Taxes and Foreign Real Estate Investment

In recent years studies examining international mixed-asset portfolios have failed to uncover any significant benefits from foreign real estate. These papers have concentrated their focus on foreign exchange rate risk as "the problem" with respect to foreign investments, and therefore they sought solutions from traditional hedging tools such as leverage, options, forward contracts and even currency swaps. This study considers differences among countries in national income tax rates as a plausible explanation for the interest in foreign real estate investment. Hypothetically, it may be possible for investors to move a portion of their wealth to a foreign country and take advantage of lower marginal tax rates. After-tax returns from mixed-asset portfolios consisting of (1) domestic financial assets only, (2) domestic financial assets plus foreign financial assets, and (3) domestic financial assets, foreign financial assets and foreign real estate are evaluated. The findings indicate that there are no significant after-tax benefits for foreign investors from investment in U.S. real estate.

Hedging Foreign Investments in U.S. Real Estate with Currency Options

Historically, the volatility in exchange rates appears to have generated so much risk in U.S. real estate returns that, from the foreign investor's viewpoint, it eliminated any potential for obtaining diversification benefits from these assets. Yet during the past twenty years foreigners purchased and continue to hold enormous amounts of U.S. real estate. This study examines the use of currency options as a means of hedging the exchange rate risk associated with a foreign investment in U.S. real estate. The findings indicate that currency options behave very much like an insurance policy. When used on a continuous basis, they insure foreign investors against any large sudden currency losses and spread the cost of these extreme losses out over time. Thus, from the foreign investor's perspective, the total risk in U.S. real estate returns is substantially reduced. However, these improvements are insufficient to make U.S. real estate consistently attractive to these investors in a mean-variance portfolio framework.

Abnormal Returns From the Common Stock Investments of Members of the U.S. House of Representatives

A previous study suggests that U.S. Senators trade common stock with a substantial informational advantage compared to ordinary investors and even corporate insiders. We apply precisely the same methods to test for abnormal returns from the common stock investments of Members of the U.S. House of Representatives. We measure abnormal returns for more than 16,000 common stock transactions made by approximately 300 House delegates from 1985 to 2001. Consistent with the study of Senatorial trading activity, we find stocks purchased by Representatives also earn significant positive abnormal returns (albeit considerably smaller returns). A portfolio that mimics the purchases of House Members beats the market by 55 basis points per month (approximately 6% annually).

Abnormal returns from the common stock investments of Members of the U.S. House of Representatives

A previous study suggests that U.S. Senators trade common stock with a substantial informational advantage compared to ordinary investors and even corporate insiders. We apply precisely the same methods to test for abnormal returns from the common stock investments of Members of the U.S. House of Representatives. We measure abnormal returns for more than 16,000 common stock transactions made by approximately 300 House delegates from 1985 to 2001. Consistent with the study of Senatorial trading activity, we find stocks purchased by Representatives also earn significant positive abnormal returns (albeit considerably smaller returns). A portfolio that mimics the purchases of House Members beats the market by 55 basis points per month (approximately 6% annually)