Competition in Soccer Leagues

In the present paper a model of competition between sports clubs in a sports league is presented. Clubs are endowed with initial players but at a cost clubs are able to sell their initial players and buy new players. The results are that: if the quality of players is one-dimensional, then equilibria in pure strategies exist, and; if the quality of players is multi-dimensional, then there need not exist equilibria in pure strategies, but equilibria in mixed strategies exist. Equilibria in mixed strategies resemblance signings on deadline day in european soccer.competition between sports clubs; dimension of quality of players; equilibrium in pure strategies; equilibrium in mixed strategies

Financial Intermediation, Moral Hazard, And Pareto Inferior Trade

We consider a simple model of international trade under uncertainty, where production takes time and is subject to uncertainty. The riskiness of production depends on the choices of the producers, not observable to the general public, and these choices are influenced by the availability and cost of credit. If investment is financed by a bond market, then a situation may arise where otherwise identical countries end up with different levels of interest and different choices of technique, which again implies differences in achieved level of welfare. Under suitable conditions on the parameters of the model, the market may not be able to supply credits to one of the countries. The introduction of financial intermediaries with the ability to control the debtors may change this situation in a direction which is welfare improving (in a suitable sense) by increasing expected output in the country with high interest rates, while opening up for new problems of asymmetric information with respect to the monitoring activity of the banks. Keywords: Capital outflow, financial intermediaries, moral hazard JEL classification: F36, D92, E4

Competition in Soccer Leagues

In the present paper a model of competition between sports clubs in a sports league is presented. Clubs are endowed with initial players but at a cost clubs are able to sell their initial players and buy new players. The results are that: if the quality of players is one-dimensional, then equilibria in pure strategies exist, and; if the quality of players is multi-dimensional, then there need not exist equilibria in pure strategies, but equilibria in mixed strategies exist. Equilibria in mixed strategies resemblance signings just before the transfer window closes in european soccer. competition between sports clubs, dimension of quality of players, equilibrium in pure strategies, equilibrium in mixed strategies

Financial Intermediation, Moral Hazard, And Pareto Inferior Trade

We consider a simple model of international trade under uncertainty, where production takes time and is subject to uncertainty. The riskiness of production depends on the choices of the producers, not observable to the general public, and these choices are influenced by the availability and cost of credit. If investment is financed by a bond market, then a situation may arise where otherwise identical countries end up with different levels of interest and different choices of technique, which again implies differences in achieved level of welfare. Under suitable conditions on the parameters of the model, the market may not be able to supply credits to one of the countries. The introduction of financial intermediaries with the ability to control the debtors may change this situation in a direction which is welfare improving (in a suitable sense) by increasing expected output in the country with high interest rates, while opening up for new problems of asymmetric information with respect to the monitoring activity of the banks.Capital outflow; financial intermediaries; moral hazard

TRANSFERS AND GIFTS IN OG MODELS: MONETARY STEADY STATES

In the present paper the study of the welfare effects of endowment transfers is extended to the set of steady states of a general stationary overlapping generation model. A complete characterization of manipulations by coalitions and transfers which leads to welfare paradoxes is provided