A Review and Assessment of Privatization in Canada

Most privatizations in Canada occurred in the 10-year period from the mid-1980s to the mid1990s, and while many of the remaining candidates are both politically and economically problematic, the Harper government has signalled its renewed interest in more privatizations. This paper, written by two of Canada’s leading experts on the subject, comprehensively assesses hard data from the earlier privatizations in Canada, including sectors such as energy, transport and telecommunications. They find that the overall impacts have been largely positive, in many cases impressively so. Key economic indicators such as capital expenditures, dividends, tax revenues and sales per employee tended to increase, while others such as employment initially fell, only to rise again over the long term. Ultimately, most of the privatized firms continue to operate efficiently, making them positive contributors to Canadians’ social welfare through the provision of increased economic opportunities, higher profits and taxes. Drawing on lessons learned, the authors propose a common-sense framework to guide future privatizations and ensure all Canadians derive the maximum possible benefits from them. No Canadian government has ever formulated such a plan for a privatization regime, making this paper a must-read for anyone with a stake in the future of Canadian business

The Theory and Evidence Concerning Public-Private Partnerships in Canada and Elsewhere

The popularity of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), as a way for governments to get infrastructure built, continues to grow. But while the public is often led to believe that this is because they result in a more efficient use of taxpayer funds and a more streamlined process, this is not necessarily the case. In fact, the clearest advantage that PPPs offers is to politicians, who are able to transfer to private partners the risks of miscalculated construction costs and revenue projections (as with a toll road, for example). For taxpayers, the deals can often work out worse than if the government had simply pursued a fixedprice design-build Public Sector Alternative (PSA) arrangement. Even from the very start of the process, there are often a limited number of private consortia equipped to bid on major PPPs, which already leads to the potential for bidders to build in higher profits, and thus, higher costs for taxpayers. Nor are these private consortia oblivious to the risks they assume; they must therefore build into their bid an effective “insurance premium” to account for unforeseen delays and increased costs. The use of private debt to finance construction further inflates prices over a government’s lower cost of capital. To an incumbent government, a key advantage of PPPs is the ability to avoid upfront costs, and let the private consortium arrange financing until the project is complete, allowing politicians to take the credit for new infrastructure while passing future maintenance and operating costs off onto future politicians, taxpayers and/or users. This, however, only provides both the incentive and bookkeeping artifice — since costs are incurred off the government’s current balance sheet — for governments to build more infrastructure than might otherwise be justified. Advocates of PPP would argue that one clear benefit PPPs do offer the public is an impressive record of bringing in projects on time and on budget. It is true that the inflexibility of contracts and the financial risk transferred to the private partners have a powerful effect in keeping projects on track. However, the yardsticks by which the on-time and on-budget criteria are measured are typically flawed. The “start dates” of PPPs are marked after the conclusion of a lengthy negotiation and project-planning process between a government and a private consortium, making project completions seem more efficient than they really are. Meanwhile, the estimated cost of a project has a tendency to increase during that preliminary process. In other words, the delay and cost inflation that so often characterize traditional PSAs are not magically eliminated in a PPP: they just tend to occur prior to the first shovel breaking ground, rather than incrementally over the course of the project’s construction. Ultimately, several of the problems common to traditional government PSA projects, and supposedly absent from PPP arrangements, are still there, only much harder to discern. The costs can be just as high, if not higher than with a fixed-price PSA, the timeframes can be just as lengthy, when the entire process is accounted for, and the amount of government resources tied up in the negotiation and planning process will often rival that of traditional procurement methods. Furthermore, all those risks that are supposedly transferred to private players are never truly transferred: The government is always the residual risk holder should the consortium somehow fail. From a policy standpoint, the measure of whether PPPs are worthwhile should be based not on whether they come in on time or on budget, but whether they increase social value relative to a PSA. There is, currently, no convincing evidence that they do

Rapid realist review of the evidence : achieving lasting change when mental health rehabilitation staff undertake recovery-oriented training

Aim: To identify the factors contributing to lasting change in practice following a recovery-based training intervention for inpatient mental health rehabilitation staff. Background: Staff training may help nurses and other staff groups in inpatient mental health rehabilitative settings to increase their recovery-oriented practice. There are no published reviews on the effectiveness of such training and few long-term evaluations. This review informed a realist evaluation of a specific intervention (‘GetREAL’). Design: Rapid realist review methodology was used to generate and prioritise programme theories. Data sources: ASSIA, CINAHL, Cochrane Library, Medline, PsycINFO, Scopus, Web of Science and grey literature searches were performed in September 2014-March 2015 with no date restrictions. Stakeholders suggested further documents. GetREAL project documentation was consulted. Review methods: Programme theory development took place iteratively with literature identification. Stakeholders validated and prioritised emerging programme theories and the prioritised theories were refined using literature case studies. Results: 51 relevant documents fed into 49 programme theories articulating seven mechanisms for lasting change. Prioritised mechanisms were: staff receptiveness to change; and staff feeling encouraged, motivated and supported by colleagues and management to change. Seven programme theories were prioritised and refined using data from four case studies. Conclusion: Lasting change can be facilitated by collaborative action planning, regular collaborative meetings, appointing a change agent, explicit management endorsement and prioritisation and modifying organisational structures. Conversely, a challenging organisational climate, or a prevalence of ‘change fatigue’, may block change. Pre-intervention exploration may help identify any potential barriers to embedding recovery in the organisational culture

State Control and the Effects of Foreign Relations on Bilateral Trade

Do states use trade to reward and punish partners? WTO rules and the pressures of globalization restrict states’ capacity to manipulate trade policies, but we argue that governments can link political goals with economic outcomes using less direct avenues of influence over firm behavior. Where governments intervene in markets, politicization of trade is likely to occur. In this paper, we examine one important form of government control: state ownership of firms. Taking China and India as examples, we use bilateral trade data by firm ownership type, as well as measures of bilateral political relations based on diplomatic events and UN voting to estimate the effect of political relations on import and export flows. Our results support the hypothesis that imports controlled by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) exhibit stronger responsiveness to political relations than imports controlled by private enterprises. A more nuanced picture emerges for exports; while India’s exports through SOEs are more responsive to political tensions than its flows through private entities, the opposite is true for China. This research holds broader implications for how we should think about the relationship between political and economic relations going forward, especially as a number of countries with partially state-controlled economies gain strength in the global economy

Study of the distribution of Malassezia species in patients with pityriasis versicolor and healthy individuals in Tehran, Iran

BACKGROUND: Pityriasis versicolor is a superficial infection of the stratum corneum which caused by a group of yeasts formerly named pityrosporium. The taxonomy of these lipophilic yeasts has recently been modified and includes seven species referred as Malassezia. The aim of this study is to compare the distribution of Malassezia species isolated from pityriasis versicolor lesions and those isolated from healthy skins. METHODS: Differentiation of all malassezia species performed using morphological features and physiological test including catalase reaction, Tween assimilation test and splitting of esculin. RESULTS: In pityriasis versicolor lesions, the most frequently isolated species was M. globosa (53.3%), followed by M. furfur (25.3%), M. sympodialis(9.3%), M. obtusa (8.1%) and M. slooffiae (4.0%). The most frequently isolated species in the skin of healthy individuals were M. globosa, M. sympodialis, M. furfur, M. sloofiae and M. restricta which respectively made up 41.7%, 25.0%, 23.3%, 6.7% and 3.3% of the isolated species. CONCLUSIONS: According to our data, M. globosa was the most prevalent species in the skin of healthy individuals which recovered only in the yeast form. However, the Mycelial form of M. globosa was isolated as the dominant species from pityriasis versicolor lesions. Therefore, the role of predisposing factors in the conversion of this yeast to mycelium and its subsequent involvement in pityriasis versicolor pathogenicity should be considered