The Moral Ecology of Extremism: A Systemic Perspective

Polarisation, social media, multiculturalism, economic strain, loss of political trust. The list of suspected drivers of extremism grows every day. How do we tell which of them really contribute to the risk of extremism? Why do some individuals seem more vulnerable to this risk than others? This paper answers these fundamental questions

Analyzing Radicalization and Terrorism: A Situational Action Theory

Although the years since 9/11 have seen an significant increase in the contribution of criminologists to the study of terrorist events, efforts to apply major criminological theories to the understanding of the development of terrorist criminality and individual involvement in terrorist action have lagged. In this chapter, we apply a recently formulated theory of moral action and crime causation, Situational Action Theory, to the explanation of terrorism and radicalization. The case is made that explanations of terrorism and radicalisation should be mechanism-based and integrate all levels of analysis. Situational Action Theory is introduced and examples of its application to the study of terrorism and radicalization are provided. The priorities of a SAT-driven, systematic research agenda are outlined

The multifinality of vulnerability indicators in lone-actor terrorism

To move beyond current aggregate and static conclusions regarding radicalisation and subsequent terrorist behaviour, empirical research should look to criminological models which are influenced by the life-course perspective. Current UK government policy designed to prevent radicalisation and terrorist engagement look to outputs from criminological perspectives to inform policy and practice. However, the guidance suffers from a lack of specificity as to the major concept of ‘vulnerability to radicalisation’, and what this incorporates. This investigation uses sequential analyses to add to our understanding of ‘vulnerability’ in the specific context of lone-actor terrorism. The statistical method bridges the gap between qualitative and quantitative approaches and provides a series of empirical outputs which visualise typical lone-actor terrorist trajectories through the discrete stages of radicalisation, attack planning and attack commission

Individual and Environmental Explanations for Violent Extremist Intentions: A German Nationally Representative Survey Study

This study examines individual differences in violent extremist intentions. It combines key criminological theories and concepts including situational action theory, social learning theory, self-control, general strain theory and legal cynicism. We employ a conceptually integrated approach to studying extremism, which acknowledges the profound effect of person-environment reciprocity and, thereby, we aim to identify key individual, developmental and social mechanisms involved in the development of extremist propensities. The analytical framework is tested using structural equation modeling. The analysis is based on a German nationally representative survey (N = 1502) collected via Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI). Representativity of the sample was achieved via a systematic and controlled approach of a multi-stratified probability sample (random-digit-dialing) in the dual-frame mode (landline telephone- households and mobile phone users). Results highlight that low law-relevant morality, low self-control, and exposure to extremism-promoting settings are associated with individuals’ readiness to engage in violent extremism. The relationship between legal morality, self-control and violent extremism is further mediated by exposure to extremist peers. We thereby identify exposure to extremist settings as a key mechanism, which stresses the importance of including social environmental factors in the explanation of violent extremism. The proximate determinants are further related to a series of distal factors, such as perceived individual and collective strains and personal alienation

Lone Actor Terrorists: A Residence-to-Crime Approach

Although there has recently been a considerable increase in research into lone actor terrorism, one of the main areas that remains understudied is that of target selection. The lack of empirically driven studies that can guide prevention measures is a notable oversight. This paper applies methods from environmental criminology to examine the residence-to-attack journeys of 122 lone terrorist acts in the U.S and Europe. The distance decay effect was evident, and significant differences were found between subgroups. Individuals were more likely to travel further if a) they were in the U.S, b) they had links to a wider network, c) they had a single-issue ideology, d) they attacked an iconic target, e) they attacked a symbolic building, or f) they used a bomb as their main weapon. A few case studies are discussed which highlight a need to conduct further research that considers the whole nodal network of an individual. The findings suggest that distance can be put forward as a constraining factor on lone actor target selection and provide support for the notion that the spatial decision making of terrorists is similar to traditional criminals

The reasoning criminal vs. Homer Simpson: conceptual challenges for crime science

A recent disciplinary offshoot of criminology, crime science (CS) defines itself as “the application of science to the control of crime.” One of its stated ambitions is to act as a cross-disciplinary linchpin in the domain of crime reduction. Despite many practical successes, notably in the area of situational crime prevention (SCP), CS has yet to achieve a commensurate level of academic visibility. The case is made that the growth of CS is stifled by its reliance on a model of decision-making, the Rational Choice Perspective (RCP), which is inimical to the integration of knowledge and insights from the behavioral, cognitive and neurosciences (CBNs). Examples of salient developments in the CBNs are provided, as regards notably multiple-system perspectives of decision-making and approaches to person-environment interaction. Short and long-term benefits of integration for CS are briefly outlined

Updating and organizing our knowledge of risk and protective factors for lone-actor terrorism

This chapter updates builds upon previous descriptive analyses of loneactor terrorists, their behaviours, ideological backgrounds and degrees of 'loneness'. It offers greater conceptual clarity, updated data and a more expansive set of variables from previous analyses. Individual vulnerability indicators examined here include potential indicators of cognitive susceptibility to moral change, and self-selection and social selection into radicalizing settings, notably membership of a social network containing one or more radicalized individual. We also examine exposure settings, attack-preparation behaviours and explore sub-set analyses of the data. The analyses informed by a Risk Analysis Framework which offers a multilevel, integrated meta-model of these events and allows for the synthesis of disparate findings. The analyses provide key insights into the behaviour of lone-actors, which could inform intelligence gathering and investigative practice, as such analyses already do in other crime prevention domains

Learning from crime prevention: Foundations of a systemist evaluation framework for online influence activities

This report introduces the crime prevention knowledge-base on evaluation and lays out the foundations of a systemist evaluation framework for online influence activities (OIAs). Different approaches to evaluation are assessed for suitability, including evidence-based and realist evaluation, and the pros and cons of the main families of research designs are described. The case is made that a formative realist model, supplemented by a systemist analytical framework, is best suited to OIA evaluation, given the embryonic state of the problem domain and the absence of a systematic knowledge-base on influence activities. A prototype of a systemist formative evaluation framework for OIA is presented

Similar crimes, similar behaviors? Comparing lone-actor terrorists and public mass murderers

This article adds to the growth in data-driven analyses seeking to compare samples of violent extremists with other violent populations of interest. While lone-actor terrorists and public mass murderers are frequently treated as distinct offender types, both engage (or attempt to engage) in largely public and highly publicized acts of violence and often use similar weapons. This article investigates the (dis)similarities between both offender types. We use a series of bivariate and multivariate statistical analyses to compare demographic, psychologic and behavioral variables across 71 lone-actor terrorists and 115 public mass murderers. The results show little distinction in sociodemographic profiles, but significant differences in (a) the degree to which they interact with co-ideologues (b) antecedent event behaviors and (c) the degree to which they leak information before the attack. Overall, our data inform the emerging idea that lone-actor terrorists and public mass shooters are not distinct offender types. There is more that unites them than divides them. Although the over-arching focus of our results are on the few variables that distinguish them, the vast majority (80%+), of the 180+ variables showed no significant difference. We discuss implications for threat assessment and management in the context of these results

Disaggregating Lone-actor Grievance-fuelled Violence: Comparing Lone-actor Terrorists and Mass Murderers

Research suggests that lone-actor terrorists and mass murderers may be better conceptualized as lone-actor grievance-fueled violence (LAGFV) offenders, rather than as distinct types. The present study sought to examine the extent to which these offenders could (or could not) be disaggregated along dimensions relevant to the threat assessment of both. Drawing on a Risk Analysis Framework (RAF), the offending process was theorized as interactions among propensity, situation, preparatory, leakage and network indicators. We analyzed a dataset of 183 U.S. offenders, including sixty-eight lone-actor terrorists and 115 solo mass murderers. Cluster analysis identified profiles within each of the components: propensity (stable, criminal, unstable), situation (low stress, high stress (social), high stress (interpersonal), preparatory (fixated, novel aggression, equipped, clandestine, predatory, preparatory), leakage (high leakage, low leakage), and network (lone, associated, connected). Bi-variate analysis examined the extent to which the profiles classified offenders previously labeled as lone-actor terrorists or mass murderers. The results suggest that while significant differences may exist at the periphery of these dimensions, offenders previously classified as lone-actor terrorists or mass murderers occupy a noteworthy shared space. Moreover, no profile classifies a single “type” of offender exclusively. Lastly, we propose a dynamic, interactional model of LAGFV and discuss the implications of these findings for the threat assessment and management of LAGFV offenders