Jump jets for the ADF?

This report argues that the costs of Australia acquiring F-35B Joint Strike Fighter short take-off, vertical landing aircraft outweigh the potential benefits. Overview Is there a case for Australia to acquire F-35B Joint Strike Fighter short take-off, vertical landing (STOVL) aircraft to operate from the two new Canberra-class landing helicopter docks (LHDs)? The government has directed that this question be addressed in the development of the 2015 Defence White Paper. This report is an independent assessment of the costs and potential benefits of such an acquisition. Reintroducing organic naval air power into the ADF would be a big strategic decision, and very complex and expensive, so it’s important to have a clear view of the circumstances in which it might be beneficial enough to be worth pursuing. And it’s important to be aware not only of the direct costs but also of the potential risks and opportunity costs. Overall, this report concludes that the benefits would be marginal at best, wouldn’t be commensurate with the costs and other consequences for the ADF, and would potentially divert funding and attention from more valuable force

The Challenge of Warning Time in the Contemporary Strategic Environment

This Centre of Gravity paper is based on an ANU public lecture given by the authors on 23 June 2021. The lecture in turn drew heavily on the authors’ paper for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Deterrence through denial: a strategy for an era of reduced warning time, published in May 2021.1 The authors are grateful to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute for agreeing that the material could be re-published in this way

Contingencies and Warning Time

The idea that there is a relationship between level of contingency and warning time has been integral to Australian defence planning since the 1970s. Yet over the years the focus on this issue, and the associated ideas of preparedness, force expansion and Australia's industrial base, has been neither strong nor consistent.Time is often the neglected dimension of defence planning. Yet its consideration is central to practical defence decision-making. This is true for any nation that takes national security and the allocation of resources seriously. Two examples illustrate the principle. First, preparedness (that is, readiness and sustainability) can be expensive, so not all elements of a defence force are kept at short notice for operations. There will usually be a spectrum of preparedness: at one end of the scale, counter-terrorist forces able to move within hours; and at the other end, Reserve units mostly able to become operational only after months if not years. Second is the idea of reconstitution or mobilisation: when threats emerge, a defence force will be expanded and, conversely, when threats go away, as at the end of the World Wars and the Cold War, forces will be reduced. So time is an important parameter in a government's approach to defence policy, risk management, and resource allocation. In Australia's case, the end of the war in Vietnam called for fresh thinking about defence policy. The emerging ideas of the Defence of Australia filled some of this gap, but there was a need also for an analytical basis from which to argue for levels of defence funding�� else the prospective budget cuts at a time of evident 'low threat' would have been harsh. This led Defence to develop the concept of the core force and expansion base. In brief, a force-in-being would evolve which would both meet the demands of those important lesser contingencies that might arise in the shorter term, and be the base from which expansion would occur in the event of major strategic deterioration. Intelligence would be critical in assessing warning time and ensuring that expansion would be timel

Australia's Defence Policy after COVID-19

The 2020 Defence Strategic Update and accompanying Force Structure Plan, and the Defence Science and Technology Strategy 2030 are, when taken together, among the more important defence policy documents that the Government has released in recent years. The timing amplifies their significance. They arrive at a time when Australia is experiencing a momentous crisis that challenges every aspect of our national life and will have consequences for decades to come

Why Australia Needs a Radically New Defence Policy

In this Centre of Gravity paper, three of Australia's leading strategists and defence practitioners from the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Emeritus Professor Paul Dibb, Honorary Professor Richard Brabin-Smith, and Honorary Professor Brendan Sargeant, make the case for bold, new strategic thinking and imagination in Australian defence policy

Nuclear risk in Asia: how Australia should respond

This report was commisioned by Australian National Universit

The heartland of Australia's defence policies

This paper looks at the conceptual framework that Australian governments have used over the past thirty years or so to give direction on defence policy and priorities. The paper examines four separate but strongly interrelated notions: self-reliance, levels of conflict and warning time; limitations to Australia's military resources and influence; and regional as opposed to distant operations. It observes that the treatment of these four themes show a high level of consistency, in spite of the several changes of government in Canberra over the period, and the extensive changes in the external security environment. The paper speculates on the continuing relevance of this conceptual framework. It concludes that, while change should not be ruled out, any more-radical change that might be contemplated would need to meet the challenge of at least matching the current conceptual framework for overall cogency and coherence

Force Expansion and Warning Time

The twin notions of force expansion and warning time have been integral to Australia�s defence planning since the 1970s. Yet over the years the focus on these issues has been neither strong nor consistent�perhaps for good reason, given that the prospect of the need for major force expansion has been seen as remote. But with the new Age of Asia, Australia�s strategic environment is changing. This article reviews the treatment of force expansion and warning time in Australia�s five Defence White Papers, and discusses the extent to which the rise of China should be a catalyst for a review of force expansion policies. Finding a position between complacency and alarm, it concludes that Defence should conduct at least a preliminary view of how Australia should identify and respond to a more threatening posture by any potential major power adversary, and to present the conclusions in the 2013 Defence White Paper

Capability development and defence research

This book is specifically designed as a companion volume to Australia's Defence: Towards a New Era? The Australia-United States Alliance has been critical to Australian foreign and defence policy since the ANZUS Treaty was signed in 1951. For 63 years it has been an enduring feature of Australian defence planning, yet the contemporary alliance is, arguably, in one of the more important phases of reinterpretation in its long history. While the Alliance by its very nature is a bi-lateral relationship, this book will therefore specifically focus on Australian perspectives and policy choices, while providing context on the role of the United States in the Asia-Pacific and its position as a global power