A very British national security state: Formal and informal institutions in the design of UK security policy

This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from SAGE Publications via the DOI in this record.What are the roles of government institutions in the design and implementation of effective national security policy? Using the case of post-2010 reform to Britain’s central government security policy machinery, we find that formal institutions can help the informal strategy-making institutions on their periphery to function better. Through interviews with 25 senior officials, we find that Britain’s National Security Council and quinquennial Strategic Defence and Security Reviews – both instituted in 2010 with the intention of improving UK security policymaking – remain limited as formal makers of national strategy. But the networks of individuals and ideas they support, by absolving some decision-makers of audience costs while immersing others in creative yet coherent strategy-development communities, have improved the overall quality of UK security policymaking compared to its pre-2010 condition. This finding also carries implications for other contexts and thus represents a promising avenue for future research

Uneven and combined development: convergence realism in communist regalia?

This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Taylor & Francis via the DOI in this recordLeon Trotsky’s notion of ‘uneven and combined development’ (U&CD) has been gaining traction as an explanatory theory of international relations over the past decade, notably in work by Justin Rosenberg and Alexander Anievas. The idea that the uneven sequencing of economic development between countries affects both their relative power relationships and domestic political stability, in particular, carries prima-facie intuitive plausibility. The potential consequences for international stability of such relative power shifts and domestic upheavals, furthermore, suggest that there may be significant explanatory payoffs from this line of investigation. At the same time, however, the U&CD intuition raises other questions about causal foundations and theoretical affiliations. What accounts for the sequencing of uneven development, for example? And how exactly do both relative power shifts and domestic political instability elevate war risks? This paper will address these lacunae, by demonstrating that – at the level of its underlying micro-foundations – U&CD can be understood as a compound of catch-up convergence growth theory and security-dilemma realism. Such a recognition paves the way, in turn, for a fruitful application of U&CD to contemporary questions in international politics

Roleplay, realpolitik and ‘great powerness’: the logical distinction between survival and social performance in grand strategy

This is the final version. Available on open access from SAGE Publications via the DOI in this recordStates exist in an anarchic international system in which survival is the necessary precursor to fulfilling all of their citizens’ other interests. Yet states’ inhabitants – and the policymakers they empower – also hold social ideas about other ends that the state should value and how it should pursue them: the ‘role’ they expect their state to ‘play’ in international politics. Furthermore, such role-performative impulses can motivate external behaviours inimical to security-maximization – and thus to the state survival necessary for future interest-fulfilment. This article therefore investigates the tensions between roleplay and realpolitik in grand strategy. It does so through interrogation of four mutual incompatibilities in role-performative and realpolitikal understandings of ‘Great Powerness’, a core – but conceptually contested – international-systemic ordering unit, thereby demonstrating their necessary logical distinctiveness. The argument is illustrated with brief case studies on the United States, China, France, the United Kingdom, Germany and Japan. Identification of such security-imperilling role motives thus buttresses neoclassical realist theory; specifically, as an account of strategic deviation from the security-maximizing realist baseline. Such conclusions carry important implications for both scholarship and statecraft, meanwhile. For once we recognize that roleplay and realpolitik are necessarily distinct incentive structures, role motives’ advocates can no longer claim that discharging such performative social preferences necessarily bolsters survival prospects too.Ohio State University’s Mershon Center for International Security StudiesUniversity of Exete

Power, polarity, and prudence: the ambiguities and implications of UK discourse on a multipolar international system

This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Taylor & Francis via the DOI in this recordWhat do UK policymakers mean when they say that Britain’s strategic environment is returning to “multipolarity”? In realist international theory, polarity is a specific causal concept; the number of powers capable of balancing even the most capable other state(s)in the international system (“poles”) is taken to determine the system’s stability. Does the post-2017 appearance of polarity references in British security policy documents therefore reflect some unexpected UK renaissance of realist thought? Or is something else going on, as recent work by Ben Zala (2017) suggests? This article will demonstrate that, while UK official usage of the “multip—” word has indeed flourished recently, the term is actually being used in a more elastic, less bounded way than realismprescribes in order to generate other kinds of political effect. Specifically, “polarity” (and its “multi-” prefix) is used to characterisethe behaviour of those major states that oppose Western-preferred international order, to elide Britain’s own relative power/status tensions, and to capture an expansivelaundry-list of perceived international dangers. The article then discusses five ways in which a shift in polaritycould negatively affect Britain; important consequences that merit preparatory contemplation, yet that an imprecise, catch-all understanding of “multipolarity” too readily obscures

Deterring Cyber Coercion: The Exaggerated Problem of Attribution

This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Taylor & Francis via the DOI in this record.Can cyberattacks be deterred? As the capability and associated damage potential of cyber weapons rises, this question will become ever more important to publics and their policymakers around the world. The principal obstacle to deterring cyberattacks via the threat of retaliatory punishment is usually taken to be such attacks’ ability to be made technically untraceable: absent a ‘return address’ for the aggression suffered, how could the victim of such an anonymous attack know where to direct its retaliation? Such concerns are overblown, however, for they conflate two distinct variables within the deterrence calculus: aggressor identity and aggressor interests. In fact, once cyberattack is understood as the coercive political act that it is, the ‘anonymity problem’ for cyber deterrence dwindles. This is because, in seeking to advance a cause via cyber coercion, an attacker must necessarily reveal a set of interests that it values. Such interests can then be held at risk by the party seeking deterrence, even if the attacker’s identity itself remains concealed

When does Competition become Conflict? Technology, Geography, and the Offense-Defense Balance

This is the final version. Available on open access from Oxford University Press via the DOI in this record.Is there a meaningful offense-defense balance of technological, geographical, and human factors that substantially affects war likelihood and severity? Key contemporary policy debates are certainly infused with the notion, from the dangers of crisis instability in East Asia to the possible first-move advantages of cyber weaponry. Defensive realist theory, meanwhile, raises the possibility of inferring intent from external posture choices. Yet for offensive realists, such signaling is a doomed hope, because of aggressors’ incentives to conceal their hostile intentions before turning extant military technology to offensive ends. This article suggests that both perspectives misstate the causal role of the offense-defense balance. Competition may be a general condition of international politics – but it only manifests itself as military conflict, defined as “cold” or ultimately “hot” war, under certain conditions. Specifically, the feasibility of advancing political goals via aggression rests on prevailing military technology, taken in its geographical context – that is, offense-defense calculations. Via three sub-theoretical cases – the “stopping power of water”, conventional blitzkrieg, and nuclear counterforce innovation – the article shows that the offensedefense balance affects conflict likelihood and severity even within offensive realism, specifically by affecting deterrence prospects. But this does not mean, as defensive realism posits, that the distinguishability of defense-dominance promises a route out of the security dilemma

Revisiting Insularity and Expansion: A Theory Note

This is the final version. Available on open access from Cambridge University Press via the DOI in this recordWhat is the relationship between insularity—a state’s separation from other states via large bodies of water—and expansion? The received wisdom, prominent in (though not exclusive to) realist theories, holds that insularity constrains expansion by making conquest difficult. We contend, by contrast, that this received wisdom faces important limits. Focusing on U.S. expansion via means short of conquest, we interrogate the underlying theoretical logics to demonstrate that insular powers enjoy two distinct advantages when it comes to expansion. First, insularity translates into a “freedom to roam”: because insular powers are less threatened at home, they can project more power and influence abroad. Second, insularity “sterilizes” power, which explains why insular powers are seen as attractive security providers and why we do not see more counterbalancing against them. On net, existing scholarship is correct to argue that insularity impedes conquest between great powers. Still, it has missed the ways that insularity abets expansion via spheres of influence abroad. One consequence is an under-appreciation for the role of geography writ large and insularity in particular in shaping contemporary great power behavior

Barriers and enablers to implementing ‘DEALTS2’ simulation-based train-the–trainer dementia training programme in hospital settings across England: a qualitative study.

Background Despite approaches to provide effective dementia training in acute care settings, little is known about the barriers and enablers to implement and embed learning into practice. We were commissioned by Health Education England to develop and evaluate a new dementia training intervention ‘Dementia training And Learning Through Simulation 2’ (DEALTS2), an innovative simulation toolkit to support delivery of dementia training in acute care across England. This study aimed to explore barriers and enablers experienced by trainers implementing DEALTS2 and extent to which it impacted on delivery of training and staff clinical practice. Methods We conducted twelve one-day DEALTS2 train-the-trainer (TTT) workshops across England in 2017 for National Health Service Trust staff employed in dementia training roles (n=199 trainers); each receiving a simulation toolkit. Qualitative data were collected through telephone interviews 6-8 months after TTT workshops with 17 of the trainers. Open ended questions informed by the Kirkpatrick model enabled exploration of implementation barriers, enablers, and impact on practice. Results Thematic analysis revealed six themes: four identified interrelated factors that influenced implementation of DEALTS2; and two outlined trainers perceived impact on training delivery and staff clinical practice, respectively: (i) flexible simulation and implementation approach (ii) management support and adequate resources (iii) time to deliver training effectively (iv) trainer personal confidence and motivation (v) trainers enriched dementia teaching practice (vi) staff perceived to have enhanced approach to dementia care. Trainers valued the DEALTS2 TTT workshops and adaptability of the simulation toolkit. Those supported by management with adequate resources and time to deliver effective dementia training, were likely to implement DEALTS2. Trainers described positive impacts on their teaching practice; and perceived staff had enhanced their approach to caring for people with dementia. Conclusions Trainers explained individual and organisational barriers and enablers during implementation of DEALTS2. The flexible simulation and implementation approach were key to supporting adherence of DEALTS2. To ensure wider implementation of DEALTS2 nationally, Trusts need to allocate appropriate time to deliver effective dementia training. Future research should measure staff behaviour change, patient perspectives of the intervention, and whether and how DEALTS2 has improved health and care outcomes

A Randomized Phase II Trial of Epigenetic Priming with Guadecitabine and Carboplatin in Platinum-resistant, Recurrent Ovarian Cancer

© 2020 American Association for Cancer Research Inc.. All rights reserved. Purpose: Platinum resistance in ovarian cancer is associated with epigenetic modifications. Hypomethylating agents (HMA) have been studied as carboplatin resensitizing agents in ovarian cancer. This randomized phase II trial compared guadecitabine, a second-generation HMA, and carboplatin (GþC) against second-line chemotherapy in women with measurable or detectable platinum-resistant ovarian cancer. Patients and Methods: Patients received either GþC (guadecitabine 30 mg/m2 s.c. once-daily for 5 days and carboplatin) or treatment of choice (TC; topotecan, pegylated liposomal doxorubicin, paclitaxel, or gemcitabine) in 28-day cycles until progression or unacceptable toxicity. The primary endpoint was progression-free survival (PFS); secondary endpoints were RECIST v1.1 and CA-125 response rate, 6-month PFS, and overall survival (OS). Results: Of 100 patients treated, 51 received GþC and 49 received TC, of which 27 crossed over to GþC. The study did not meet its primary endpoint as the median PFS was not statistically different between arms (16.3 weeks vs. 9.1 weeks in the GþC and TC groups, respectively; P ¼ 0.07). However, the 6-month PFS rate was significantly higher in the GþC group (37% vs. 11% in TC group; P ¼ 0.003). The incidence of grade 3 or higher toxicity was similar in GþC and TC groups (51% and 49%, respectively), with neutropenia and leukopenia being more frequent in the GþC group. Conclusions: Although this trial did not show superiority for PFS of GþC versus TC, the 6-month PFS increased in GþC treated patients. Further refinement of this strategy should focus on identification of predictive markers for patient selection