use, we can achieve only a pale simulation of competitive pricing by way of rate regulation. In transportation, however, either the reality or the prospect of competition is almost always present. There are, to be sure, patches of monopoly, as when one railroad serves a coal-mining area, or one airline a small city with no practical likelihood of another entrant. But in major markets railroads face other railroads, sometimes water carriers too, and, ubiquitously, trucks. Airlines try to woo business from each other, and, without great success, to attract more of the great mass of travellers who insist on driving vast distances in their own cars

Civil Remedies for Intellectual Property Invasions: Themes and Variations

Both practitioners and students of intellectual property may benefit by exposure to comparisons of the overall remedial schemes of the three statutes that encompass copyrights, patents, and trademarks. Such a survey is further warranted by my belief that, in general, we do not pay enough attention to remedies. They come at the end of the road (with, of course, the major exception of preliminary relief) and, for most of us, do not have the intellectual challenge of determining the existence of rights. Yet remedies are the payoff in litigation. Their potential severity, or lenity, presumably influences business decisions. The risk of treble damages if one skirts a patent too closely, or of a crippling injunction if a marketing program runs into an existing trademark, ought to affect the advice of lawyers, as well as the decisions of entrepreneurs. The comparison will proceed from injunctive remedies, both before and after trial, to the varying forms of monetary recoveries: actual damages (which are usually plaintiffs\u27 lost profits, or reasonable royalties), defendants\u27 profits, statutory substitutes for actual damages, and enhanced and punitive damages. Each type of remedy is subdivided among copyrights, patents, and trademark. Recovery of lawyers\u27 fees by either party in copyright cases is the topic of another contribution to this symposium, by Professor Peter Jaszi. Fees in patent and trademark cases are not addressed here. This comparison seeks to survey the dominant similarities and disparities among the various remedies, illustrating the variations that have developed over a century or more. Occasionally, the comparison will linger somewhat on contentious matters, notably the conflict between the copyrights of some authors and the first amendment privileges of other authors

Collective Bargaining in Higher Education

Clearly, there are many institutions where the model of shared authority has been attained; there are many more where it is attainable; and, unfortunately, there are many where it is not foreseeable. It is the first thesis of this Article that the advantages of an internal framework of representation make it worthwhile to strive for its realization