Real options, patents, productivity and market value: evidence from a panel of UK firms

Patents citations are a potentially powerful indicator of technological innovation. In this paper we describe the IFS-Leverhulme patents dataset that we have constructed by combining information from the US Case-Western Patent database with UK company accounts and share price information from the London Stock Exchange. Patents citations like patentc ounts, arehighly skewed and have a modal lag of four years. Analysing data on over 200 major British firms since 1968, we show that patents have an economically and statistically significant impacton firm-level productivity and market value. Patent citations contain more information than simple counts. A doubling in the stock of citation-weighted patents is associated with a four percent increase in (total factor) productivity and an eight percent increase in market value. As expected patenting and citation information feeds into market values immediately but appears to have some additional lagged effects of productivity suggesting gradual takeup of new technologies

Issues in the design and implentation of an R&D tax credit for the UK

R&D tax credits have become a popular policy tool for encouraging research and development (R&D) spending by business, with many countries offering subsidies of this form. The divergence between private and social rates of return to R&D expenditure by private firms provides one of the main justifications for government subsidies to R&D.2 In order to achieve the optimal level of R&D investment, government policy aims to bring private incentives in line with the social rate of return. An R&D tax credit does this by reducing the cost to the firm of doing R&D. Recent empirical evidence suggests that R&D tax credits are an effective instrument in stimulating additional R&D. However, in order to be desirable, a policy needs to be cost-effective and implementable. This Briefing Note reviews some of the major issues in the design and implementation of R&D tax credits. In Section 2, we briefly discuss the existing tax treatment of R&D in the UK. In particular, we outline the new Research and Development Allowance - which is an allowance for expenditure on plant, machinery and buildings for use in scientific research and which is available to firms of all sizes - and the tax credit for R&D that is available to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). We then discuss, in Section 3, some of the main design features of tax credits that have been implemented in other countries. The discussion mainly concerns the question of how to target new or incremental R&D so as to keep down the total exchequer cost. We discuss problems that arise in defining incremental R&D and how these can be tackled. In Section 4, we provide estimates of the amount of new R&D and the exchequer cost that would be likely to result from implementing different designs of R&D tax credit in the UK. Section 5 concludes. Some technical details are dealt with in the Appendix

Competition and innovation: an inverted U relationship

This paper investigates the relationship between product market competition (PMC) and innovation. A Schumpeterian growth model is developed in which firms innovate ‘step-by-step’, and where both technological leaders and their followers engage in R&D activities. In this model, competition may increase the incremental profit from innovating; on the other hand, competition may also reduce innovation incentives for laggards. This model generates four main predictions which we test empirically. First, the relationship between product market competition (PMC) and innovation is an inverted U-shape: the escape competition effect dominates for low initial levels of competition, whereas the Schumpeterian effect dominates at higher levels of competition. Second, the equilibrium degree of technological ‘neck-and-neckness’ among firms should decrease with PMC. Third, the higher the average degree of ‘neck-and-neckness’ in an industry, the steeper the inverted-U relationship between PMC and innovation in that industry. Fourth, firms may innovate more if subject to higher debt-pressure, especially at lower levels of PMC. We confront these four predictions with a new panel data set on UK firms’ patenting activity at the US patenting office. The inverted U relationship, the neck and neck, and the debt pressure predictions are found to accord well with observed behavior in the data