Images of Eyes Enhance Investments in a Real-Life Public Good

A key issue in cooperation research is to determine the conditions under which individuals invest in a public good. Here, we tested whether cues of being watched increase investments in an anonymous public good situation in real life. We examined whether individuals would invest more by removing experimentally placed garbage (paper and plastic bottles) from bus stop benches in Geneva in the presence of images of eyes compared to controls (images of flowers). We provided separate bins for each of both types of garbage to investigate whether individuals would deposit more items into the appropriate bin in the presence of eyes. The treatment had no effect on the likelihood that individuals present at the bus stop would remove garbage. However, those individuals that engaged in garbage clearing, and were thus likely affected by the treatment, invested more time to do so in the presence of eyes. Images of eyes had a direct effect on behaviour, rather than merely enhancing attention towards a symbolic sign requesting removal of garbage. These findings show that simple images of eyes can trigger reputational effects that significantly enhance on non-monetary investments in anonymous public goods under real life conditions. We discuss our results in the light of previous findings and suggest that human social behaviour may often be shaped by relatively simple and potentially unconscious mechanisms instead of very complex cognitive capacities

Innovation through Integration in Honors Education

UM’s Davidson Honors College claims many strengths: freshmen with exceptionally high test scores and GPAs, major scholarship winners, enviable placement rates, courses taught by outstanding faculty, and unique extra-curricular opportunities. In 2016, the DHC unveiled a new mission, “innovation through integration,” focused on Postdoctoral Teaching, Research, and Mentoring; Career Development; and DHC QUEST, integrated with a strategy focusing on inclusivity rather than exclusivity

Replication Data for: U.S. Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation

What can states expect to receive in return for the military aid they provide to other states? Can military aid buy recipient state compliance with donor objectives? In this study, we systematically investigate the effects of U.S. military assistance on recipient state behavior toward the United States. We build on existing literature by creating three explicit theoretical models, employing a new measure of cooperation generated from events data, and controlling for preference similarity so that our results capture the influence military aid has on recipient state behavior independent of any dyadic predisposition toward cooperation or conflict. We test seven hypotheses using a combination of simultaneous equation, cross-sectional time series, and Heckman selection models. We find that, with limited exceptions, increasing levels of U.S. military aid significantly reduce cooperative foreign policy behavior with the United States. U.S. reaction to recipient state behavior is also counter-intuitive; instead of using a carrot-and-stick approach to military aid allocations, our results show that recipient state cooperation is likely to lead to subsequent reductions in U.S. military assistance

US foreign aid, interstate rivalry, and incentives for counterterrorism cooperation

A common strategy pursued by states targeted by international terrorism is to provide economic and military assistance to the states that host this activity. This is thought to increase their willingness and capacity to crack down on terrorism, but very little work to date has looked at whether this strategy actually leads to desirable outcomes. This article offers an explanation for why a strategy of foreign aid-for-counterterrorism can be successful in some contexts, but counterproductive in situations in which recipients have more pressing strategic priorities. Specifically, I argue that host states receiving US foreign aid that are involved in an ongoing interstate rivalry will use the aid to arm against their rival, rather than to undertake counterterrorism. These states thus have an incentive not to disarm terrorist groups, but rather to play-up the threat from terrorism in order to continue receiving aid concessions. Using data on US foreign aid and terrorist activity in recipient countries, I employ a series of duration and count models to demonstrate that, while US foreign aid can help to decrease terrorist activity in non-rivalrous states, the opposite is true in states with at least one rival

Middle powers in the Indo-Pacific: Potential pacifiers guarantying stability in the Indo-Pacific?

The article examines the potential of middle powers’ cooperation to establish communities of practice to reinforce their ability to influence world affairs. Illustrating the argument with three case studies—Australia, Indonesia, and South Korea—we assert that middle powers play key roles in structuring the world order. We test the following hypotheses: (i) middle powers do not look, nor do they need to look to great powers for leadership, and can influence events by forging new regional relationships; (ii) when leadership topples or tensions emerge between great powers, with a potential or nascent leadership vacuum, the initiative to guarantee the status quo (i.e., a liberal order) can be provided by middle powers. While rooted in IR theories, the research mostly builds upon the framework of communities of practice and management theories, linking them to highlight the importance of existing interactions, the opportunity for and advantage of greater cooperation and its potential systemic impact