Le choix entre taxe unitaire et taxe ad valorem

In this paper, I propose a survey on the economic literature dealing with the balance between specific and ad vabrem taxation. Three lessons emerge from this literature. First, predominantly specific taxation leads to relatively high price and profits and a relatively low fiscal revenue. Second, no general rule indicate which type of taxation is the best instrument as this choice is closely link to the market structure and/or to the government's objective. Third, even if a lot of works have been done on this debate, there still exist many gaps to fill.L'objectif principal de cet article est de faire le point sur la littérature économique traitant du choix entre taxe ad valorem (taxe sur la valeur des ventes) et taxe unitaire (taxe sur le volume des ventes). Trois enseignements majeurs sont mis en évidence. Premièrement, une prédominance de la taxe unitaire conduit à des prix, des profits, une qualité relativement élevés, et une recette fiscale plutôt faible. Deuxièmement, il n'existe pas de règle générale permettant de statuer sur le choix du type de taxe à utiliser. En effet, ce choix est étroitement lié à la structure du marché étudié et à l'objectif poursuivi par le gouvernement. Troisièmement, même s'il y a eu beaucoup d'avancées, il existe encore de nombreuses zones d'ombres qui peuvent faire l'objet de travaux intéressants.Boldron François. Le choix entre taxe unitaire et taxe ad valorem. In: Revue française d'économie, volume 17, n°3, 2003. pp. 109-128

Commodity taxation with non linear pricing oligopoly

This paper studies commodity taxation when firms use two-part tariffs in model of competition A la Hotelling. Three kinds of taxes are considered: a specific tax, an ad valorem one on the subscription fee and an ad valorem one on the per usage fee. We first derive the equilibrium tariffs, market shares and profits. We show that the tax on the subscription fee is profit neutral (unlike the other two) but socially costly (like the other two) as it modifies the consumption choice of the consumers. In a context of costly public funds the ad valorem taxation on the variable fee dominates specific taxation. Moreover, the ranking between ad valorem taxation on the fixed fee and an ad valorem taxation on the variable fee depends on the relative magnitude of economic parameters, in particular the degree of differentation. Finally, we show that the government might prefer the use of two-part tariffs rather than the use of more general tariffs

Commodity taxation with non linear pricing oligopoly

This paper studies commodity taxation when firms use two-part tariffs in model of competition A la Hotelling. Three kinds of taxes are considered: a specific tax, an ad valorem one on the subscription fee and an ad valorem one on the per usage fee. We first derive the equilibrium tariffs, market shares and profits. We show that the tax on the subscription fee is profit neutral (unlike the other two) but socially costly (like the other two) as it modifies the consumption choice of the consumers. In a context of costly public funds the ad valorem taxation on the variable fee dominates specific taxation. Moreover, the ranking between ad valorem taxation on the fixed fee and an ad valorem taxation on the variable fee depends on the relative magnitude of economic parameters, in particular the degree of differentation. Finally, we show that the government might prefer the use of two-part tariffs rather than the use of more general tariffs.two-parts tariffs, commodity taxation

Relation verticale et régulation. Le problème des biens intermédiaires

Regulation and unregulated essential facility This paper shows that a regulator should not regulate a final product which industry is characterized by the need of an unregulated essential facility sold through non-linear tariffs. Two main reasons drive this result. First, the regulator maximizes social welfare and values more the final good production than the producer itself. Second, the regulator has access to an extra source of financing with the profits of the whole regulated sector.Cet article montre qu'un régulateur ne doit pas réguler une industrie nécessitant un bien intermédiaire essentiel non régulé et vendu par un tarif binôme. En effet, le régulateur maximisant le bien-être social sous contrainte budgétaire, il attribue une valeur plus importante à la production du bien final que le producteur lui-même. De plus, ce régulateur a accès à des fonds plus importants que le producteur grâce aux profits possibles de l'ensemble des activités régulées.Boldron François, Hariton Cyril. Relation verticale et régulation. Le problème des biens intermédiaires. In: Revue économique, volume 52, n°3, 2001. pp. 655-664

Relation verticale et régulation. Le problème des biens intermédiaires

This paper shows that a regulator should not regulate a final product which industry is characterized by the need of an unregulated essential facility sold through non-linear tariffs. Two main reasons drive this result. First, the regulator maximizes social welfare and values more the final good production than the producer itself. Second, the regulator has access to an extra source of financing with the profits of the whole regulated sector. Classification JEL : D82, L12, L51

Relation verticale et régulation. Le problème des biens intermédiaires

[fre] Cet article montre qu'un régulateur ne doit pas réguler une industrie nécessitant un bien intermédiaire essentiel non régulé et vendu par un tarif binôme. En effet, le régulateur maximisant le bien-être social sous contrainte budgétaire, il attribue une valeur plus importante à la production du bien final que le producteur lui-même. De plus, ce régulateur a accès à des fonds plus importants que le producteur grâce aux profits possibles de l'ensemble des activités régulées. [eng] Regulation and unregulated essential facility. . This paper shows that a regulator should not regulate a final product which industry is characterized by the need of an unregulated essential facility sold through non-linear tariffs. Two main reasons drive this result. First, the regulator maximizes social welfare and values more the final good production than the producer itself. Second, the regulator has access to an extra source of financing with the profits of the whole regulated sector.