Licensing under Cournot vs Bertrand competition

In this paper we consider, on one hand, a differentiated Cournot model, and, on the other hand, a differentiated Bertrand model, when one of the firms engages in an R&D process that gives an endogenous cost-reducing innovation. The aim of the present paper is two-fold. The first is to study the licensing of the costreduction by a per-unit royalty and a fixed-fee in these Cournot and Bertrand models. The second is to do a direct comparison between Cournot model and Bertrand model. We analyse the implications of these types of licensing contracts over the R&D effort, the profits of the firms, the consumer surplus and the social welfare. We show that some previous results for two-part tariff licensing are not robust, in the sense that they can be not true for just either a per-unit royalty contract or a fixed-fee contract. Furthermore, by using comparative static analysis, we conclude that the degree of the differentiation of the goods assumes a great importance in the results. We also discuss the optimal licensing, meaning that which licensing method is preferred, in each of the duopoly models considered.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Licensing by fixed-fee and two-part tariff in a differentiated Stackelberg model when the follower is the innovator

In the present paper we consider a differentiated-good Stackelberg model, when the follower firm engages in an R & D process that gives an endogenous cost-reducing innovation. The aim is two-fold: the first is to study the case when there is a technology transfer between the innovator and the non-innovator firm based on a fixed-fee licensing contract, and the second is to study the case when there is a technology transfer between the innovator and the non-innovator firm based on a two-part tariff licensing contract. The main result of the paper is that the degree of the differentiation of the goods is the key factor in the decisions of the innovator firm, influencing its licensing strategy. In particular, we find that for the innovator firm is better a fixed-fee or a two-part tariff licensing contract than no-licensing, even if the innovation is drastic. In the case of a fixed-fee licensing, the main variables of this duopoly model increase with the differentiation of the goods all the time. It turns out that in the case of a two-part tariff licensing, this conclusion does not fit all the time. The findings of this paper extend the literature on contract auctions when the innovating firm has different options for licensing its innovation.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Per-unit royalty and fixed-fee licensing in a differentiated Stackelberg model

In the present paper we consider a differentiated Stackelberg model, when the leader firm engages in an R&D process that gives an endogenous cost-reducing innovation. The aim is to study the licensing of the cost-reduction by a per-unit royalty and a fixed-fee. We analyse the implications of these types of licensing contracts over the R&D effort, the profits of the firms, the consumer surplus and the social welfare. By using comparative static analysis, we conclude that the degree of the differentiation of the goods plays an important role in the results

Licensing endogenous cost-reduction in a differentiated Stackelberg model

In this paper we consider a differentiated Stackelberg model, when the leader firm engages in an R&D process that gives an endogenous cost-reducing innovation. The aim is to study the licensing of the cost-reduction by a two-part tariff. By using comparative static analysis, we conclude that the degree of the differentiation of the goods plays an important role in the results. We also do a direct comparison between our model and Cournot duopoly model.ESEIG/IPP. Investing in people! Ph.D. scholarship, Investing in people! Ph.D. scholarship, Project co-financed by the Sectoral Operational Program for Human Resources Development 2007-2013 Priority Axis 1. Education and training in support for growth and development of a knowledge based society Key area of intervention 1.5: Doctoral and post-doctoral programs in support of research. Contract POSDRU/88/1.5/S/60185 - Innovative Doctoral Studies in a Knowledge Based Society, Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania

Comparison between different licensing schemes in a Stackelberg model when the follower is the innovator

In the present paper we consider a differentiated-good Stackelberg model, when the follower firm engages in an R&D process that gives an endogenous cost-reducing innovation. We assume that there can exist a technology transfer between innovator and non-innovator firm. The aim of this paper is three-fold: to do a comparison of the fixed-fee and royalty licensing cases, of the two-part tariff and royalty licensing cases, respectively of the two-part tariff and fixed-fee licensing cases, in order to state in which case is indicated for the innovator firm to license its technology. This comparison allows us to identify which licensing scheme is more profitable for the innovator (follower firm).info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) in a price-set competition between private and state-owned hotels

Environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) has emerged as a crucial concept in the business world, reflecting a growing recognition of the profound impact of corporate activities on the environment. We will study a model in which two hotels with different objectives must take decisions on environmental CSR policies and on room rates, considering the separation between ownership and management. We will discuss two cases: (i) the SO hotel takes the leader position; (ii) the FP hotel takes the leader position. The study was conducted using game theory techniques. The results allow us to conclude that by adopting environmental CSR, hotels are improving social welfare. In the case that SO hotel acts as a leader, we prove that both hotels adopt environmental CSR, whereas in the case of FP hotel acting as a leader, only the SO hotel (follower) adopts environmental CSR. In both cases, environmental CSR improves social welfare.Fernanda A. Ferreira and Flávio Ferreira thank the Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT, Portugal) for financial support by national funds FCT/MCTES to UNIAG (UIDB/04752/2020 and UIDP/04752/2020).info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio