Industry concentration and strategic trade policy in successive oligopoly

We study a policy game between exporting and importing countries in vertically linked industries. In a successive international Cournot oligopoly, we analyse incentives for using tax instruments strategically to shift rents vertically, between exporting and importing countries, and horizontally, between exporting countries. We show that the equilibrium outcome depends crucially on the relative degree of competitiveness in the upstream and downstream parts of the industry. With respect to national welfare, a more competitive upstream industry may benefit an exporting (upstream) country and harm an importing (downstream) country. On the other hand, a more competitive downstream industry may harm exporting countries.Financial support from the Norwegian Research Council, through the PETROPOL research programme, is gratefully acknowledged. The paper has been greatly improved by the suggestions of two anonymous referees. We also thank Hisashi Hokari and Frode Meland for valuable comments and suggestions

Phase I clinical trial of an intranodally administered mRNA-based therapeutic vaccine against HIV-1 infection

OBJECTIVE: The efficacy of therapeutic vaccines against HIV-1 infection has been modest. New inerts to redirect responses to vulnerable sites are urgently needed to improve these results.DESIGN: We performed the first-in-human clinical trial with naked mRNA (iHIVARNA) combining a dendritic cell activation strategy (TriMix:CD40L+CD70+caTLR4 RNA) with a novel HIV immunogen sequences (HTI immunogen).METHODS: A dose escalation, phase I clinical trial was performed in 21 chronic HIV-1-infected patients under ART who received three intranodal doses of mRNA (weeks 0, 2 and 4

Financial Structure, Product Market Decisions and Default Risk in an Asymmetric Duopoly

Financial and output market decisions are crucial to the success or failure of an organization. In this paper we analyze the equilibrium default risk in a two-stage duopoly model with an uncertain environment, where firms decide their financial structure in the first stage of the game and decide their quantities in the second stage of the game. Using numerical analysis, we analyze the impact of changing the asymmetry in the two firms' marginal costs on the equilibrium default risk. Our results show that as a firm becomes less efficient it is optimal to reduce its debt level and the quantity produced. The reverse is true for the more efficient firm. This behavior implies that although higher marginal cost leads to lower profits, the less efficient firm reduces its default probability due to a more cautious behavior in the financial and product market

Optimal Land Development with Endogenous Environmental Amenities

A spatially explicit model of the optimal timing and location of land development is presented that incorporates dynamic interactions between land development and water quality. Ignoring two-way interactions leads to a lower level of water quality, more development, and lower social welfare. The optimal pace and pattern of development can be achieved through the assessment of an impact fee that internalizes pollution damages and irreversibility costs. Our results demonstrate the importance of accounting for the spatial dimension of land use, the interdependence between land use and environmental quality, and development irreversibility in models of urbanization and amenity-driven growth. Copyright 2008, Oxford University Press.

Capital Structure Decisions: Which Factors Are Reliably Important?

"This paper examines the relative importance of many factors in the capital structure decisions of publicly traded American firms from 1950 to 2003. The most reliable factors for explaining market leverage are: median industry leverage (+ effect on leverage), market-to-book assets ratio ( - ), tangibility (+), profits ( - ), log of assets (+), and expected inflation (+). In addition, we find that dividend-paying firms tend to have lower leverage. When considering book leverage, somewhat similar effects are found. However, for book leverage, the impact of firm size, the market-to-book ratio, and the effect of inflation are not reliable. The empirical evidence seems reasonably consistent with some versions of the trade-off theory of capital structure." Copyright (c) 2009 Financial Management Association International..

Debt Overhang, Costly Expandability and Reversibility, and Optimal Financial Structure

This article compares the investment and financing decisions of a firm that adopts a 'first-best' strategy with those of a firm that adopts a 'second-best' strategy. The former issues bonds upon deciding an initial capacity, while the latter issues bonds, and only then decides an initial capacity. The former is thus able to avoid the agency cost associated with the 'debt overhang' problem. Accordingly, the former will both issue more bonds and install a larger initial capacity than the latter. However, the agency cost of debt, i.e., firm value difference between these two strategies, is modest for plausible parameter values. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2004.