Sport governance after the White Paper: the demise of the European model?

In 1998 the European Commission introduced into the political arena the concept of a ‘European model of sport’ in the build up to the Helsinki Report on Sport, the Commission’s first attempt to formulate a comprehensive approach towards sport in the ‘post-Bosman era’. In the recently adopted White Paper on Sport (July 2007), the Commission however considers it ‘unrealistic’ to define a single model of sport for Europe. This article argues that the Commission’s departure from its previous position deserves attention because it is an explicit acknowledgement of the transformations in the governing structures of European sport over the last two decades. The article suggests two possible motives for the Commission’s new understanding of European sport. First, the Commission is responding to the politicisation and redefinition of the concept of the ‘European Model’ by sport governing bodies, who are attempting to forestall legal intervention by the European courts and the Commission. Second, the Commission is just acknowledging the reality of the new governance of sport. In this respect, the article focuses on professional football to argue that the governance of the sport in Europe is transforming from the old pyramidal and vertical structure to more horizontal configurations of stakeholder networks. The White Paper is just another indication of this process, and the Commission has used it to position itself within the network structure. The Commission, it is argued, has opted for a supervisory role, offering governing bodies a degree of ‘supervised autonomy’ where the specific role of federation is recognised in exchange for greater stakeholder representation within governing structures

The EU and sport governance: between economic and social values

The EU and sport governance: between economic and social value

From regulation to governance and representation: agenda-setting and the EU’s involvement in sport

This paper presents the origins and development of the EU’s involvement in sport through the examination of the landmark decisions that have shaped its approach over time. The initiation and development of that policy can be considered an example of ‘ task expansion’, in which the EU has extended the scope of its activities as a consequence of actors instrumentalising institutional venues to their own benefit. It draws on concepts from agendasetting to argue that the initial insertion of sport in the EU’s systemic agenda can be explained by the commercialisation of sport in the 1980s and 1990s. However, actor centered agendasetting models may be more suitable to explore the consideration of sport in the institutional agenda after the 1995 Bosman case. Two routes of agenda-setting are identified: the high politics route and the low politics route. At first, sports policy was just regulatory in nature, being introduced through the low politics route. The response to the Bosman case from actors both outside and within the system (mainly sports federations and European Council) moved the issue to the high politics route, focusing more on the socio-cultural and educational particularities of sport

Playing ball: EU regulation of professional football since the Bosman ruling

Playing ball: EU regulation of professional football since the Bosman rulin

Sport&EU workshop: the EU and the governance of sport, policy and perspectives

Sport&EU workshop: the EU and the governance of sport, policy and perspective

The Independent European Sport Review: half full or half empty?

This contribution reviews the ongoing debates on the role of European public authorities in the governance of sport, focusing on the recently published Independent European Sport Review, an initiative of British sports minister Richard Caborn during the 2005 UK Presidency of the EU. Former Portuguese Presidency minister, José Luis Arnaut, was charged with the task of carrying a review of the current state of European football in the aftermath of major corruption scandals in Germany, Belgium and Italy. With the support of UEFA, FIFA and the European sports ministers, Arnaut delivered his report last May, claiming that, despite being focused on football, it presents a template to improve the governance standards of sport in Europe, define the role the EU has to play and to preserve the so-called European Sports Model. The Independent European Sports Review is now featuring heavily in the consultation process conducting to the forthcoming European Commission White Paper on Sport

The influence of the EU on the governance of football

The influence of the EU on the governance of footbal

The 2001 informal agreement on the international transfer system

The control structures of football have traditionally positioned players at the bottom of the football pyramid (Tomlinson 1983: 173). Clubs must register their players with their respective national FA or league to participate in national championships. They have to follow similar procedures with UEFA if they participate in European competitions. These governing bodies regulate and decide which players can be registered to play in the competitions they organise, thus having a certain amount of power over the players that any given club can hire. Football governing bodies have traditionally adopted two sets of norms to regulate the employment and registration of footballers: transfer systems and nationality quotas (Lanfranchi and Taylor 2001: 218). From the players’ point of view, the most contentious issue of a transfer system is any rule that can be used to prevent a player from moving from one club to another at the end of the contract, for instance if agreement cannot be reached between the buying and selling club about an appropriate ‘transfer fee’. The football transfer system used to favour clubs rather than players, for it allowed clubs to retain a player at the end of the contract when there was no agreement over compensation for a transfer. [...continues

He was not alone: Bosman in context

This chapter analyses the social, political, historical and economic context of the Bosman case. The chapter argues that Bosman needs to be understood as yet another stage of a continued process of commercialisation and transformation in European football. Football players fought to transform their employment conditions since the 1960s. Clubs questioned the legitimacy of UEFA to regulate European football and organise club competitions as they wanted a larger share of the commercial profits of the game. Finally, political institutions in Brussels started to exert pressure on football governing bodies to modify the international transfer system. The chapter argues that, taking these into account, major transformations in the governance and regulation structures of football were needed, and they would have happened even without the Bosman ruling. Consequently, Bosman cannot be seen, on its own, as the only cause of the transformation of modern football in Europe. Finally, the chapter dedicates some space to Jean Marc Bosman’s legal team composed by Luc Misson and Jean Louis Dupont. It was their legal expertise what made a challenge before the Belgian and European courts also possible

UEFA and the European Union: from confrontation to co-operation?

This article investigates the relationship between UEFA, as European football’s governing body, and the EU. It assesses the evolution of UEFA as a football governing body since the Bosman ruling (1995) until current initiatives such as the rules on locally-trained players (2005-2006). The paper traces the evolution of UEFA’s reactions to the increasing involvement of EU institutions in football matters, with special focus on the regulation of the players’ market. It is argued that UEFA’s attitude towards the EU has changed in the last ten years. Whilst the EU was seen as a threat for UEFA in 1995, it is now considered a ‘long term strategic partner’. Two main reasons can be identified for UEFA’s evolution. First and foremost, UEFA has been forced to accept the primacy of European law and its application to the activities of football organisations. UEFA has had no option but to adapt to the impact of European law and policies on its activities. This has lead to a relationship of ‘supervised’ autonomy between UEFA and the EU institutions. Second, UEFA’s strategic vision to preserve its own position within the governance structures of football. UEFA has tried to enhance its legitimacy within football’s governing structures by engaging in policy co-operation with EU authorities. This paper draws almost entirely on empirical research conducted through elite interviews and the review of official documents