Moral Status, Moral Value, and Human Embryos: Implications for Stem Cell Research

Human embryonic stem cells (ES cells) are of scientific and medical interest because of their ability to develop into different tissue types and because of their ability to be propagated for many generations in laboratory culture. Grown in a laboratory, they might one day be used in the treatment of degenerative diseases such as Parkinson’s and Alzheimer’s. They could provide bone cells for the treatment of osteoporosis, eye cells for macular degeneration, blood cells for cancer, insulinproducing cells for diabetes, heart muscle cells for heart disease, nerve cells for spinal cord injury. The potential for benefit to so many people is a strong argument for doing—and funding—embryonic stem cell (ESC) research. Yet ESC research is very controversial because the derivation of ES cells—at least at the present time—destroys the embryo. Thus, the morality of ESC research depends primarily on the morality of destroying human embryos, raising the question of the moral status of the human embryo

Payment for Egg Donation and Surrogacy

This article examines the ethics of egg donation. It begins by looking at objections to noncommercial gamete donation, and then takes up criticism of commercial egg donation. After discussing arguments based on concern for offspring, inequality, commodification, exploitation of donors, and threats to the family, I conclude that some payment to donors is ethically acceptable. Donors should not be paid for their eggs, but rather they should be compensated for the burdens of egg retrieval. Making the distinction between compensation for burdens and payment for a product has the advantages of limiting payment, not distinguishing between donors on the basis of their traits, and ensuring that donors are paid regardless of the number or quality of eggs retrieve

Wrongful Life and Procreative Decisions

This paper defends and refines the claim that procreation can be wrongful. Procreation is wrongful first when the nonexistence condition is met: the person\u27s life will be filled with suffering that cannot be ameliorated or empty of all the things that make life worth living. Recognizing that this condition is rarely met, the paper then argues that it is wrong to create a person in less extreme circumstances: when the person is likely not to have a minimaly decent life, one in which certain important interests cannot be satisfied. Although we must be very cautious about concluding that any particular impairment precludes a minimally decent life, there will be circumstances in which a future life is unlikely to hold a reasonable promise of containing the things that make human lives good. In these circumstances, and if reproduction is avoidable, we are required to forego reproduction altogether

The Morality of Killing Human Embryos

Embryonic stem cell research is morally and politically controversial because the process of deriving the embryonic stem (ES) cells kills embryos. If embryos are, as some would claim, human beings like you and me, then ES cell research is clearly impermissible. If, on the other hand, the blastocysts from which embryonic stem cells are derived are not yet human beings, but rather microscopic balls of undifferentiated cells, as others maintain, then ES cell research is probably morally permissible. Whether the research can be justified depends on such issues as its cost, chance of success, and numbers likely to benefit. But this is an issue for any research project, not just ES cell research. What makes the debate over ES cell research controversial is that it, like the debate over abortion, raises “questions that politicians cannot settle: when does human life begin, and what is the moral status of the human embryo?”1 This paper looks at several theories of moral status and their implications for embryo research

Designer Babies: Choosing our Children\u27s Genes

The phrase “designer babies” refers to genetic interventions into pre-implantation embryos in the attempt to influence the traits the resulting children will have. At present, this is not possible, but many people are horrified by the mere thought that parents might want to choose their children’s genes, especially for non-disease traits. I want to argue that the objections are usually not well articulated, and that even when they are, it’s far from obvious that such interventions would be wrong

Introduction by the Guest Editors

10.1353/asb.2016.0014Asian Bioethics Review83159-16