Circuit theory of finance and the role of incentives in financial sector reform

The author analyzes the financial system's role in economic growth and stability, addressing several core policy issues associated with financial sector reform in emerging economies. He studies finance's role in the context of a circuit model, with interacting rational, forward-looking, heterogeneous agents. He shows finance to essentially complement the price system in coordinating decentralized intertemporal resource allocation choices made by agents operating with limited information and incomplete trust. He discusses the links between finance and incentives for efficiency and stability in the context of the circuit model. He also identifies incentives and incentive-compatible institutions for reform strategies for financial sectors in emerging economies. Among his conclusions: 1) Circuit theory features important methodological advantages to analyze the role of finance, and to assess structural weaknesses of financial systems under different institutional settings and in different stages of economic development. 2) Incentives for prudence and honesty can protect the stability of the circuit by directing private sector forces unleashed by liberalization. In particular: a) Financial institutions should be encouraged to invest in reputational capital. b) Governments should complement the creation of franchise value by strengthening supervision and by adopting a regulatory regime based on rules designed to align the private incentives of market players with the social goal of financial stability. c) Safety nets to reduce systemic risk should minimize the moral hazard from stakeholders by limiting risk protection and by making the cost of protection sensitive to the risk taken. d) Governments should encourage self-policing in the financial sector. e) Where information and trust are scarce, there is a potential market for them, and governments can greatly improve incentives for optimal provision of information. f) Governments should strengthen the complementarity between the formal and the informal financial sectors. Emphasizing incentives is not to deny the importance of good rules, capable regulators andsupervisors, and strong enforcement measures. It is to suggest that the returns on investments to set up rules, institutions, and enforcement mechanisms can be greater if market players have an incentive to align their own objectives with the social goal of financial stability.Banks&Banking Reform,Economic Theory&Research,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Environmental Economics&Policies,Financial Intermediation,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,Banks&Banking Reform,Financial Intermediation,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism

The problem of the co-existence of Arctodiaptomus bacillifer (Koelb.), Acanthodiaptomus denticornis (Wierz.) and Heterocope saliens Lill [Translation from: Memorie dell'Istituto Italiano di Idrobiologia Dott.Marco de Marchi 8 81-94, 1954]

In freshwater environments of modest size and without notable ecological structure, there is usually present only one diaptomid species. When two or more diaptomid species are present in the same habitat, generally their body dimensions are distinctly different. There are only four examples of co-existence of Arctodiaptomus bacillifer (Koelb.) and Acanthodiaptomus denticornis (Wierz.) situated at higher altitudes alpine lakes. The article discusses the results of sampling in the summer of 1953 and the problem of the co-existence of Arctodiaptomus bacillifer, Acanthodiaptomus denticornis and Heterocope saliens

In Finance, Size Matters

This study investigates the relationship between production efficiency in financial intermediation and financial system size. The study predicts and tests for the existence of "systemic scale economies" (SSE) effects, whereby value-maximizing intermediaries operating in large systems are expected to have lower costs of production, risk absorption, and reputation signaling than intermediaries operating in small systems. The study explores the mechanics of SSEs and estimates their quantitative relevance using a large cross-country banking data panel. The study shows strong evidence in support of SSEs and finds that the institutional environment, risk environment, and market concentration affect significantly the production efficiency of financial intermediation services. Copyright 2004, International Monetary Fund

The role of trust in financial sector development

In any economic environment where decisions are decentralized, agents consider the risk that others might unfairly exploit informational asymmetries to their own disadvantage. Incomplete results, especially, lies at the heart of financial transactions in which agents trade real claims for promises of future real claims. Agents thus need to invest considerable resources to assess the trustworthiness of others with whom they know they can interact only under conditions of limited and asymmetrically distributed information. Thinking of finance as the complex of institutions and instruments needed to reduce the cost of trading promises among anonymous individuals who do not fully trust each other, the author analyzes how incomplete trust shapes the transaction costs in trading assets, and how it affects resource allocation and pricing decisions from rational, forward-looking agents. His analysis leads to core propositions about the role of finance and financial efficiency in economic development. He recommends areas of financial sector reform in emerging economies aimed at improving the financial system's efficiency in dealing with incomplete trust. Among other things, the public sector can improve trust in finance by improving financial infrastructure, including legal systems, financial regulation, and security in payment and trading systems. But fundamental improvements in financial efficiency may best be gained by eliciting good conduct through market forces.Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Decentralization,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Banks&Banking Reform,Insurance&Risk Mitigation

Financial development and industrial capital accumulation

In an economy where decisions are decentralized and made under conditions of uncertainty, the financial system can be seen as the complex of institutions, infrastructure, and instruments that society adopts to minimize the costs of trading promises when agents have incomplete trust and limited information. Building on a microeconomic general equilibrium model that portrays such fundamental financial functions, the author shows that, in line with recent empirical evidence, the development of financial infrastructure stimulates greater and more efficient capital accumulation. He also shows that economies with more developed financial infrastructure can more easily absorb exogenous shocks to output. The results call for addressing a crucial issue in the sequencing of reform in the financial sector: early in development, banks provide essential financial infrastructure services as part of their exclusive relationships with borrowers. Further economic development requires that such services be provided extrinsically to the bank-borrower relationship, clearly at the expense of bank rents. There may be a compelling discontinuity to financial sector development in that banks need to be supported early in development but to be"weakened"later - at the expense of bank rents - to foster further development. The important question for policy is when and how to generate and manage this discontinuity so that it is not forced on society by costly and traumatic events such as bank failures.Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Banks&Banking Reform,Economic Theory&Research,Decentralization,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Banks&Banking Reform,Economic Theory&Research,Financial Intermediation,Environmental Economics&Policies,Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring

"Should Banks Be Narrowed?"

Over the past 70 years, a proposal to narrow the scope of banks has emerged more and more frequently in financial debates and research. Narrow banking would prevent deposit-issuing banks from lending to the private sector and restrict nonbank intermediaries from funding investments with demand deposits. Proponents of narrow banking defend it as a step toward greater financial stability and efficiency. This study reviews the literature on the subject, contrasts the concept of narrow banking with contemporary banking theories, and evaluates the potential effects of narrow banking on finance and the real economy. The study also delineates an empirical exercise to estimate the costs of bank narrowness and draws policy conclusions based on those estimates.

"Should Banks Be "Narrowed"? An Evaluation of a Plan to Reduce Financial Instability"

In this issue, Biagio Bossone of the IMF evaluates narrow banking from the perspective of modern theories of financial intermediation. These theories portray the status quo banking system as a solution to otherwise intractable problems of imperfect information, risk, and even moral hazard. The system's characteristic coupling of liquid liabilities with illiquid assets-seen by some as an undesirable "mismatch"? in fact contributes greatly to the efficiency of the economy. Bossone argues that these efficiency gains outweigh the disadvantages associated with the existing legal framework.

A Case Report of a Mediastinal Fistula with Liver Abscesses as a Complication of Aortic Valve Replacement Surgery

We report a case of mediastinal fistula with liver abscesses detected by thoracic and abdominal computed tomography as a complication of aortic valve replacement surgery

Should banks be narrowed?

Over the past 70 years, a proposal to narrow the scope of banks has emerged more and more frequently in financial debates and research. Narrow banking would prevent deposit-issuing banks from lending to the private sector and restrict nonbank intermediaries from funding investments with demand deposits. Proponents of narrow banking defend it as a step toward greater financial stability and efficiency. This study reviews the literature on the subject, contrasts the concept of narrow banking with contemporary banking theories, and evaluates the potential effects of narrow banking on finance and the real economy. The study also delineates an empirical exercise to estimate the costs of bank narrowness and draws policy conclusions based on those estimates

Current state of knowledge on Takotsubo Syndrome: a Position Statement from the Taskforce on Takotsubo Syndrome of the Heart Failure Association of the European Society of Cardiology

Takotsubo syndrome is an acute reversible heart failure syndrome that is increasingly recognized in modern cardiology practice. This Position Statement from the European Society of Cardiology Heart Failure Association provides a comprehensive review of the various clinical and pathophysiological facets of Takotsubo syndrome, including nomenclature, definition, and diagnosis, primary and secondary clinical subtypes, anatomical variants, triggers, epidemiology, pathophysiology, clinical presentation, complications, prognosis, clinical investigations, and treatment approaches. Novel structured approaches to diagnosis, risk stratification, and management are presented, with new algorithms to aid decision-making by practising clinicians. These also cover more complex areas (e.g. uncertain diagnosis and delayed presentation) and the management of complex cases with ongoing symptoms after recovery, recurrent episodes, or spontaneous presentation. The unmet needs and future directions for research in this syndrome are also discussed