“What Gets Measured Gets Done”: Headteachers’ Responses to the English Secondary School

English secondary schools operate within a performance management system, which includes league tables reporting school performance across a number of indicators. This paper reports the results of an interview-based study, showing that head teachers care about their school’s place in the league tables, and that they believe this system affects behaviour. The effects they identify include some unintended consequences, not necessarily related to improved overall school performance, including focusing on borderline students who can boost a pivotal indicator: the number of students gaining five A*-Cs at GCSE. This behaviour reflects, in part, the dual role played by headteachers: they are both educationalists (serving the interests of all pupils); and school marketers, concerned with promoting the school to existing and prospective parents. The behaviour is also consistent with economic theory, which predicts a focus on that which is measured, potentially at the expense of that which is important, in sectors characterised by incomplete measurement, by multiple stakeholders and containing workers with diverse objectives. We conclude that, given that performance indicators do affect behaviour, it is important to minimise unintended consequences, and we suggest the use of value-added indicators of student performance.education, performance measures

Evaluating the Impact of Performance-related Pay for Teachers in England.

This paper evaluates the impact of a performance-related pay scheme for teachers in England. Using teacher level data, matched with test scores and value-added, we test whether the introduction of a payment scheme based on pupil attainment increased teacher effort. Our evaluation design controls for pupil effects, school effects and teacher effects, and adopts a difference-in-difference methodology. We find that the scheme did improve test scores and value added, on average by about half a grade per pupil. We also find heterogeneity across subjects, with maths teachers showing no improvement.Incentives, teachers pay, education reform, pupil attainment

An economic analysis of a voluntary hospital : the foundation and institutional structure of the Middlesex Hospital, 1745-1900

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Health professionals' views of contracting for infection control in the NHS internal market.

This paper reports a national study which investigated the involvement of infection control professionals in (and their views about) the formal processes of contracting for health care in the NHS internal market. Health care professionals needed to be involved contracting, if it was to be effective. The study found that many infection control professionals were not, in fact, involved in contracting, while the importance of both contracts and informal professional networks were recognised But respondents did not think that their professional networks entirely compensated for their lack of involvement in contracting. As formal agreements continue to be central to achieving quality of care in the post-internal market NHS, infection control professionals need to be involved in specification and implementation of these arrangements

The use of contracts in the management of infectious disease related risk in the NHS internal market.

The paper reports a unique study of contracting for infectious disease control in the English National Health Service internal market. New-institutional economic and socio-legal theories are used to predict that it will not be possible to make contracts for the control of infectious disease which are complete with respect to either the allocation of financial risk or the specification of quality standards. Socio-legal theory predicts that in some circumstances informal relationships (known as networks or relational contracts) can evolve to compensate for some of the deficiencies of incomplete contracts. NHS policy makers are shown to have expected and continue to expect that contracts can be complete. The study comprised five in-depth case studies of contracting in different local areas in England and a national survey of all infection control professionals. The results confirm the theoretical predictions. Contracts were not complete, and some of the elements of relational contracts were present. These elements did not, however, fully compensate for the lack of clear accountability caused by contractual incompleteness

CMPO Working Paper Series No. 01/45 Incentives in Secondary Schools: The Impact of the Performance Threshold

This paper reports the results of interviews with the head teachers of 25 English secondary schools, designed to elicit their perception of the Threshold’s impact in schools. One of the stated objectives of the Performance Threshold was to provide a financial incentive for teachers to increase their effort. The Threshold’s effectiveness in meeting its objectives depends partly on whether its design is consistent with the characteristics of schools, including their use of team working and their incentive structures, and whether it measures the outcomes that are important. Most of the head teachers in our sample believed that team working is important in schools and that changes in pupil attainment are the result of a team effort. None had observed divisive behaviour as the result of the individual-basis of the Performance Threshold, but a number recognised the risk. Heads were divided over how they would use financial incentives to motivate teachers, with some believing they cannot be used to motivate teachers directly. Others believed that financial incentives can be used to motivate teachers, but that the Threshold may not be effective because of its flaws in design. Some, but not all, heads believed that the Threshold’s definition of success creates targets that are too narrow, and which may therefore generate perverse incentives. Others believed that the targets were constructive, promoting a broad focus on factors that are important in good teaching

Waiting Times for Hospital Admissions: the Impact of GP Fundholding

Waiting times for hospital care are a significant issue in the UK National Health Service. The reforms of the health service in 1990 gave a subset of family doctors (GP fundholders) both the ability to choose the hospital where their patients were treated and the means to pay for some services. One of the key factors influencing family doctors’ choice of hospital was patient waiting time. However, without cash inducements, hospitals would get no direct reward from giving shorter waiting times to a subset of patients. Using a unique data set we investigate whether GP fundholders were able to secure shorter waiting times for their patients, whether they were able to do so in cases where they had no financial rewards to offer hospitals, and whether the impact of fundholding spilled over into shorter waiting times for all patients.Hospital Care; Physicians And Financial Incentives; Waiting Times